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Italy and the Sanusiyya: Negotiating Authority in Colonial Libya, 1911-1931
By Eileen Ryan
 In the first  decade of their occupation of the former Ottoman territories of Tripolitania 
and Cyrenaica in current-day Libya, the Italian colonial administration established a system of 
indirect rule in the Cyrenaican town of Ajedabiya under the leadership  of Idris al-Sanusi, a 
leading member of the Sufi order of the Sanusiyya and later the first  monarch of the independent 
Kingdom of Libya after the Second World War.  Post-colonial historiography of modern Libya 
depicted the Sanusiyya as nationalist leaders of an anti-colonial rebellion as a source of 
legitimacy  for the Sanusi monarchy.  Since Qaddafi’s revolutionary coup in 1969, the Sanusiyya 
all but disappeared from Libyan historiography as a generation of scholars, eager to fill in the 
gaps left by the previous myopic focus on Sanusi elites, looked for alternative narratives of 
resistance to the Italian occupation and alternative origins for the Libyan nation in its colonial 
and pre-colonial past.  Their work contributed to a wider variety of perspectives in our 
understanding of Libya’s modern history, but the persistent focus on histories of resistance to the 
Italian occupation has missed an opportunity  to explore the ways in which the Italian colonial 
framework shaped the development of a religious and political authority in Cyrenaica with 
lasting implications for the Libyan nation.    
 As a latecomer to the European “Scramble for Africa”, the Italian occupation of the 
Libyan territories has received little attention in Italian historiography or in larger works on late 
European imperialism.  The perception that the Italian colonial project in North Africa was too 
short and insignificant to merit serious analysis persists in Italian intellectual and public 
discourses, but the Italian occupation of the Libyan territories represented a critical moment of 
national formation in Italy.  Coming just four decades after the territorial unification of the 
Kingdom of Italy in 1870, the movement to invade the Libyan coast  and subsequent debates 
concerning methods of colonial rule reflected conflicting visions of the type of nation Italy 
should become as it  attempted to expand overseas.  In the years leading up to the invasion of the 
Libyan coast in 1911 and for the following decade, the Italian colonial administration largely 
adhered to a liberal ideal of indirect rule by appealing to Muslim elites even while the Occupying 
Forces engaged in a frequently brutal repression of armed rebellion.  The attempts of Italian 
administrators to negotiate a power-sharing system with Sanusi elites placed them in an 
international competition among imperial powers jockeying for influence in Muslim North 
Africa.  A perception of the Sanusiyya as a highly  centralized and powerful organization capable 
of calling on the loyalties of Muslims throughout the region inspired the Ottoman Sultan 
Abdulhamid II to arm the Sanusi zawāyā or religious centers at  the end of the nineteenth century 
in the hopes that the Sanusi elite would lead local populations against European expansion. 
Subsequent colonial administrations in the region courted the favor of the spiritual leader of the 
Sufi order, Ahmad al-Sharif, despite the widespread doubts concerning the extent and nature of 
his political authority among the region’s tribal leaders.    
 When it became clear that the recognized head of the Sufi order, Ahmad al-Sharif, would 
not lend his support  to pacifying the Cyrenaican interior, the Italian administration, with a strong 
push from British officials in Egypt, identified his cousin Idris al-Sanusi as an alternative 
intermediary who could generate consensus for Italian rule.  From 1916 until 1923, the Italian 
state cultivated Idris al-Sanusi’s authority by  providing him with armed forces and allowing him 
to adopt the symbols of government in a semi-autonomous emirate in the Cyrenaican interior.
  An invitation from a group of Tripolitanian notables for Idris al-Sanusi to extend his 
emirate into the western region precipitated the decision of the fascist Ministry of Colonies, 
Luigi Federzoni, to denounce previous negotiations with the Sanusiyya in 1923, and he 
expressed concerns that the Italian state had created a political authority where one did not exist, 
rewarded Italy’s enemies, and invested misplaced trust in a regional leader that proved unable or 
unwilling to generate consensus for Italian colonial rule.  Idris al-Sanusi left the Libyan 
territories for Cairo where he remained in exile until the United Nations placed him on the throne 
of the independent Kingdom of Libya.  With the departure of Idris al-Sanusi and the dissolution 
of the Sanusi emirate, Federzoni and his administration initiated a program of territorial 
expansion to fulfill the nationalist quest for land in the Libyan interior.  In the late 1920s, Italy 
initiated a series of brutal military campaigns culminating in the capture and hanging of the 
Sanusi shaykh Omar al-Mukthar in 1931.
 This dissertation explores the Italian approach to colonial rule in eastern Libya as a 
reflection of internal national struggles over the relationship between religious and political 
authority and as a formative moment in the political history of the Libyan nation.  
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Introduction 
 When Italian troops landed on the shores of the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania 
(Trabulsgarp) and Cyrenaica (al-Barqa) in what is today known as Libya in October 1911, 
officials in Rome expected the local populations to welcome them as liberators from Ottoman 
control.  The commanding officer of the Italian Occupying Forces, General Carlo Caneva, issued 
a series of proclamations in Arabic and Italian declaring Italy’s friendly intentions and promising 
to uphold local Islamic traditions.  The troops under his command, he claimed, were there, “not 
to subdue and enslave the populations of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and other countries of the 
interior, which are now under the bondage of the Turks, but to restore to them their rights, punish 
the usurpers, make them free and in control of themselves, and to protect them against those very 
usurpers, the Turks, and against any others who try  to enslave them.” 1   Caneva targeted his 
public declarations to Muslim notables in the region, and he promised them positions of 
authority within the colonial administration, the institution of shari’a law, and the recognition of 
waqf properties or religious endowments.  To encourage the peaceful submission of Muslim 
notables to the Italian state, Caneva emphasized the religiosity of the Italian population, a 
characteristic that, he claimed, would make the Italian administration a welcome change from 
Ottoman rule.2 
1
1 “non a sottomettere e rendere schiave le popolazioni della Tripolitania, della Cirenaica e degli altri paesi 
dell’interno, ora sotto la servitù dei turchi, ma a restituire loro i propri diritti, a punire gli usurpatori, a 
renderle libere e padrone di sé, ed a proteggerle contro gli usurpatori stessi, i turchi, e contro chiunque 
altro le volesse asservite.”  Ministero della Guerra, Stato Maggiore del Regio Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 
“Proclama del tenente generale Caneva alle popolazioni della Tripolitania, Cirenaica e regioni annesse - 
13 ottobre 1911,” Campagna di Libia (Rome: Poligrafico per l’Amministrazione della Guerra, 1922), 
357.
2 AUSSME L8/154/1, Caneva, “Agli Arabi della Tripolitania”, 15 January 1912. 
 Caneva’s proclamation reflected an attempt by Italian central authorities in Rome to 
institute what came to be known by its detractors as a “pro-Islamic” approach to colonial rule in 
the early years of their occupation of the Libyan territories.  Calling on the establishment of a 
system of indirect rule through the mediation of regional notables, advocates of this approach 
sought to leverage dissatisfaction with the modernizing tendencies of the political elite in 
Istanbul among Muslim notables in the Libyan provinces to negotiate a power-sharing system to 
ease the extension of Italian state control into the region’s interior.  
 In the eastern region of Cyrenaica, Italian officials focused these efforts on cultivating 
relationships with elite leaders of the Sufi ṭarīqa—way or order—of the Sanusiyya.  The Sanusi 
ṭarīqa developed in Cyrenaica in the mid- to late-nineteenth century under the spiritual guidance 
of the Sanusi family, a line of descendants from the recognized founder of the Sanusi order, 
Muhammad ‘Ali al-Sanusi.  The Sanusi family and a select group of their adherents built a 
network of zawāyā with the support of regional tribal leaders affiliated with their religious cause. 
The zawāyā served as centers for education, prayer, and resting points along caravan trading 
routes, and by the end of the nineteenth century, they stretched from Benghazi on the coast down 
to the northern edges of what is today  Chad and Sudan.  As the Sanusi ikhwān—or brothers—
spread a message calling for a return to the ways of the Prophet Mohammad among the Bedouin 
tribes of the Northern Sahara, state officials in the imperial centers of Europe and Istanbul eyed 
the expansion of Sanusi zawāyā as they tried to determine whether growing adherence to the new 
religious order signaled a threat to state authority or a possible ally in ruling the impenetrable 
interior of an increasingly important strategic area.  
2
 In the first decade of the twentieth century, Italian agents reached out to the grandson of 
Mohammad ‘Ali al-Sanusi and the recognized spiritual leader of the Sanusiyya, Ahmad al-Sharif, 
with the hope that he would help ease their eventual extension of commercial and state presence 
in the Libyan territories.  But they  were not alone in vying for his support; during the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, the Italians competed with Ottoman, French and British 
officials for an alliance with the Sanusi family by  sending emissaries with gifts of money, arms, 
and ammunition.  When the Ottomans won the support of Ahmad al-Sharif in military operations 
against the western border of Egypt in the First World War, Italian officials—with considerable 
encouragement from British authorities—identified an alternative Sanusi intermediary in Ahmad 
al-Sharif’s younger cousin, Idris al-Sanusi.  In a process of formal negotiations, Italian and 
British officials committed their resources to cultivating Idris as the official head of the Sanusi 
order and granted him and the tribes affiliated to the Sanusiyya the right to maintain armed 
forces.  The initial treaties between the Italian authorities and Idris limited Italian state presence 
in Cyrenaica to a few cities along the coast, and Italian officials celebrated the arrangement as 
contributing to the relatively  peaceful situation in Cyrenaica compared to the western region of 
Tripolitania where regional notables fought a fierce civil war amongst themselves and against the 
Italian state for political control of the region’s interior.  
 The negotiations began to fall apart when state officials looked to deepen Italian control 
in the Cyrenaican interior in collaboration with Idris al-Sanusi in the interwar era.  In 1920, they 
signed a treaty  establishing a semi-autonomous Sanusi emirate in the Cyrenaican interior in 
exchange for Idris al-Sanusi’s assistance in gaining the consensus of Cyrenaican tribal leaders for 
the expansion of Italian state authority and the development of transportation infrastructure in the 
3
region’s interior.  Over the next two years, the Italian-Sanusi alignment fell apart, and in January 
1923 Idris al-Sanusi left  for self-imposed exile in Egypt where he stayed until the United Nations 
named him as the first King of the independent Libyan monarchy in 1951.  In the years following 
the departure of Idris al-Sanusi, the fascist administration initiated a series of military campaigns 
to expand state control that lasted throughout the 1920s.  Italian troops—composed primarily of 
Eritrean soldiers—used increasingly harsh tactics to fight against  a loose and shifting coalition of 
Sanusi and tribal forces, and they finally declared the interior pacified in 1931 with the capture 
and hanging of the Sanusi military leader Omar al-Mukhtar.  
 The process of negotiations between Italian officials and Sanusi elites and the subsequent 
disintegration of their alliance has received widespread attention in scholarship on the Italian 
occupation of the Libyan territories, but both Italian and Libyan scholarship on the issue has 
tended to reflect the political concerns of their national historiographies.  Among Libyan 
historians, the weight of identifying national origins in anti-colonial resistance skewed 
scholarship  during the Sanusi monarchy  towards hagiographical accounts of the Sanusiyya as 
leaders of anti-Italian resistance.  After the coup that brought Muamar Qaddafi to power in 1969, 
Libyan historians turned the focus away from the Sanusi elite to depict  a less centralized populist 
account of anti-colonial resistance.  Either case led to a homogeneous view of the Sanusiyya and 
missed the variety of ways in which social and political groups deployed the name of the 
religious order in the shifting tribal, regional, and international alliances of the early twentieth 
century.  The occupation of the Libyan territories has attracted relatively little attention in the 
historiography of modern Italy.  The majority  of the work that  has been done on the Italian 
colonial project has tended to maintain a clear distinction between the political and social 
4
movements of the Italian peninsula and the events in the colonial territories; any connection 
between the two generally appears to follow a path from center to periphery, thus missing the 
ways in which the experiences of colonial rule in Libya shaped the Italian nation and the 
centrality of the colonial project in an emerging Italian nationalism. 
 This dissertation reexamines the relationship between Italian colonial state officials and 
the Sanusi family to consider how the attempt to incorporate the Sanusi elite within the Italian 
colonial system reflected the contested role of religion in the emerging national identities and 
political structures of the modern Mediterranean.  Widespread assumptions among officials in 
imperial centers from Paris to Istanbul posited a necessary connection between religious and 
political authority  in Muslim North Africa that informed the desire of Italian officials to establish 
an alliance with the Sanusi elite as a potential tool to generate consensus for Italian rule and 
promote a favorable image of Italy in the Muslim Mediterranean.  But Italian officials disagreed 
over the nature of the Sanusiyya as a political and/or religious organization and their capacity to 
generate consensus for state rule in the region, and the politically charged historiography of the 
Sanusiyya has done little to clarify  how the value of the Sanusiyya shifted as a religious 
movement, a proxy for state power, or as leaders of anti-state resistance during the colonial era. 
The popularity of the Sanusi flag as a symbol of nationalism and liberty in the anti-Qaddafi 
revolution pointed to the need to revisit the highly contested history of the Sufi ṭarīqa as a 
religious organization and a political force in the Libyan nation.  
 For Italian imperialists, debates over what they considered a pro-Islamic approach of an 
alliance with the Sanusiyya in the colonial state also reflected conflicting views of what kind of 
imperial power Italy should become and unresolved tensions concerning the proper role for 
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religion in Italian national identity.  Coming at  the end of decades of acrimonious relations 
between state officials and Catholic interest groups following the deposition of the Papal States, 
the popularity of the colonial wars in the Libyan territories accelerated the integration of 
Catholics into Italian national politics.  In the years leading up to the invasion, the Catholic press 
sold the colonial war as an opportunity to spread a Catholic brand of Italian civilization, and 
Church funds helped finance the increased Italian influence in North Africa.  As General 
Caneva’s quote indicated above, the influence of the Catholic Church did not necessarily run 
counter to a liberal ideal of creating systems of indirect rule through the mediation of Muslim 
elites; on the contrary, some Catholic nationalists argued that their religiosity placed them in a 
unique position to act as a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world.  But in the aftermath of 
the First  World War, the  inability of Idris al-Sanusi to gain consensus for increased Italian 
control over the Libyan interior  revealed the limitations of a facile reliance on his uncertain 
authority, and a growing alliance between Catholic and nationalist interests, galvanized by 
Mussolini’s first Minister of Colonies, Luigi Federzoni, pushed for what they considered the 
‘reconquest’ of the Libyan interior to make it into a fully  Italian space for demographic 
colonialism.   
 That the focus of this dissertation remains predominantly on the Italian colonial system 
reflects the nature of colonial state sources.  Ideally, this dissertation would incorporate a wide 
range of Libyan documents tracing how the position of the Sanusi family as religious, political, 
and financial elite shifted in relation to the social and political context of the Northern Sahara, 
but the difficulty of even entering Libya under Qaddafi’s regime and during a year of revolution 
prevented me from accessing more than a few documents from whatever source material might 
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remain in the Libyan state archives in Tripoli, in the national library in Benghazi, or in the Sanusi 
zawāyā of the Libyan interior.  Nevertheless, this project moves significantly  towards a goal of 
examining how the political authority and symbolic value of the Sanusiyya developed and 
shifted within the colonial system. 
  
Historiography of Italian Colonialism
 As a latecomer to the international competition for imperial influence, studies of the 
Italian colonial project have been absent from broader comparative works of the European 
“Scramble for Africa.”  Like Germany, the expansionist policies of Italy in African territories 
seemed too small, too short, and too late to warrant much attention in the post-World War II 
reckoning of twentieth century European aggression.  The focus on the Third Reich’s 
expansionist aspirations in Europe long overshadowed the earlier formation of German imperial 
ambitions in Africa, but in the past  fifteen years, a number of historians have drawn attention to 
the longer continuities in the drive for international dominance through the expansion of German 
interests in Africa as a testing ground for later military practices and a central component in 
Germany’s territorial ambitions in the twentieth century.3  Historians of modern Italy have been 
slower to recognize the centrality of colonial ambitions in the political and social movements of 
the late nineteenth and early  twentieth centuries, but the occupation of the Libyan territories 
merits further attention as a popular cause in the development of Italian nationalism and a 
symbol of contested visions for Italy’s future as a European power.   
7
3  Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, Liberal Imperialism in Germany: Expansionism and Nationalism, 1848-1884 
(New York: Berghahn, 2008).  Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of 
War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Sebastian Conrad, Globalisation and 
the Nation in Imperial Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
 A reluctance to open colonial archives and an overarching drive to ignore the 
international crimes of the fascist regime in Italy’s search for normalcy led to a general silence 
on Italy’s colonial history in the first three decades after the Second World War.4  In the absence 
of a critical investigation into Italy’s colonial past, popular memory conformed to the persistent 
myth of italiani brava gente, that is the characterization of the Italian people as good natured in 
contrast to German brutality in the twentieth century.  The idea of Italians as brava gente 
developed primarily around stories of individuals protecting Italian Jews from deportation, 
supposedly for humanitarian reasons.5   The myth extended to the colonial context as an 
explanation for the failures of Italian expansionism that perpetuated a popular image of Italian 
imperialists as bumbling, ineffective, and therefore relatively  harmless.  The idea that the failure 
to fulfill Italian imperial ambitions mitigated any damage they could have inflicted in the process 
of colonial expansion continues to shade public opinion on the significance of Italy’s colonial 
past.  
 In the 1970s, a handful of scholars began to correct these myths of national 
exceptionalism by turning attention to the violence and damage wrought in the name of Italian 
expansion.  In 1973, Giorgio Rochat published one of the first critical assessments of the human 
costs of Italy’s colonial wars in Africa based primarily on the private papers of military 
commanders found in the Italian state archives at a time when fascist military archives were 
8
4 Angelo Del Boca, “The Myths, Suppressions, Denials, and Defaults of Italian Colonialism,” in A Place 
in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Unification to the Present, Patrizia Palumbo, ed. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 18-19.
5 The idea of the Italians refusing to hand over Jews for humanitarian reasons persists in part to emphasize 
the cruelty of Germans.  See Davide Rodogno, Il nuovo ordine mediterraneo: Le politiche di occupazione 
dell’Italia fascista in Europa (1940-1943) (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2003), 400. 
inaccessible.6  The most widely recognized historian of Italian colonialism, Angelo Del Boca, 
also began writing about Italian colonialism in this early  period.  Credited with having provided 
the first historical examination of the archives of the Italian Ministry of Colonies, Del Boca’s 
multi-volume series of books on Italian colonialism in Libya and East Africa established detailed 
narratives of Italian imperialism with a focus on Italian crimes committed against  the Libyan 
people.7 Following the examples of Rochat and Del Boca, the numbers of scholars researching 
Italy’s colonial past grew steadily in the 1980s.  Their early  efforts brought much-needed public 
attention to the topic of Italy’s colonial past, but  with little more than cursory  attention to the 
local political and social contexts of Italian colonial rule—whether in Libya or East Africa—their 
works read as self-reflexive studies on the violent effects of expansionism that  pitted colonizer 
against colonized in a simplistic dichotomy.  
 The past two decades have witnessed an effort among scholars of Italian colonialism to 
overcome linguistic limitations and expand beyond the narrow confines of a national self-
reckoning.  Exposing Italy’s colonial crimes has continued to offer a potent topic,8 but historians 
have also branched out to examine a wider range of social, political, economic, and cultural 
aspects of the years of Italy’s occupation of the Libyan territories.  The publication of several 
edited volumes in English has provided a broad overview of the historiographical issues in the 
study of Italian colonialism to a general audience.  These works combine impassioned pleas for 
9
6 Giorgio Rochat, Il colonialismo italiano (Turin: Loescher Editore, 1973).
7 Angelo Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa orientale, 4 vols (Rome: Editori Laterza, 1976); Del Boca, Gli 
italiani in Libia, 2 vols (Rome: Laterza, 1986).
8 Angelo Del Boca, Le guerre coloniale del fascismo (Rome: Laterza, 1991); Lino Del Fra, Sciara Sciat: 
Genocidio nell’Oasi: L’esercito italiano a Tripoli (Rome: Datanews, 1995);  Nicola Labanca, ed. Un 
nodo: Immagini e documenti sulla repressione coloniale italiana in Libia.  (Manduria-Bari-Rome: Piero 
Lacaita, 2002).  
accountability for Italy’s colonial past with sample studies of cultural and social histories from 
Italian East Africa and the Libyan territories.9  Before the publication of these volumes, only  a 
few key studies in Italian foreign policy provided accounts of Italian colonialism in Libya in 
English, most notably the work of Richard Bosworth.10   The distinct focus on demographic 
colonialism in Italian expansionist themes inspired several early studies of Italian colonization 
schemes both in English and in Italian, and it continues to generate interest  within the context of 
Italy’s extraordinary emigration at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
centuries.11 
 The linguistic barriers to incorporating Libyan sources and historiography  into Italian 
studies of the colonial period have proven more difficult to overcome, but the scholarship of a 
number of individuals among a new generation of Italian scholars who have dedicated the time 
and energy to learn Arabic and travel to North Africa will define the next wave of scholarship  on 
Italian colonialism.  Though not proficient in Arabic himself, Nicola Labanca has proven a vocal 
advocate for a new generation of historians to foster cross-Mediterranean ties.  Labanca first 
10
9 See Patrizia Palumbo, ed. A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to 
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established his career as a military historian of Italian colonialism in studies that largely followed 
the methods of Giorgio Rochat and Angelo Del Boca in his Italian-centric approach,12 but he has 
lent his considerable weight in the hierarchies of the Italian academy to organize conferences and 
collaborative works in an attempt to bring Libyan and Italian scholars together in a common field 
of study.  His collaboration with Pierluigi Venuta made available the first comprehensive account 
in Italian of the Libyan historiography of the colonial period.13  Among this new generation of 
Italian scholars, Anna Baldinetti looms increasingly large for her ability to incorporate Arabic 
source material and engage an international field of discussion.  Baldinetti began her career with 
detailed studies of the early attempts of Italian agents in North Africa to establish ties with 
Libyan notables and gain consensus for the eventual occupation.14   Her awareness of broader 
trends in Middle East and Islamic studies distinguished Baldinetti’s early works from the 
majority  of Italian scholarship, but in her most recent study  on the development of Libyan 
nationalism among exiles during the Italian colonial period, Baldinetti demonstrated a 
remarkably  high comfort level with Arabic source material and Libyan historiography.  As one of 
the most recent publications on Libyan nationalism in English, Baldinetti stands poised to engage 
a broad international audience beyond the narrow confines of Italian national history.15 
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 Despite a consistent focus among Italian colonial administrators on the religion of 
colonial subjects and their attempts to develop  relationships with Muslim notables, few 
historians have examined the link between religion and politics in the Italian colonies of Libya. 
Cesare Marongiu Buonaiuti’s study on the use of religion as a political tool in all of the Italian 
colonies of Africa represents a rare example.  His analysis offers broad distinctions between the 
approach to colonial rule in East Africa and in the Libyan territories based on assumptions 
concerning the religious identities of the relevant populations.  However, his intent on 
distinguishing a fascist  mode of religious policies from the liberal predecessors overshadowed 
other regional, national, and international influences on the shifts in relations between the Italian 
colonial state and Muslim elites.  In the discussion of Italian relations with the Sanusiyya in 
particular, he demonstrated little awareness of internal divisions within the Sufi ṭarīqa or of the 
Sanusiyya within broader trends of Islam.16  Vittorio Ianari has published more recent volumes 
on Islam and Christianity  in the Libyan territories, and his work represents the only use I have 
seen of Italian missionary  archives.  But with a highly limited research focus, Ianari’s works 
failed to place the Italian colonial religious policies in a wider context either in the colonial, 
national, or international levels.17   
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Libyan Historiography of Resistance
 Historiography  in postcolonial Libya, like most  postcolonial states, has been driven by  an 
overwhelming focus on the imperatives of finding sources of resistance during the colonial era as 
a form of proto-nationalism.  During the Sanusi monarchy  (1951-1969), this imperative led to an 
exaggeration of the influence of the Sanusi elite during Libya’s colonial past.  As I will examine 
in more detail in the next chapter, the British anthropologist and official in the post-War British 
administration of Cyrenaica, E.E. Evans-Pritchard, published a highly  influential study that 
provided historical legitimacy for the Sanusi monarchy  to an international audience in 
preparation for the United Nations’ creation of the unified Libyan Kingdom under the Sanusi 
monarchy, and his work continues to shape the historiography of the Sanusiyya and modern 
Libya despite having been widely discredited as an example of scholarship in the service of 
European domination.  The Egyptian historian, Muhammad Fu’ad Shukri, served as a 
representative in the United Nations discussions on Libyan independence and subsequently 
wrote studies on the Sanusiyya that followed Evans-Pritchard’s lead in finding historical 
precedent for Sanusi leadership over a unified Libyan nation.  Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Ashhab, 
a descendent of a Sanusi ikhwān and a close adviser to Idris al-Sanusi, wrote studies of Libyan 
heroes of colonial resistance focused primarily on Sanusi notables like Idris and Omar al-
Mukhtar.  The pro-Sanusi literature looked for pre-colonial foundations for Sanusi political 
authority in the nineteenth century and characterized the Sufi order as leaders of an anti-colonial 
resistance and a natural source of unity in the formation of a Libyan nation.18   
 Since the coup that brought Qaddafi to power in 1969, the new regime sponsored 
historical scholarship  that  condemned Idris al-Sanusi and the Sanusi family as collaborators with 
Italian and British colonial officials.  The Libyan armed forces released three volumes of 
documents exposing the Sanusi family’s ties to international organizations as a depiction of their 
betrayal of the Libyan nation for their personal gain.19  As I will examine in more detail, the 
Qaddafi regime and the newly minted Libyan Studies Center in Tripoli began collecting oral 
histories from former mujahidin who fought against Italian state expansion throughout the 
Libyan territories as an effort to create a new archive that gained a wider perspective on popular 
involvement in anti-colonial resistance and countered official Sanusi interpretations of 
centralized leadership during the colonial era.  The oral histories turned away from the earlier 
focus on nationalist heroes and provided more complex social, political, and economic 
interpretations for the motivations behind individual decisions to resist the colonial state.  
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 The end of the Sanusi monarchy  inspired scholars in Europe and the United States to 
broaden the historical lens beyond the previous myopic focus on the leadership of the Sanusi 
elite in colonial Libya.  The number of publications on modern Libyan history increased in the 
1990s.  Both Lisa Anderson and Ali Abdullatif Ahmida examined sources of national and 
regional identity  beyond the involvement in anti-colonial resistance of religious affiliations. 
Anderson examined political structures while Ahmida looked for regional economic and social 
ties that predated the colonial era as the foundation for the formation of national identity.20 
Knut Vikør’s use of early  Sanusi writings tends to portray  a hagiographic view of the early years 
of the Sanusiyya as a religious order, but his study is valuable in that it escaped the teleological 
approach of post-independence literature that read a militant anti-European program into the 
beginnings of the Sanusiyya.  By  making a distinction between ‘the political’ as an intellectual 
opposition to political forces and ‘the political’ as a formation of structures that  set the conditions 
for later opposition to political forces, Vikør avoided a common problem in colonial sources that 
posited a necessary link between the political and religious in Islam.  Though Vikør disputed the 
intellectual underpinnings for a politicization, anti-colonial, or nationalist movement in the 
Sanusiyya, he did argue that  the Sanusiyya created the beginnings of a political structure in the 
nineteenth century through this network of zaw.  Vikør argued that the Sanusiyya transformed 
from its beginnings as a religious organization into a political structure over the course of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  “This happened through the merging of the spiritual 
particularity  of the Sufi brotherhood with the ethnic identity  of the Saharan beduin and 
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neighboring peoples into an entity that  some may call a proto-nationalistic movement.”21  Since 
he did not explain how this process unfolded, we are left to assume that  the process followed the 
patterns E.E. Evans-Pritchard described in The Sanusi of Cyrenaica according to which the 
Sanusiyya became a political structure by embedding themselves within regional Bedouin tribes, 
and they became political leaders through the opposition to colonial rule.22  
 As valuable as these contributions have been to broadening our understanding of the 
political and social alliances at work throughout Libya during the Italian occupation, they have 
avoided the thorny issue of the position of the Sanusiyya during the colonial era and led 
thoughtful.  Otherwise thorough historians have tended to revert to simplistic understandings of 
the Sanusiyya as leaders of a resistance movement or dismiss the Sanusi elite as colonial 
collaborators with no part in the formation of Libyan nationalism.  In the historiography of 
Italian colonialism in Libya, the colonial state’s relationship to the Sanusiyya remains the most 
frequently mentioned but least understood element in the Italian approach to native policy in the 
Libyan territories.    
Historiographies in Conversation
 This dissertation represents an attempt to examine the Italian occupation of the Libyan 
territories within the broader trajectories of both Italian and Libyan national histories by bringing 
together historiographic traditions and documents from Italian, French, British, and—to a 
necessarily limited extent—Libyan archives.  The primary narrative of the dissertation centers on 
the process of negotiations between the Italian colonial authorities and Idris al-Sanusi to 
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establish a semi-autonomous Sanusi administration in support of Italian claims to sovereignty in 
the Cyrenaican interior during and in the years immediately after the First World War.  My 
research builds on secondary  literature on the Italian occupation of the Libyan territories, but it 
arrives at a deeper level of detail in the narrative of Sanusi-Italian negotiations to generate new 
perspectives on the contested nature of political and religious authority within the Sanusiyya in 
relation to the Italian colonial state.  In a turbulent  political and economic context marked by 
Italian occupation and international competition for control over the Cyrenaican interior, Sanusi 
elites struggled over the direction of the Sanusi ṭarīqa, access to resources, and control over 
regional trade routes, and at times they gained strategic advantages through alliances with 
European powers in the region.           
 My focus on divisions among the Sanusi elite within an international contest for a Sanusi 
alliance throws the conditional nature of Sanusi authority in the colonial era into sharper relief. 
As local intermediaries, the Sanusi family  relied on the patronage of centralized powers for the 
influx of military and financial resources that aided the rapid extension of the influence of the 
Sufi ṭarīqa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  But the position of the Sanusiyya 
also depended on the ability of Sanusi elites to generate consensus among tribal leaders of the 
Cyrenaican interior.  This dependence came into distinct  focus in the collapse of the alliance 
between the Italian colonial authorities and Idris al-Sanusi resulting from their failed attempt to 
extend Sanusi-Italian control with associated infrastructural development projects into the 
Cyrenaican interior with the Treaty of Regima in 1920-1922.  The breakdown of the Sanusi 
administration and the Italian renunciation of agreements with the Sanusi family  in 1923 
reflected the inability of Idris to secure the acceptance of a coalition of tribal leaders in western 
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Cyrenaica for an extension of the power-sharing system beyond the territorial limits defined in 
their original agreements in Acroma in 1917.  The failure to generate consensus for the Regima 
Accords demonstrated that the ability of Idris to act as a local intermediary was contingent on the 
perception that his arrangement with the Italians acted as a firm restriction against the expansion 
of the Italian colonial state, the possibility  of Italian mass colonization, and associated risks to 
the financial stability  of tribes whose dominance in regional trade patterns stemmed from their 
control over access to camels and water supplies.  When Idris al-Sanusi indicated his willingness 
to assist the Italian state in extending railway lines into the Cyrenaican interior, he lost the crucial 
support of tribal leaders and Sanusi elites who had previously championed the Sanusi 
administration as a form of regional autonomy and a source of protection against state demands.
 The idea that the Sanusi family—and Idris in particular—negotiated a position as local 
intermediaries by balancing the demands and resources of central authorities and regional tribal 
leaders may seem self-evident, but it merits attention as a corrective to the persistent tendency of 
scholars to assume a uniformity in the Sanusi ṭarīqa and a related lack of awareness concerning 
the dependency of the Sanusi family on a network of alliances with tribal leaders and powerful 
Sanusi shaykhs throughout the region.  I began my research hoping to generate a more complete 
social and political history of the Sanusiyya within regional tribal and economic systems, but 
such an endeavor would require the sort of documents this author has not been able to access, 
documents most likely held in the Sanusi zawāyā in the Libyan interior blocked by travel 
restrictions during the Qaddafi era and by the residual violence of the anti-Qaddafi rebellion 
since February 2011.  This study  relies primarily on colonial documents, and in so doing, it does 
not escape the framework of the colonial state.  As much as possible, however, I try  to amplify 
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the voices of Sanusi elites as actors in regional and international politics and as participants in 
the Italian colonial system, and the narrative I establish in the following chapters highlights the 
influence of several key  tribal leaders and Sanusi military commanders in the opposition to an 
expansion of Italian control in conjunction with Idris al-Sanusi.  My work goes further than 
previous studies of the Sanusiyya and the Italian colonial occupation to explore the relationships 
between Sanusi elites and regional tribal leaders as an underlying network of alliances and 
rivalries that shaped the development of a Sanusi political authority in connection to the Italian 
colonial state.
 Nevertheless, Italian state officials retain a dominant position in the narrative of this 
dissertation as they engaged in the messy work of arranging systems of colonial rule in response 
to pressures from domestic expectations, international competition, and disputed understandings 
of local culture and politics.  This dissertation de-emphasizes the division between the liberal and 
fascist administrations in Italy as a causal factor in the disintegration of the alliance between the 
Italian colonial state and Idris al-Sanusi both as a way  to bring attention to the dependence of 
Sanusi authority  on the support of regional power brokers and as a reflection of continuities I 
found in the discussions among Italian official and semi-official actors concerning the benefits 
and risks associated with using a Sanusi intermediary  to generate consensus for Italian state 
control.  
 Of course, there were definite turning points in the direction of the Italian colonial 
administration of the Libyan territories associated with the rise of a political class committed to a 
nationalist agenda of territorial expansion.  The 1922 March on Rome preceded the renunciation 
of accords with Idris al-Sanusi by a few short months and brought the nationalist leader and 
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outspoken advocate of aggressive colonial expansion Luigi Federzoni to the position of the 
Minister of Colonies.  Despite the renunciation of previous agreements with the Sanusi family, 
Federzoni’s administration continued to toy with the idea of resuming negotiations with either 
Idris al-Sanusi or Ahmad al-Sharif and retained officials from the previous administration with 
experience and expertise in dealing with the Sanusi elites.  Mussolini’s visit to the Libyan 
territories in 1926 signaled a more decisive turn away  from negotiations with regional notables 
and the initiation of a period of intensified military operations to gain control of the Libyan 
interior, but the extension of a combination of state and private capital influence into the interior 
of the region from the narrow positions on the coast remained a constant  objective between the 
liberal and fascist administrations.  The key difference lay in the willingness and the ability of 
the fascist  administration to resort to brutally repressive measures against Libyan populations, 
regardless of their involvement in armed rebellions against Italian forces.  Most colonial officials 
in the liberal administration saw their negotiations with regional elites—especially  Idris al-
Sanusi—as a temporary  measure that would eventually  give way  to the development of a strong 
state presence in the region.  The end goals of the fascist colonial administration—to extend state 
presence into the interior and build infrastructure for the realization of mass settlement plans for 
Italian emigrants—had always been at  the center of popular support for the colonial project in 
the Libyan territories.  After 1922, the brakes came off as colonial administrators discredited the 
utility  or necessity  of a Sanusi intermediary and central authorities devoted increased resources 
to military operations to accelerate the process of state expansion and Italian settlement.  
 Throughout the dissertation, I bring archives from Italian Catholic missionaries in the 
Libyan territories into the narrative as indicative of how the attempt to formulate models of 
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colonial rule in a Muslim society fit into broader conflicts over the relationship  between Church 
and state in an emerging sense of Italian nationalism.  The impression that consensus for colonial 
rule required the support and moral authority of Muslim elites like the Sanusi family reflected 
conventional models of civilizational progress in North Africa as dependent on religious belief 
for political control and the widespread assumption of a necessary  connection between religious 
and political authority in Islam.  The Italian state’s corresponding restrictions on missionary 
activities also fit into trends in European colonial rule in North Africa as an attempt to promote 
an image of religious tolerance to diminish local opposition.  But for Italy, a rising tide of 
Catholic influence in national politics amplified the issue of religious identity in the expansion of 
the colonial state.  Missionaries in the Libyan colonies were on the frontier of a rising focus in 
the connection between Italian nationalism and the Catholic Church in Italy’s expansion abroad.
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Chapter 1: Remembering the Sanusiyya in Libyan National History
 When demonstrations broke out against Qaddafi’s regime in eastern Libya in February 
2011, the flag of the pre-Qaddafi Libyan monarchy suddenly  appeared on television screens, the 
internet, and front  pages of newspapers around the world as the rebellion’s most prevalent 
symbol.  A council of elite Libyans first adopted the red, black, and green flag as a symbol of 
national unity and independence in 1951 when the United Nations established the Kingdom of 
Libya following Italy’s loss of its North African territories in World War II.  In creating the new 
nation, the United Nations joined three regions—Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan—that had 
been governed as distinct districts by  both the Ottoman Empire and the Italian colonial 
administration.  The United Nations named as the first King of Libya Idris al-Sanusi, a British 
ally known as the head of the Sufi ṭarīqa—way or order—of the Sanusiyya that had a wide 
network of adherents stretching from Benghazi down into Wadai when the Italians invaded in 
1911.  The flag’s central black band with a white crescent and star recalls the flag the Sanusiyya 
flew during the Italian colonial occupation.  
 Although there does exist a small pro-monarchy component to the opposition forces that 
toppled the Qaddafi regime, the adoption of the flag as the symbol of the rebellion and the post-
Qaddafi government does not indicate a widespread desire for a return to the monarchy or the 
leadership of the Sanusi family; rather, it speaks to nostalgia for the relatively peaceful period 
Libya enjoyed immediately after it gained independence, an oasis of stability in a long century 
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marked by  colonial occupation, war, and revolution.23  The flag of the monarchy also sent a 
message of defiance to Qaddafi by  highlighting a part of Libya’s past that  he actively suppressed. 
After World War II, British and Libyan scholars had a vested interest in promoting an image of 
Idris al-Sanusi and the Sanusiyya as leaders of a centralized, nationalist, anti-colonial resistance 
as a source of legitimacy for the post-independence government.  Following the coup that 
brought Qaddafi to power in 1969, his regime sought to delegitimize Idris al-Sanusi as a leader 
of a nationalist movement during the colonial period by encouraging scholarship  that depicted 
him as an opportunist  collaborator in the European colonial project, but memories of Sanusi 
involvement in armed struggles against the Italian state persisted especially  in the figure of the 
Sanusi shaykh ‘Umar al-Mukhtar.  The use of the Sanusi flag as the symbol of the anti-Qaddafi 
rebellion provides an opportunity to reexamine these conflicting images of the Sanusiyya in 
Libya’s national history.
 This chapter begins with an examination of the anti-Sanusi historiography  of the Qaddafi 
regime as a starting point  for a re-examination of the history of the Sufi ṭarīqa in modern Libya. 
Following a general movement in postcolonial historiography in the 1960s and 70s, Libyan 
historians recorded oral testimonies from former mujahidin—soldiers who had fought against the 
Italian occupation—from around the country to establish an alternative archive with the potential 
to generate a broader social history of the region during the colonial era.  The Oral History 
Project and the historiographic traditions it typified offered a correction to the myopic focus of 
previous scholarship on the elite leadership of the Sanusiyya, and it  continues to provide 
valuable source material for local histories.  I argue, however, that it must be read against the 
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political imperatives of the Qaddafi regime as an attempt to canonize popular narratives of 
resistance and erase the Sanusi family from Libyan national history.  Much remains to 
understand concerning development of the Sanusiyya as a religious and political authority  during 
the colonial era.   
 The second part of this chapter looks at representations of the Sanusiyya and anti-colonial 
resistance in the pre-Qaddafi historiography.  Fitting with general trends in postcolonial African 
historiography and the interests of the Sanusi monarchy, scholarship of the 1950s and 60s told 
the stories of Sanusi notables as national heroes and natural leaders of a monolithic anti-colonial 
resistance movement.  A monograph by  the British anthropologist E.E. Evans-Pritchard set the 
course for this literature; Evans-Pritchard naturalized the post-independence monarchy by 
finding roots for Sanusi political leadership in the nineteenth century.  Relying on French and 
Italian colonial sources and in direct support of British geopolitical aims, Evans-Pritchard 
attributed the Sanusiyya with developing state structures in the mid-nineteenth century  as an 
integral part of the pre-colonial social and political landscape.  European and American 
scholarship, citing Evans-Pritchard as their primary source, perpetuated the characterization of 
the Sanusiyya in the nineteenth century as a Saharan state financed by  their involvement in trade 
routes and directly responsible for governing the Bedouin tribes of the Libyan desert leading to 
an overemphasis on the Sanusi elites to the neglect of other social, economic, and political 
factors that shaped modern Libyan history.  
 Starting in the 1990s, a growing cadre of scholars has tried to correct the overemphasis 
on Sanusi leadership by examining other factors in the political, religious, and social landscape 
of the Libyan territories in the nineteenth century and the colonial era.  Using a small pool of 
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evidence, historians have been slowly  filling in the gaps by pointing to the involvement of 
Ottoman officials, notables in Tripolitania, and the activities of Libyans in exile in the 
development of Libyan nationalism and anti-colonial resistance.24  Discussions of the Sanusiyya, 
however, continue to rely on a shaky scaffolding of secondary literature with Evans-Pritchard at 
the center.  Scholars continue to focus on finding a point of transition when the Sufi ṭarīqa 
changed from a religious mission to a political-military organization.  Assuming a strict  division 
between the two, this focus misses the opportunity to examine the mutually  constitutive nature of 
religious and political authority in a context of restricted access to resources.  
 In the final section of this chapter, I bring this scholarship together to examine what we 
know about the Sanusiyya as a religious, economic, and social force in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  This chapter moves backwards through time to find the origins of the 
idea of a Sanusi state in nineteenth century  literature by French explorers and imperialists who 
greatly exaggerated the influence of the Muslim notables in the region with little conception of 
how the Sufi ṭarīqa fit into a wider framework of regional political, economic, and tribal 
alliances.  Recent research in the Ottoman archives suggests that almost as soon as the Sanusiyya 
began to develop as a religious mission, Ottoman and European states competing for the 
opportunity to present themselves as protectors of the Muslim world began to send weapons and 
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funds to Sanusi centers, turning Sanusi zaw into arms depots and military  training grounds.  This 
research suggests the futility  in looking for a transition point in the Sanusiyya from a religious to 
a political-military organization, but the widespread characterization of the Sanusiyya as a state 
within a state has oversimplified the complex nature of the relationships among centralized 
imperial authorities, the Sanusi elite, and the regional tribes who claimed adherence to the Sanusi 
ṭarīqa and, at times, used their weapons for or against state power.
 I will not attempt to generate a detailed analysis of the social and political history of the 
Sanusiyya at this point; the opacity of the sources hardly allows the historian to scratch the 
surface.  For now, it is more important to examine the stakes involved in how the Sanusiyya have 
been represented in terms of their position in Libyan society  and their relationships with the 
Italian colonial administration.  Competing perceptions of the Sanusiyya as a religious, political, 
or militaristic anti-European organization dominated Italian discussions over the possibilities of 
establishing a power-sharing system under Sanusi leadership in Cyrenaica.  As I will demonstrate 
in subsequent chapters, arguments concerning the relative merits of a Sanusi alliance often rested 
on imperfect understandings of their religious beliefs and practices and their relationship to the 
Ottoman state, and the echoes of this colonial literature on the Sanusiyya continue to inform 
historical analysis of the position of the Sanusi elite in Libya’s national history.  What image of 




The Legacy of the Sanusiyya in Qaddafi’s Regime and the Oral History Project
 Following the coup that brought him to power in 1969, Qaddafi’s regime promoted a 
reinterpretation of the history of the colonial period that delegitimized the political authority of 
Idris el-Sanusi by identifying the Libyan anti-colonial resistance as a movement originating from 
the Libyan people without Sanusi leadership.  During Qaddafi’s regime, the Libyan Studies 
Center in Tripoli took on a central role in this reinterpretation.   Founded in 1977 by Muhammad 
Jerary, a Libyan native with a PhD from Northwestern University, the title of the Center in 
Arabic was first Markaz Dirāsat li-Jihad al-Libin dhad al-Ghazū al-Itali or the Center for the 
Study of the Libyan Struggle Against the Italian Invasion.  In 2009, the name changed to the 
Markaz al-Watanī lil Mahfuthāt wa al-Dirāsāt al-Tārīkhiya, or the National Center for Archives 
and Historical Study.  The change in title accompanied an expansion of the Center’s facilities and 
its growing importance as a depository  for primary and secondary sources on Libyan history 
beyond the colonial period. 
 As its first major act, the new Libyan Studies Center in Tripoli launched an Oral History 
Project (al-Riwayāt al-Shafawiyya) in 1978 with the goal of recording oral interviews about anti-
colonial resistance in Libya with people who took up arms against the Italian occupation.  The 
project followed general trends in African studies which in the 1960s and 70s looked to oral 
sources as a means of escaping the history of elites found in the colonial archives following 
Dike’s innovative use of oral sources in his work on the social and political history of Nigeria. 
Recognizing the weight of oral evidence in Islamic culture, the turn to oral sources accelerated in 
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Islamic Africa in the 1970s.25  The Libyan Studies Center inaugurated the Oral History Project at 
the tail-end of this trend and in the process, created an archive with alternative narratives of 
resistance that focused on the stories of individual mujahidin and local histories instead of the 
leadership of Sanusi elites.   
 To oversee the project, Jerary  invited his former professor from Northwestern University, 
the emminent Africanist  and oral historian, Jan Vansina.  Though he had little experience in 
North Africa and little familiarity with the Arabic language, Vansina spent about six months in 
Tripoli where he trained seventeen high school teachers to conduct interviews and helped them 
develop a list of questions to guide the conversations.  Vansina and his team divided Libya into 
fourteen regions, and they traveled throughout the country to interview men (and a few women) 
who had been identified as former mujahidin in the struggle against  Italian colonial occupation. 
The interviewers recorded their conversations on cassette tapes, many of which have been 
translated from highly localized dialects into standard Arabic and transcribed into over twenty 
volumes published by the Libyan Studies Center and housed in their library.  Unfortunately, 
reading the transcriptions instead of listening to the recordings places an extra interpretive layer 
between the researcher and the original source, but the use of local dialects make the recordings 
inaccessible to any but a very  small handful of historians.  The staff at the Libyan Studies Center 
have told me that even urban Libyans find the dialects of the mujahidin so difficult to understand 
that the process of transcribing them continues to this day.         
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 Jan Vansina wrote about his involvement in the Oral History Project in his memoirs, 
Living With Africa, and I had the opportunity to ask him for more details in a personal interview 
in 2007.  In both instances, Vansina agreed with the general thrust  of the Qaddafi-era 
historiography in its rejection of the centrality of the Sanusi leadership in the anti-Italian armed 
resistance.  Vansina claimed that  the interviews contradicted accounts of the Sanusiyya as central 
leaders of a nationalist  resistance movement by demonstrating that anti-colonial resistance arose 
organically  in highly localized manifestations that the leaders of the Sanusiyya then usurped for 
personal gain.  He along with the staff of the Libyan Studies Center intended the Oral History 
Project to provide “a history of the people, for the people” as a divergence from previous 
narratives of resistance that focused on elite leaders as national heroes.26  In this sense, the Oral 
History Project followed Qaddafi’s general message of social empowerment and localized power 
as part of his revolutionary agenda to establish direct popular democracy.
 The Oral History  Project created an archive of individual memories and popular 
interpretations of resistance in post-colonial Libya, and the collection’s detailed descriptions of 
individuals’ involvement in particular battles have the potential to contribute to our 
understanding of the political and military  landscape during the Italian occupation.  However, the 
stories in the Oral History Project must be read against the political imperatives of the Qaddafi 
revolution during a time when an institution like the Libyan Studies Center required the approval 
of the regime to receive funding and continue its mission of supporting historical research in 
Libya’s colonial past.  In creating a new lexicon of national heroes, the transcribed volumes of 
the Oral History  Project  failed to explain how they  identified the anti-colonial mujahidin, thus 
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eliding the complexity of the colonial past and the political consequences of claiming a legacy of 
resistance, and the format of the interviews contributed to a certain standardization of their 
accounts.   
 The majority  of the interviews occurred in public settings, and the public display of their 
memories of resistance influenced the stories they chose to tell and the ways in which they  told 
them.  Consider, for example, a moment during an interview with a mujahid from the al-Shata’ 
region in northern Fezzan.  When asked to talk about what he knew about the Italians’ arrival to 
the area, he told a story about a group of tribal leaders from his region who traveled to talk to 
Turkish officials soon after the Italians landed in Tripoli.  When the group  of representatives 
returned, the speaker said, “I was amazed at the return of Muhammad bin ‘Amir,” one of the 
tribal leaders in the group, but he did not explain why or what had amazed him.  At this point, the 
dialogue in the text broke, and the researcher conducting the interview later inserted a note that 
the presence of Muhammad bin ‘Amir’s sons among the group of people gathered for the 
interview prevented the speaker from divulging more details about their father’s return for fear 
that, “some of the young men were embarrassed by the remembrance or account.”27   In other 
instances, the interviews were conducted within a group leading to formulaic accounts of local 
histories.  
 Through this process of performative interviews, the Oral History Project collected 
certain versions of local histories as they were remembered in the popular imagination and lent 
them authority  through the weight  of repetition and public display.  One can only imagine the 
arrival of interviewers from the Libyan Studies Center in Tripoli to small villages throughout 
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Libya created a public spectacle and conferred prestige on those individuals selected for the 
interview process as representatives of local history  and national heroes of anti-colonial 
resistance.  Not all of the accounts went uncontested.  The transcriptions include other moments 
of breaks in the dialogue when audience members interrupted to correct the speaker or provide 
alternative narratives for particular events.  The interviewers were careful to note dissent from 
among the onlookers, but they gave clear preference to the narratives of those being interviewed, 
the official storytellers.  The Oral History Project collected and reinforced particular ways of 
talking about anti-colonial resistance in the process of celebrating heroes of the resistance.    
 Because of their limited accessibility, only a small handful of scholars writing in English 
have made use of the recorded histories, and as far as I know, no one working primarily on 
Italian history has done so.28   The collected testimonies represent an opportunity  to trace local 
histories and tribal alliances during the colonial era.  For example, the stories reveal greater 
details about Libyans like ‘Abd al-Nabi Balkhir, a leader of Libya’s largest tribe, the Warfalla, 
who helped the Italian troops in their initial invasion into Fezzan, but switched sides to help  in 
the defeat of the Italians during an infamous battle at Qasr Abu Hadi in 1914.  However, because 
the stories were collected as part of a nationalist project to remember the heroism of the Libyan 
people against a common enemy, the Oral History Project reads as a collection of reactions 
against a colonial aggressor, thus emphasizing the Italians as primary actors who, however, 
appear as monolithic and undifferentiated in the mujahidin’s accounts.  
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Evans-Pritchard and The Sanusi of Cyrenaica
 In collecting the individual stories of anti-Italian mujahidin, the historians of the Oral 
History Project hoped to escape the dominant interpretation of the anti-colonial movement in 
Libya as one led by the Sanusiyya established in the monograph from the British anthropologist 
E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, in 1949.  The interpretation of the Sanusiyya as 
nationalistic political leaders in Evans-Pritchard’s book provided a firm rationale for the British-
backed decision by the United Nations to create a Sanusi monarchy under the leadership of Idris 
al-Sanusi in the Libyan territories after the Second World War, and it came to shape postwar 
Libyan historiography under the Sanusi king.  Evans-Pritchard based his work on his experiences 
during the two years he spent as a Political Officer in the British Military Administration of 
Cyrenaica starting in 1942.  Evans-Pritchard’s task in the position was to recommend the best 
course of action for answering the needs of the Bedouin tribes in Cyrenaica as the United 
Nations developed plans for a future independent state, and he wrote his book as an examination 
of how the Sanusiyya functioned as leaders within Bedouin society.  Mirroring ethnographic 
studies from the previous century, Evans-Pritchard argued in favor of a Sanusi state as the best 
solution for securing unity  and stability in a region that he depicted as riddled with tribal 
factions.  
 Although it might not have been Evans-Pritchard’s goal, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica gave 
considerable weight to the British objective of establishing Idris as a head of state on Libya’s 
independence.  It was, as Lisa Anderson put it, “an illuminating example of scholarship  in the 
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service of imperialism.”29   The political stakes of determining the political and religious 
authority of the Sanusiyya heightened after independence; facing the prospect of a future 
independent state on Egypt’s western border, the British eagerly promoted the image of Idris as a 
centralized authority figure, certain that he would promote British interests in the region.  Evans-
Pritchard naturalized the leadership  of Idris by depicting the Sanusiyya as the best possible 
leaders for the Bedouin population of Cyrenaica based on his conception of segmentary tribal 
structures.  In Evans-Pritchard’s segmentary  model, tribes developed as delicately  balanced 
power systems in which no one individual could exercise permanent authority over the other 
members of society.  He imagined that in this highly divided system of relations, the Sanusiyya 
served a mediating function in negotiating tribal disputes.  Thus he claimed that the greatest 
number of zawāyā could be found in the territories of the most highly  fragmented tribes; the 
more cohesive the tribe, the less use it had for Sanusi presence.30   
 According to Evans-Pritchard’s analysis, the Sanusiyya made a complete transformation 
from a religious to a political organization gradually over the course of the late nineteenth 
century in opposition to the increased presence of European interests and out of the need to deal 
directly  with European states, but he found the roots for the Sanusi’s political functions during 
the Ottoman era.  The state structure of the Sanusiyya, in Evans-Pritchard’s account, worked in 
tandem with the centralized Ottoman state in what he called a “Turco-Sanusi condominium” in 
which the Sanusi elite collected taxes from the tribes of the interior in exchange for exemption 
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from taxes on Sanusi properties.  Evans-Pritchard claimed that the Ottomans depended entirely 
on the Sanusiyya to control the fragmented tribes of the interior.31
 Evans-Pritchard established a precedent for subsequent studies of the Sanusiyya by 
identifying a transitional moment for the Sanusiyya from a religious-missionary organization 
into a nationalist and patriotic movement when the Sufi ṭarīqa faced the incursions of aggressive 
European imperialism.  The essence of this national movement, he claimed, had been there from 
the beginning of the Sanusiyya’s existence as a Sufi ṭarīqa; as a highly organized network of 
zawāyā, the Sanusiyya provided a political structure to a group of tribes that already shared a 
common culture.  Given the highly fragmented nature of tribal society, Evans-Pritchard 
contended that Cyrenaican Bedouins required the leadership  of an organization that  could at once 
stand outside of the tribal structures and integrate with tribal leadership, and he held that the 
religious nature of the Sanusi movement allowed Sanusi shaykhs to serve that purpose.  In his 
assessment, the Sanusiyya never stopped being a religious movement, but after the Italian 
invasion, the language used to express the “desire of a people to live according to their own 
traditions and institutions” had simply changed from religious to political in nature.  
 Evans-Pritchard’s depiction of the Sanusiyya as centralized political and religious leaders 
and as the center of anti-colonial resistance and postcolonial nationalism echoed earlier colonial 
reports about the threat of the Sanusiyya while it supported British interests in establishing a 
Sanusi kingdom, but he was careful to distance the Sanusiyya from a reputation of Islamic 
fanaticism found in the vast majority of nineteenth century colonial literature.  Though he 
attributed the emergence of political functions of the Sanusiyya to their resistance to European 
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presence, he compared the Sanusiyya favorably to the eighteenth century Wahhabi movement in 
Saudi Arabia in terms of their attitudes towards Europeans as allies.  Evans-Pritchard claimed 
that the Sanusiyya, unlike the Wahhabis, “have never shown themselves more hostile than other 
Muslims to Christians and Jews, and the Grand Sanusi and Sayyid al-Mahdi scrupulously 
avoided all political entanglements which would bring them into unfriendly  relations with 
neighboring States and the European Powers.”32   Evans-Pritchard’s study instead favored a 
tradition of colonial literature about the Sufi ṭarīqa that characterized the Sanusiyya as a 
civilizing force in an otherwise ungovernable society, an intermediary  step in the progression of 
North Africa to assist in the efforts of centralized powers to settle and educate the Beduoin tribes.
 Since Evans-Pritchard wrote The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, scholars have criticized his 
interpretation of the Sanusiyya both for its methodological approach and for its clear complicity 
with British political interests, but few scholars have managed to escape his naturalization of the 
Sanusiyya as a state-like organization that presented a unified leadership in a highly divided 
region.  A student of Evans-Pritchard, Emyrs Peters, first discredited the segmentary model for 
Bedouin society  in his doctoral thesis in 1951.  Peters criticized Evans-Pritchard’s segmentary-
lineage model of Bedouin society as being excessively static, a structure of equilibrium that did 
not allow for change until the Sanusiyya transformed from a religious to a political structure.  To 
counter this model, Peters examined networks of voluntary association in Bedouin society, like 
trade relationships, that did not follow tribal divisions to demonstrate greater flexibility  in 
networks of association in the Bedouin society of eastern Libya.  Evans-Pritchard’s myopic focus 
on lineage, he claimed, reflected ideological explanations for tribal relationships and obscured 
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other social structures at work in the development of the Sanusiyya among the Bedouin tribes. 
By disproving the primacy of lineage as an organizing principle in Bedouin society, Peters called 
into question Evans-Pritchard’s functional interpretation of the Sanusiyya as mediators in deep-
seated tribal conflicts, and he opened up the possibility that other sources for regional allegiances 
besides religion shaped the development of social and political alliances during the Italian 
occupation.  
 In his analysis of the development of the Sanusiyya within regional tribal structures, 
Peters rejected Evans-Pritchard’s insistence on the political motivations of the Sanusi elite in 
their movement into the southern oases of the late nineteenth century, and he pointed out that 
Evans-Pritchard lacked empirical data to support  his claim that the Sanusiyya built zawāyā in 
regions with the greatest tribal divisions.  Instead, Peters recognized that the expansion of the 
Sanusiyya followed the development of the trans-Saharan trade routes and their relationships 
with powerful tribal leaders who could provide resources and a social basis for the religious 
organization.  Rather than developing where tribal divisions seemed to require the presence of an 
outside arbiter, Peters argued that the expansion of the Sanusiyya occurred where the Sufi ṭarīqa 
could find access to land and water and a community of potential converts and students.33   
 A number of historians, anthropologists, and religious studies scholars have followed 
Peters’ example in rejecting Evans-Pritchard’s functionalist interpretation of the Sanusiyya, and 
some have gone on to examine the influence of other social structures in the history of Cyrenaica 
under Italian and Sanusi rule.  The issue of whether or not or when the Sanusiyya developed state 
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functions or a state structure, however, remains unclear in most scholarship on the Sanusiyya in 
Libyan history.  The political weight of finding precolonial legitimacy for the Sanusi monarchy 
continues to cloud scholarship on the development of the Sanusi ṭarīqa and the early relationship 
of the Sanusi elite to state and tribal  authorities in the region. 
The Sanusiyya in the Nineteenth Century
 The Sanusiyya developed as a Sufi ṭarīqa in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, a period 
bookmarked by the end of the reign of the Qaramanlis and the second Ottoman occupation in 
1835 and the French occupation of the Lake Chad region in 1901-02.  Histories of the Sanusiyya 
credit Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Sanusi, Idris al-Sanusi’s grandfather, as the founder of the 
Sanusiyya.  Born in Algeria, al-Sanusi studied in Mecca under Ahmad ibn Idris, a religious 
teacher in the Salafist tradition who advocated an Islamic revival through a return to the practices 
or sunna of the Prophet Muhammad.34  A number of students of Ahmad ibn Idris established Sufi 
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ṭuruq after their teacher’s death in 1837.35  After a period of traveling back and forth between 
Mecca and Cyrenaica, Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Sanusi settled with an entourage in Cyrenaica in 
1853 where he began to build zawāyā—Sufi religious centers for teaching and prayer—with a 
headquarters in the oasis town of Jaghbub near the Egyptian border.36   Like many religious 
leaders credited with founding ṭuruq in the Maghrib, al-Sanusi never explicitly  declared his 
intention to establish a Sufi ṭarīqa or used the term “Sanusiyya”; his son Muhammad al-Mahdi 
al-Sanusi began to refer to the family’s collection of zawāyā as part of the Sufi ṭarīqa of the 
Sanusiyya when he assumed the spiritual guidance of the movement after his father’s death in 
1859.37   Al-Mahdi initiated a period of rapid expansion of the Sanusiyya into the southern 
reaches of Fezzan and into the region of Wadai.  By the end of the nineteenth century, the name 
of the Sanusiyya was attached to zawāyā stretching from Benghazi all the way  down to Lake 
Chad, Wadai, and Darfur.38  
 The religious practices of the Sanusiyya expanded quickly  in part due to its syncretic 
merging with preexisting practices and beliefs among Bedouin tribes in the region who had a 
long history of venerating murābitūn or marabouts.  The marabouts venerated in Cyrenaica 
generally  came from outside the immediate region where they settled either on their way to or 
back from the hajj to Mecca, and they  acquired reputations as holy men who accrued and 
distributed baraka to those who prayed at their tombs.  They were known to act as mediators in 
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disputes, and their tombs served as places of refuge.39  In a pattern similar to other Sufi ṭuruq, the 
Sanusiyya established two levels of followers.  Sanusi ikhwān or brothers lived in the Sanusi 
zawāyā, observed stricter practices, distributed baraka among their followers, and when they 
died, their tombs became sites of pilgrimage.  For the majority of Sanusi followers, the Sufi 
ṭarīqa offered a relatively  open framework that could fit easily with preexisting traditions.  The 
only additional requirement for Muslims to follow the Sanusi path “was a communal dhikr 
ceremony, which consisted of reading passages from the Qur'an followed by the recitation of al-
Salat al-'Azimiyya, the supererogatory prayer Ibn Idris said was taught him by the Prophet."40  In 
the two-tiered system of the Sanusiyya, European observers attributed the ikhwān with control 
over the workings of the Sufi ṭarīqa and access to trade routes throughout the region.   
 The direct ties of the Sanusiyya and their followers with a vibrant trans-Saharan trade 
route proved important in the Sufi ṭarīqa’s expansion, but the exact nature of the involvement of 
Sanusi ikhwān in regional trade remains unclear.  By the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the Wadai-Benghazi route became the busiest artery  for the trans-Saharan slave trade. 41   The 
route first became active at the beginning of the nineteenth century  when the Sultan ‘Abd al-
Karim Sabun of Wadai (r.1803-13) sought a road to Egyptian and Mediterranean markets that 
avoided Darfur.  The route fell into disuse with ‘Abd al-Karim Sabun’s death, but it  picked up 
again under the Sultan Muhammad al-Sharif (1835-58) and renewed hostilities with Darfur. 
Official abolition of slaves and the slave trade in Tunis in 1841, the closing of the slave market in 
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Istanbul in 1847, and French restrictions in Algiers spurred an uptick in activity along the Wadai-
Benghazi route among slave traders nervous about their future prospects.  The abolition of the 
slave trade in Egypt in 1877 (enforced following the British occupation of 1882) only increased 
the importance of the Wadai-Benghazi route.  Trade along this route reached its height in the 
1890s at about 2,000 slaves per year, and it remained active until the 1920s, longer than any 
other trans-Saharan path.  Slaves were the most valuable but not the only  commodity traded 
along the Wadai-Benghazi route; ivory, ostrich feathers, and esparto grass traveled north to 
European markets, and caravans returned with European commercial goods including beads, 
paper, and cotton.
 In a pattern similar to other Sufi ṭuruq in the Maghrib, the Sanusi zawāyā provided 
resting points and communication centers for trans-Saharan traders.  The oasis of Kufra - the site 
of one of the most important  Sanusi zawāyā and the headquarters of the Sanusi family  after 1902 
- fell in the middle of one of the most difficult portions of the route between Tekro in Borkou and 
the Cyrenaican oasis of Jalo, and caravans typically rested in Kufra for about ten days before 
heading north to Benghazi.42  In the spread of the Nasiriyya in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Morroco, donations determined the status of adherents within the Sufi ṭarīqa and their 
subsequent access to the order’s resources.  Assuming a pattern of development similar to that of 
the Nasiriyya, it is likely  that adherence to the Sanusiyya granted individuals and tribal leaders in 
Cyrenaica increased access to resources as the Sufi ṭarīqa grew in importance during the 
nineteenth century.43  The Sanusi elites, as Islamic scholars, also served as primary agents of 
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communication along the trans-Saharan trade routes in collaboration with the Bedouin tribes who 
served as guides and merchants in a pattern that could be seen throughout the Sahara in the 
nineteenth century.44
 Due to a lack of reliable documentation, however, we do not have a clear idea of the 
exact nature of the involvement of Sanusi elites in trans-Saharan trade in the nineteenth century. 
Traditional explanations have attributed the growth of trade along the Wadai-Benghazi route to 
the facilitation of the Sanusiyya, but while they might have eased regional communications and 
provided structural support to merchants, the involvement of the Sanusiyya in trade depended on 
the adherence of the tribes who controlled scarce resources and served as essential guides in the 
Northern Sahara.  The Mogarba and Zuwaya tribes, two tribes linked through economic alliances 
and a shared history, dominated trans-Saharan trading patterns through their access to camels and 
water sources in the nineteenth century.  The adherence of these tribes to the Sanusi zawāyā in 
the nineteenth century was crucial for the connection between the Sanusi ṭarīqa and regional 
commerce.  Mogarba and Zuwaya notables gained powerful positions within the Sanusiyya, and 
as we will see further along, Mogarba elite helped shape Sanusi politics during the Italian 
colonial occupation.45  
 As the Sanusi ikhwān constructed zawāyā along southward trade routes, they  developed a 
reputation as mediators in intertribal conflicts that observers cited as evidence of their position 
outside of tribal affiliations and their ability  to generate unity.  However, the spread of the 
Sanusiyya and the role of the Sanusi ikhwān as mediators depended on the consent of the 
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Bedouin tribes, and contrary to customary explanations for the centrality of the Sanusiyya in 
spreading trade throughout the region, it was the development of trade routes by regional tribes 
that led to the spreading influence of the Sanusiyya into the Northern Sahara.  The spread of the 
Sanusiyya into the oases of Kufra, for example, occurred in direct collaboration with the 
Zuwaya, traditionally a client  tribe who payed tribute to a more powerful tribe of the Mogarba in 
eastern Sirte in exchange for access to water and land.  In the 1840s, when drought conditions 
drove a group  of the Zuwaya to move southward, they invaded the oases of Kufra and took 
possession of its rich palm groves from Tibbu tribes who continued to work the land and pay 
tribute to the Zuwaya.    The move to Kufra allowed the Zuwaya to establish control over the 
portion of the trans-Saharan trade route from Wadai to Kufra and a vast network of trade through 
their traditional ties to the Mogarba of eastern Sirte.46   The influx of Zuwaya inhabitants, 
however, generated a crisis with the Tibbu, and in 1895, Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi moved 
his headquarters of the Sanusiyya from Jaghbub to Kufra on invitation of the Zuwaya who asked 
them to mediate a truce with the Tibbu to solidify  their control of the oasis and its connected 
trade routes.47 
 Sanusi religious authority  lent legitimacy to the Zuwaya and their dominance over the 
Tibbu population in Kufra, and their acceptance of the Sanusiyya was essential to the Sufi 
ṭarīqa’s expansion into the south.  The Zuwaya and the Sanusiyya established a symbiotic 
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relationship, but more work needs to be done to determine how their relationship developed with 
the expansion of the Wadai-Benghazi trade route.  The expansion of the Sanusiyya and their 
particular form of Islam grew in direct correlation to the success of the Benghazi-Wadai trade 
route; in the late nineteenth century, merchants benefitted from adherence to the Sanusiyya by 
gaining access to resources and a vast social and religious network while the Sanusiyya 
benefitted from donations made by its increasing numbers of adherents.  Through their 
dominance in regional trading patterns and their continued relationships with Zuwaya tribes in 
the interior oases, Mogarba elites in western Cyrenaica gained prominent positions within the 
Sanusiyya.  As we will see, the opposition of Mogarba tribes who saw the Italian presence as a 
potential threat to their commercial interests represented a major stumbling block to attempts by 
Italian colonialists to expand into the Libyan interior.  In their eventual negotiations with Idris al-
Sanusi, Italian colonial officials hoped to gain the consensus of Mogarba notables, but their 
failure led to the dissolution of Sanusi-Italian treaties under the fascist administration. 
 
French Encounters with the Sanusiyya
 The expansion of the Sanusiyya as a religious organization with links to important trade 
networks attracted the attention of state observers in the region who eyed the Sufi ṭarīqa with a 
combination of apprehension and cautious curiosity for what the growing importance of the 
Sanusiyya could mean for political alignments in an increasingly important region.  French 
explorers and imperialists in North Africa wrote the earliest reports observing the development 
of the Sanusiyya in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, and they  exaggerated the potential for 
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Sanusi elites to pose a threat to French interests.  In his comprehensive, two-volume study on the 
subject, Jean-Louis Triaud divided his analysis of French contact with the Sanusiyya into four 
periods.  First, between 1855 and 1870, French explorers began to write about the Sanusiyya in 
their travels across the Sahara with a measure of curiosity and only marginal direct contact. 
Triaud identified Henri Duveyrier, the Vice President of the Société Géographique de France, as 
the author responsible for focusing public attention in France on the Sanusiyya during this 
period.   Duveyrier introduced the Sanusiyya as a focal point for French colonial literature in a 
book about the Tuareg of North Africa in 1864.48  In his descriptions of the Sanusiyya, Duveyrier 
likened the Sufi ṭarīqa to Jesuits or Freemasons, both of which carried negative connotations in 
French public opinion at the time as secret religious societies with dangerous political goals. 
According to Duveyrier, the Sanusiyya represented an aggressive group of religious fanatics who 
sought to establish Muslim dominance over the Christian world and who had the capacity to 
mobilize massive numbers of dedicated followers to their cause.  He contrasted the supposed 
fanaticism of the Sanusiyya with what he characterized as the tolerant Sufi order of the 
Tijaniyya, one of the Sufi ṭarīqāt that had become a focal point for French concerns in West 
Africa by the end of the nineteenth century.49  
 The dissemination of Duveyrier’s negative image of the Sanusiyya led to a shift in former 
French attitudes towards Sufi ṭarīqāt throughout North Africa.  Towards the beginning of French 
interest in the Sahara in the 1840s, prevailing opinion held that the French should adopt policies 
similar to what they believed to have been the approach of the Ottoman Empire towards the 
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Sanusiyya: treat  them like friendly  religious orders and allow them limited influence over local 
administrative decisions.50  Following the warnings of Duveyrier, the French began to watch all 
Sufi ṭarīqāt with suspicion.  Starting in the 1870s, French intelligence officers established 
surveillance on the Sanusiyya and followed communications between Sanusi elites and regional 
leaders in an attempt to determine the capacity of the Sanusiyya to influence the political climate 
and to prevent the widespread distribution of arms and ammunition through Sanusi trade 
networks.  According to Triaud, this second period represented the height of French 
preoccupation with the Sanusiyya bordering on obsession with what was referred to in French 
literature as “le légend noire,” the black legend of the Sahara.  At the height of the French 
hysteria over the supposed threat of the Sanusiyya to imperial interests in North Africa, 
Duveyrier published a pamphlet with the Société de Géographie in 1884 for a wide audience that 
depicted the spiritual guide of the Sanusiyya as an omnipotent force with a large army at his 
disposal.  He claimed that the Sanusiyya represented a political and economic organization with 
a strong hierarchical structure and a tendency to assimilate other Sufi orders to create a network, 
two characteristics that, in combination, suggested that the spiritual head of the Sanusiyya could 
command vast numbers of followers.  In a characteristic exageration, Duveyrier estimated that 
the leadership  of the Sanusi ṭarīqa had 2.5-3 million followers ready to take up arms against 
Christian imperialists.51  
 French agents in the region often contributed to a sense of urgency concerning the 
Sanusiyya as a strategic move to gain more resources and prestige for their positions as colonial 
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officers.  According to Triaud, Eugène Ricard, a French consular agent in Benghazi, inflated the 
threat the Sanusiyya posed to Europeans as a strategic career move.  From his arrival in 1866 
until he left Benghazi in 1895, Ricard’s correspondence with officials in France escalated in its 
hysteria over the threat of the Sanusiyya and monopolized the official discourse concerning 
North Africa.52   After Ricard’s successor Édouard Bertrand arrived in Benghazi in 1895, the 
focus of official correspondence turned away from the threat of the Sanusiyya.  During this third 
period in Triaud’s chronology  of French perceptions of the Sanusiyya, the correspondence 
concerning the Sanusiyya followed a more cautious line in fitting with the diplomatic 
background of the new French consul in Tripoli, Charles-Ferdinand Destrées, and French 
officials in Paris, Tripoli, and Benghazi undertook a reassessment of the Sanusiyya in the late 
1890s that resulted in a more positive image of the Sufi ṭarīqa and a turn towards conciliatory 
policies.53   Bertrand criticized the tendencies of Duveyrier and Ricard to exaggerate in their 
characterizations of Sanusi dominance in the region: “The importance of the house [zāwiyya] in 
Kufra has been a bit exaggerated and […] except in Hedjaz and the Sudanic regions, [the 
Sanusiyya] does not elsewhere have influence over even half the action that has often been 
accorded them. In reality, we are the ones who made the name of the Senousi known and 
recognized.”54   
 The depictions of the Sanusiyya as a political power found in the French literature shaped 
all subsequent understandings of the Sanusiyya as the effective political leaders in the 
Cyrenaican interior.  Following this foundational literature on the Sanusiyya as a form of 
46
52 Ibid., 141.
53 Triaud, Légende noire,  295.
54 Ibid., 303.
religious and political authority in the Sahara, British, Italian, German, and Ottoman officials 
competed for an alliance with the Sanusi elite as a means of securing their influence in what 
became in the early  twentieth century an increasingly important strategic region as a final 
battleground for influence in the “Scramble for Africa.”  Disagreements over the relative strength 
of the Sanusi elite, their relationships to regional tribes, and their ties to pan-Islamic movements 
throughout the Muslim world informed official discussions over the relative possibility  or 
desirability of negotiating an alliance with the recognized spiritual leader of the Sanusiyya after 
the death of Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi in 1902, Ahmad al-Sharif.  To some extent, the 
French legénde noire became a self-fulfilling myth as imperial officials began to send the Sanusi 
family members gifts of arms and supplies to try  to win their favor, thus contributing to the 
militarization of the region and the dominance of the Sanusiyya as a political and social force.
Sanusi Authority in the Ottoman Empire
 French, and later Italian, officials often imagined themselves to be following the example 
of the Ottoman Empire in their conciliatory approach to the Sufi ṭuruq of North Africa, but 
surprisingly little work has been done to explore what the Ottoman archives can tell us about the 
exact nature of the relationship between Sanusi leaders and the Ottoman government in the mid- 
to late-nineteenth century.  Post-independence historiography  perpetuated an interpretation of the 
relationship  between Sanusi notables and Ottoman officials based on an illusory Ottoman firman 
from 1856 that, according to Evans-Pritchard, established the ‘Turco-Sanusi Compendium’ by 
exempting the Sanusiyya from paying taxes in exchange for their cooperation in collecting taxes 
47
for the Ottoman authorities from Bedouin tribes of the interior.  In his 1949 study, Evans-
Pritchard cited this supposed agreement as further evidence of the legitimacy  and necessity  of 
Sanusi rule, claiming that the Ottomans depended entirely  on the assistance of Sanusi notables 
for a task that would have been impossible otherwise because of the resistance of Bedouin tribes 
to outside interference.  
 More recent research in the Ottoman archives has demonstrated that Ottoman officials 
left the tribes of the Cyrenaican interior to their own devices through most of the nineteenth 
century until the late 1870s, and even after Sultan Abdulhamid attempted to integrate the Sanusi 
notables into a more centralized structure towards the end of the century, there is no clear 
indication that  the Sanusi ikhwān accepted his appeals for their help—or that they were in a 
position to do so.55   The laissez faire approach to the Bedouin tribes of the Cyrenaica interior 
until the 1870s reflected broader trends in Ottoman policies and the more specific effects of the 
region’s political and economic landscape.  The early  years of the development of the Sanusiyya 
in the 1830s and 40s coincided with the first period of the tanzimat reforms in Istanbul that were 
intended to centralize authority in the empire while diminishing foreign interference by 
establishing equality of the empire’s minorities before the law.56   Despite the centralization 
policies, local notables continued to hold authority in the empire’s outer provinces, and the 
Ottoman government had little financial motive to disturb the status in the interior of Cyrenaica 
in the early decades of the nineteenth century.  They  knew the tribes of the Cyrenaican interior to 
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be rebellious, and the Ottoman administration easily collected enough revenue from the more 
prosperous province of Tripolitania to cover the costs of its skeleton administration throughout 
the region.57
 In the 1870s and 80s, Cyrenaica and the Sanusiyya took on greater importance for 
Istanbul in the centralizing and pan-Islamic politics of Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909). 
After the French invaded Tunisia in 1881 and the British took Egypt in 1882, Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica represented symbolic value as the last remaining Ottoman territories in North Africa 
and strategic value as a line of defense for access to the Red Sea and the Hejaz.  Facing a crisis 
of confidence in Ottoman rule following the failed policies of the tanzimat reforms of the 1860s 
and the string of insurrections against Ottoman rule in the Balkans in 1875 and 1876, 
Abdulhamid called on Islamic unity to shore up support among Muslims in the Ottoman 
provinces, and the Libyan territories took on a central role as the Sultan tried to promote an 
image of strength and Islamic unity.58  The Ottoman defeat by Russia in 1877-78 cost the empire 
a third of its territories and emphasized the futility  of perpetuating the tanzimat idea of Ittihad-i 
Anasir or the “unity of Ottoman nations,” and Abdulhamid turned instead to an idea of Islamic 
unity  to support his efforts at centralization.59   Western observers coined the term “pan-
Islamism” to refer to Abdulhamid’s campaign for Muslim unity in the mid-1870s, but Ottoman 
appeals to Islamic unity were far from new.  The closest equivalent in Ottoman Turkish, Ittihad-i 
Islam or Ittihad-i Din, appeared frequently in requests for Ottoman aid and protection from 
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Muslim rulers of India, Central Asia, and Indonesia in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and 
nineteenth centuries, and the Ottoman Sultan replied to such requests with similar calls to 
Muslim unity.60  In the mid-nineteenth century  policies of Abdulhamid, however, the turn to an 
ideology of Islamic unity  took on an urgent tone as an alternative to rising nationalist revolts 
against Ottoman rule.        
  Sultan Abdulhamid pursued strategic alliances with Sufi orders in the African provinces 
hoping to win their loyalties and use their resources against further French and British influence 
in North Africa.61  There is some evidence to suggest that Abdulhamid based his identification of 
the Sanusi elite as likely candidates for a consolidation of Ottoman authority in the region 
against the threat of European expansion on a reading of the early French literature which, if 
true, suggests a sort of inter-imperial feedback loop of information concerning the nature of 
Sanusi authority in the region.62  In a move that placed the late Ottoman Empire directly in line 
as a contender for the European “Scramble for Africa,” Abdulhamid’s approach to local elites 
throughout the Ottoman provinces made up  part  of a larger modernizing or civilizing mission 
which he hoped would secure central control over the remaining territories of the Ottoman 
empire against anti-Ottoman revolts and European invasions.  Abdulhamid’s efforts to foster ties 
with Islamic leaders in the Ottoman provinces also reflected Germany’s new influence in the 
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Ottoman Empire and the enthusiasm of German emperor Wilhelm I for the possibility of using 
the ideology of pan-Islamism to encourage revolts against their shared enemies.63
 In a detailed plan for modernization and centralization from the 1890s, Abdulhamid 
called for “winning the affection of the local people [in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania] so that in the 
event of external aggression, say from Italy, it will be possible to defend the province without 
recourse to the sending of troops from the centre.”64   Hoping to gain the support of Islamic 
notables, Abdulhamid increased funding for Islamic education throughout the Empire’s 
territories, increased salaries and pensions for ulema and other Islamic officials, funded the 
restoration and upkeep of mosques, and pushed for increased Arabic use throughout the Empire. 
Abdulhamid’s pan-Islamic propaganda also emphasized his claims to the position of the 
Caliphate or religious leader of the Muslim world, and Ottoman propaganda called for Muslims 
to respect their duties to a broader Islamic community and their duties to the Sultan as the 
Islamic Caliph.  The ability to claim Islamic unity  in association with the Sultan’s position as 
Caliph seemed to offer the Ottoman Empire a distinct  advantage over regional rivals in the 
competition for political legitimacy among Muslim populations in North Africa and the Middle 
East.65  As Selim Deringil has noted, “Abdulhamid was attempting to do precisely what he feared 
the British and the French would do to him that is to use Muslims of French or British allegiance 
as a political fifth column.”66    
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   In Abdulhamid’s modernizing plans, the Sanusi ikhwān were to serve a civilizing 
function by spreading loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph along with Islam among the tribes of the 
Northern Sahara.  Abdulhamid tried to gain full cooperation from the Empire’s Arab provinces 
by inviting Arab notables to Istanbul and appointing them to high positions in the central 
government “so that they could act in enlisting and preserving the loyalties of their people to the 
state and the Sultan Caliph.”67   His attempt to incorporate Muslim notables in North Africa 
included an invitation to Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, but it remains unclear to what extent 
Abdulhamid succeeded in incorporating the Sanusi elite in his attempt to retain dominance in the 
region.  Michel Le Gall has suggested that the Sanusi leader rejected the Sultan’s overtures in 
protest against his taxation policies.  The diversion of trans-Saharan trade out of Tripolitania and 
the relative prosperity of the Wadai-Benghazi route inspired the Ottoman governor of Benghazi 
to pursue tax revenue from tribes in the Cyrenaican interior, in some cases requesting back-taxes 
from the previous ten years.  Ottoman officials approach Sanusi shaykhs twice in 1883 and 1884 
to request their assistance in collecting taxes, or at least in persuading the tribes who adhered to 
them to pay, but Muhammad al-Mahdi rejected both requests.68  Over the following decade, the 
Ottomans pursued a series of armed campaigns against tribes loyal to the Sanusiyya.  In 
1888-1891, the Ottomans initiated an attack against the Zuwaya near the oases of Awjila and 
Jalo.  This settlement of Zuwaya made up part of a larger tribe with direct control over the trade 
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route from Wadai to Kufra and close allies of the leading Sanusi family.  The Ottomans 
successfully extracted six years of taxes from the Zuwaya and established a garrison.  
 In the midsts of these attacks in the 1890s, the Ottoman government approached the 
Sanusiyya to recommend the idea of establishing an Ottoman kaymacan and garrison in Kufra, 
ostensibly  to assist the Sanusiyya in defending against  the encroaching presence of French troops 
in the south.  In 1899, al-Mahdi decided to move his headquarters from the oasis of Jaghbub on 
the Egyptian border to the oasis of Kufra deep in the southern reaches of Cyrenaica.  Observers 
at the time and postcolonial historians interested in finding origins of Libyan independence 
movements in the Sanusi leadership  saw al-Mahdi’s decision as an attempt to escape the control 
of the Ottoman government and defend his independence against  the French government.  Based 
on research in the Ottoman archives, Le Gall has argued that the Ottoman interest in Kufra had 
more to do with their desire to control the Zuwaya and the resources of the residual slave trade 
and large salt  deposits in the region than retaining territorial integrity.  In light of this context, the 
decision of al-Mahdi to move his residence and the headquarters of the ṭarīqa from Jaghbub to 
Kufra could represent an attempt to defend the economic interests of the Zuwaya while moving 
further away  from the Ottoman garrison in Awjila and Jalo instead of a concern with the French 
movements in the Lake Chad region.69
 A recent dissertation by Mostafa Minawi based on research in the Ottoman archives could 
lead to a revision of Le Gall’s reading of the Sanusi-Ottoman relations of the 1890s.  Minawi 
argues that Le Gall misread the Ottoman documents, and that Abdulhamid and al-Mahdi 
established a clear agreement in which the Sultan supplied the Sanusi zawāyā with arms and 
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training from Ottoman officers to defend against French attacks from their positions in the 
Sahara and the Sahel.70  The suggestion of an alliance between al-Mahdi and the Ottoman Sultan 
after the mid-1890s could explain subsequent reports from British intelligence that the Sanusiyya 
had initiated a program in Kufra of unifying tribes under their leadership and the subsequent 
battles between troops fighting under Sanusi leadership and the French Senegalese troops in the 
Lake Chad region in 1901 and 1902.71
 Whether or not Sultan Abdulhamid II gained the full support of Muhammad al-Mahdi for 
his calls to Islamic unity, consistent reports of increased arms supplies throughout the region by 
the mid-1890s pointed to a clear militarization of the Sanusiyya and their affiliated tribes by the 
end of the century.  Though international treaties had outlawed trade in arms in North Africa, the 
Ottoman officials turned a blind eye to the trade in weapons and ammunition along the coast.  As 
the trade made its way  into the Cyrenaican interior, the Sanusi zawāyā collected large deposits of 
weapons and ammunition along caravan routes, leading one British officer in the region to 
assume by 1905, “that practically every  Senussiite is in possession of some sort of fire-arm and 
ammunition.”72
   
French Aggression and the Spread of Arms 
 In November 1901, French troops attempted to take possession of the southernmost 
zāwiyya of the Sanusiyya in the region of Kanem which served as a launching pad for attempts to 
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expand Sanusi influence into the Lake Chad region and present-day Sudan.73  In his volume on 
French contacts with the Sanusiyya, Jean-Louis Triaud identified the battle in Kanem as a 
moment of dramatic militarization of the Sanusiyya that initiated a period of direct  conflict 
between Sanusi and French forces in Chad, Algeria, and Niger for the following decade.74 
Sanusi affiliated tribes, reinforced by the recent arrival of Tuareg exiles pushed out from 
southern Algeria and Niger by French invaders, managed to repel the attack on the Sanusi 
zawāyā, but the French troops finally took control in January 1902.   Following the French 
invasion, Muhammad al-Mahdi retreated from the Lake Chad region.75   
 Coming just months before the death of Muhammad al-Mahdi and the subsequent 
recognition of his nephew Ahmad al-Sharif as the spiritual guide of the Sanusiyya, the struggles 
between French and Sanusi forces in 1901 and 1902 became a source of conflict between the 
Sanusi elite and French officials.  In later attempts by French officials to negotiate a truce with 
Ahmad al-Sharif, he depicted the Sanusi ikhwān as persecuted by a relentless French war.  After 
they  moved from Bir Alali to Ain Galakka, Ahmad al-Sharif complained that the French pursued 
them and set fire to the Sanusi zāwiyya there causing the loss of seven hundred books and four 
thousand guns, a prized cache of Sanusi goods and symbol of their wealth and power in the 
region.76  
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 For the ten years following the French invasion of Bir Alali, European military, political, 
and economic presence in the region increased, and in this context of militarization and restricted 
access to goods, the ties of Sanusi zawāyā to regional trade routes made them a conduit for arms 
throughout the region and a natural ally  of regional leaders seeking supplies in a context  of 
increasingly  limited resources.  In particular, French military  action in the region strengthened 
relationships between Ahmad al-Sharif, as the newly recognized leader of the Sufi ṭarīqa, and the 
Sultans of Dar Fur and Wadai.  Among the few indications of the direct involvement of the 
Sanusiyya in the nineteenth and early twentieth century caravan trade, a collection of letters in 
the National Record Office of Sudan in Khartoum that British officers took from the palace of 
‘Ali Dinar when they invaded the area and killed the Sultan in 1916 documents the development 
of a favorable relationship between ‘Ali Dinar and Sanusi shiekhs during the period of Sanusi 
expansion in the late nineteenth century, and they suggest that the Sanusi shaykhs’ status as 
educated elite enabled them to control communications along the Wadai-Benghazi trade route. 
Following the initiation of expansionist  measures by French troops in Borkou and the Lake Chad 
region, the relationship between ‘Ali Dinar and the Sanusi ikhwān of the Saharan oases improved 
as transportation of arms between the two increased.  The redactors of these documents, Jay 
Spaulding and Lidwien Kapteijns, characterized the relationship  between ‘Ali Dinar and Ahmad 
al-Sharif and his local agents as a formal alliance based primarily  on a shared religious identity 
and a commitment to anti-European action.  Jean-Louis Triaud has argued, and I concur, that the 
characterization of their relationship as a formal alliance based on shared religious identity 
against European aggressors is probably  an exaggeration derived from the biased interpretations 
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of British observers.77   The letters from Khartoum establish a convincing history of an 
interdependent trade relationship between the Sanusi elites (on behalf of the Zuwaya and 
Mogarba tribes) and ‘Ali Dinar as the Sanusiyya relied on ‘Ali Dinar for food supplies and ‘Ali 
Dinar in turn depended on the Sanusiyya for arms and ammunition, but though they  both faced a 
common source of anxiety  in the increased presence of French troops, their relationship was 
based more on mercantile concerns during a period of restricted possibilities for trade rather than 
a sense of Islamic resistance to Christian expansion.  
 The association between Sanusi ikhwān and ‘Ali Dinar intensified from 1904 to 1911 as 
constraints on traditional trade routes made them increasingly interdependent, thus contributing 
to the influence of the Sanusi ikhwān and the control of Sanusi zawāyā over arms supplies 
throughout the region.  After 1904, the new Sultan of Wadai, Dudmurrah, blocked ‘Ali Dinar’s 
access to Mediterranean trade through central Saharan routes because ‘Ali Dinar refused to end 
his protectionist practices of placing high tariffs on goods from Wadai.  At the same time, the rise 
of a young shaykh from the Kababish tribe on the North-Eastern frontier of Darfur with the full 
backing of the Anglo-Egyptian officials in Khartoum blocked ‘Ali Dinar’s access to 
Mediterranean markets on the old Forty  Days’ Road.78  As a result, ‘Ali Dinar relied increasingly 
on his Sanusi contacts for supplies of arms and ammunition in exchange for a steady stream of 
food supplies (an increasingly  valuable commodity considering the drastic level of drought in the 
Central and Western Sudan between 1903 and 1915) and commercial goods from the south like 
ivory and ostrich feathers that enjoyed heightened popularity  in European markets at the end of 
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the nineteenth century.  The alliance between Ahmad al-Sharif and ‘Ali Dinar soured after 1911 
when the invasion of Italian troops on the coast of Libya redirected the focus of the Sanusi 
leadership northward.  In 1914, ‘Ali Dinar complained to Muhammad Abid about a shipment of 
arms that never reached him because the Sanusi leaders decided to divert them to Fezzan to help 
in the expulsion of Italian troops led by General Miani in the famous battle of Qasr Bu Hadi 
which successfully drove the Italians out of the interior until the military  campaigns of the 
1920s.79
 Documentation on the relationship between the Sultan of Wadai and the Sanusiyya has 
been more scattered and has resulted in less clarity concerning the involvement of the Sanusiyya 
in the internal affairs of Wadai.  A series of succession conflicts and a subsequent civil war in 
Wadai prevented the establishment of Sanusi zawāyā or a strong level of cooperation between 
Sanusi ikhwān and merchants in Wadai in the mid- to late-nineteenth century.  However, after the 
French invasion of Kanem, the proclamation of a new Sultan Dudmurrah in Wadai in 1902 
initiated an era of increased cooperation between the Sultan of Wadai and the Sanusiyya. 
Communications between Sultan Dudmurrah and Sanusi ikhwān in Borkou increased in 
frequency as they recognized their mutual dependency given the presence of French troops and 
their restrictions on trade in the Central Sudan.  Ahmad al-Sharif saw the presence of a strong 
Sultanate in Wadai as a check on French ambitions, and by the height of tensions with French 
troops in the region in 1910, the Zuwaya and Mogarba troops of the Sanusiyya attacked French 
forces alongside Dudmurrah, then the ex-Sultan of Wadai.80  As I will demonstrate in more detail 
58
79 Ibid., 46.
80 BNA FO 881/9909, British Consul-General in Tripoli to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, 
30 June 1910.
in subsequent chapters, Ahmad al-Sharif later called on the French to abandon Wadai as 
preconditions for possible negotiations, a sign of his continued recognition of the importance of 
the region for the Sanusi ṭarīqa and the trade routes of their affiliated tribes.81
Conclusions
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Sanusiyya represented a force of 
frightening proportions in the imaginations of officials in imperial centers from Paris to Istanbul. 
In an era of international rivalry to gain control of the last remaining territories of the Ottoman 
Empire in North Africa, the possibility of gaining the support of the spiritual guide of the 
Sanusiyya, Ahmad al-Sharif, seemed to represent the best means of gaining control of a strategic 
area where limited access to water and communication routes dictated control over regional trade 
on routes that took weeks to travel.  The extent  of the control of the Sanusi ikhwān over the 
region’s tribal affiliations and associated trade routes in the mid- to late-nineteenth century 
remains a matter of debate with direct political consequences for the political legitimacy of the 
postcolonial Libyan state, and the stakes in determining the political authority of the Sanusiyya’s 
religious leaders has clouded the historical inquiry into the ṭarīqa’s development in the region.  
 By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the links between the Sanusi zawāyā and 
regional trade in arms led to an increased militarization of the region.  The widespread 
perception that the Sanusiyya represented a political authority  with the capacity to mobilize 
powerful tribal affiliations in the region, especially the Zuwaya and the Mogarba, inspired 
Ottoman officials to increase the movement of arms and ammunition through the Sanusi zawāyā 
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in the hopes that they could depend on an alliance with the Sanusi elite to prevent further loss of 
territory in the Northern Sahara.  Though further research in the Ottoman archives could clarify 
the exact progression of the militarization of the region, the involvement of the Sanusi zawāyā in 
spreading arms throughout the region and organizing or even training armed forces seems to 
have become a clear component of the Sufi ṭarīqa and the relationships between the Sanusi 
ikhwān and regional leaders by the end of the nineteenth century.
 The death of Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi and the succession of his nephew as the 
recognized leader of the Sanusiyya in 1902 occurred in a moment of heightened tensions 
between Sanusi ikhwān and French forces in the region of Lake Chad and the Central Sudan as 
French military presence threatened the security of Sanusi zawāyā and access to trade routes. 
Over the next decade, Sanusi zawāyā and a large-scale displacement of people from the French 
military territory diffused weapons that entered the territory with the consent of Ottoman 
officials on the coast and perhaps even with the explicit  approval of the Ottoman Sultan eager to 
retain a presence in North Africa through Sanusi mediation.  It  was precisely during this time that 
Italian imperialists began to focus their attentions on the prospect of claiming the Libyan 
territories as their own, and in the preparation for their eventual invasion of the coast in 1911, 
Italian regional experts began to look to the Sanusiyya as a possible threat or a potential tool to 
assist in Italy’s imperial ambitions.
 Despite the critical reassessment of reports concerning the Sanusiyya voiced by French 
officials at the end of the nineteenth century and a subsequent attenuation of the image of the 
Sanusi leaders as highly centralized and virtually omnipotent, the earlier literature of Duveyrier 
and Ricard created a lasting tradition.  As I will analyze in detail in the next chapter, the Italian 
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administration accepted the characterization of the Sanusiyya as the most important power 
structure in the region and its leaders as the key to gaining control over the populations of the 
interior.  Early Italian imperialists, however, adopted a more conciliatory view of the Sanusiyya, 
and they felt hopeful that they could persuade the Sanusiyya to support Italian rule. 
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Chapter 2: Religion and Nationalism in the Italian Colonial Project
 Historians have often overlooked or underemphasized the Italian colonial project due to 
its relative brevity, but ambitions for an overseas empire emerged as a defining force in political 
and social debates in the early decades of Italian unification as a dominant aspiration among 
nationalists hoping for Italy to join the ranks of Europe’s Great Powers.  Domestic concerns 
bolstered the nationalist calls for territorial expansion as a possible outlet for Italy’s growing 
emigrant populations fleeing the restive South.  Italian interest  in the Libyan territories as a 
possible sphere of influence emerged in the 1880s after the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881 
and the British invasion of Egypt in 1882 threatened to exclude Italy from the “Scramble for 
Africa” and stymie national influence in the Mediterranean.82   Italy secured international 
recognition of a claim over the Libyan territories in the event that the region’s status as Ottoman 
provinces should change in 1887.83  
 The rising popularity of colonial expansion as an opportunity to spread italianitá and 
prove Italy’s worth on the international stage shored up waning support for the government of 
Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti and prompted new political alliances, and after decades of 
tensions following the fall of the Papal States, the popularity of expansionist goals generated a 
new level of enthusiasm among Catholic interest groups for Italian national politics.  Catholic 
elites and the Catholic popular press sold the idea of the imperial project as an opportunity to 
spread Italian culture and commercial interests in conjunction with the missionary objectives of 
the Vatican.  The liberal ruling class stood to benefit from the increased alignment of Catholic 
62
82 Askew, Europe and Italy’s Acquisition of Libya, 6.
83 BNA FO 101/94, Italian Ambassador to Britain to Secretary of State, 12 February 1887.
interests in shoring up  popular support against socialist opposition at home, and preexisting 
missionary  and financial networks of the Catholic Church in North Africa eased the initial 
expansion of Italian state presence in the region.  In the decade leading up to the invasion of the 
Libyan coast, the Italian state provided direct funding to Italian Catholic missionaries as a means 
of promoting national culture, and the Catholic Banco di Roma invested heavily in North Africa 
in direct collaboration with Giolitti’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.  But the popularity of colonial 
expansion as an opportunity to engage in a civilizing mission and secure land for Italy’s 
emigrants conflicted with the Giolitti administration’s plans to cultivate relationships with local 
Muslim elites, both as an immediate necessity and as a part of a large ambition to affirm Italy’s 
authority in the Muslim world.  In the years leading up to the invasion, both models of colonial 
expansion informed attempts to expand Italian presence in the region and at times worked to 
contrary purposes.  
 As latecomers to the European “Scramble for Africa,” Italian colonialists leaned heavily  
on the pre-existing body of primarily French literature emphasizing the power of the Sanusi 
ṭarīqa as a religious and political organization as they sought to deepen ties with Libyan elites. 
Italian experts began to develop their own body of literature concerning the Libyan territories 
and the Sanusiyya in response to the increasing interest in occupation in the decade leading up to 
the invasion in 1911.  A handful of government agents in Cairo were given responsibility for 
organizing projects to generate good will among elite Libyans living abroad and for ascertaining 
the possible reactions to an eventual occupation.  One Italian expert in particular, Enrico 
Insabato, went to Cairo as a personal agent of Giolitti to act as his ears and eyes in the region. 
Through the use of a local informant in Cairo, Insabato established contact  with the recognized 
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head of the Sanusi family, Ahmad al-Sharif.  Insabato’s early reports of the Sanusiyya established 
a representation of the Sufi ṭarīqa that countered French fears of a possible Sanusi-led pan-
Islamic revolt.  Like the French literature, Insabato characterized the Sanusiyya as a highly 
centralized religious organization that enjoyed extensive control over a devout  population.  But 
where French explorers and officials painted the Sanusiyya as a group of religious fanatics eager 
to rise up against Christians, in Insabato’s reports, the Sanusiyya appeared more as a potential 
tool that, if used correctly, could help  increase Italian prestige and authority  in the Libyan 
interior and even throughout the Muslim world.  Insabato portrayed the Sanusi ṭarīqa as a 
conservative civilizing force in North Africa, a form of Islamic orthodoxy the Italians could use 
to bolster their interests against the pressures of the French and the British and related reform 
movements among their Muslim allies.  
 The idea of cultivating relationships with Sanusi elites as colonial intermediaries 
dominated Italian strategies for increasing their economic influence in Cyrenaica and generating 
consensus for the occupation.  Even critics of what came to be known as the ‘pro-Islamic’ 
approach to colonial rule advocated by Enrico Insabato recognized the utility  of a favorable 
relationship  with Ahmad al-Sharif for the initial occupation, but in the subsequent development 
of an Italian colonial state, the emphasis on methods of indirect rule through an alliance with 
Muslim elites clashed with popular schemes for mass colonization calling for a cultural 
expansion to make the Libyan territories a fully Italian space.  The debates over the relative 
merits of direct or indirect forms of colonial rule often reflected competing interests of state or 
private capital or the influence of domestic political pressure, but the debate also reflected a 
national anxiety  over the position of religion in national politics and imperial expansion as 
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Italians struggled to deal with the thorny issue of the Catholic Church in a new national order 
and colonial officials sought  to define their administration in relation to a predominantly Muslim 
population.  
Early Italian Imperial Ambitions
 The territorial unification of the Kingdom of Italy and the fall of the Papal States in 
1861-1870 occurred in an age of heightened liberalism when imperialists throughout Europe 
rejected formal power in colonial expansion in favor of more subtle forms of indirect influence. 
The political elite in Rome, hoping to increase Italian influence and prove Italy’s worth as an 
imperial power, followed suit by favoring a form of national expansion that avoided direct state 
domination.84   In the 1870s, a small class of Italian explorers, capitalist adventurers, and 
missionaries began to call for territorial expansion, but ambitions among political actors in the 
Italian state focused primarily on an informal process of increasing Italian influence through the 
establishment of Italian trading posts and a combination of cultural and economic projects 
among Italian emigrants abroad.85  Italy’s failure to gain colonial possessions in the Congress of 
Berlin and the subsequent French occupation of Tunisia in 1881 and the British invasion of 
Egypt in 1882 fed popular perceptions that the liberalism of the 1870s had served as a superficial 
cover for maintaining British and French hegemony in the international competition for overseas 
dominions, and it precipitated the development of a nationalist discourse focused on territorial 
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aggrandizement in Italian popular press and among political elite in Rome.86   Mass emigration 
of Italians in the decades after unification, especially from Italy’s restive South, became a potent 
symbol of the inability  of the nation to provide for its people, and colonial expansion seemed to 
offer a possible solution by providing land for agricultural workers while utilizing Italy’s 
supposed excess population to the nation’s advantage on the international stage as the Italian 
state claimed the right to protect Italian communities around the world.   
 At the end of 1887, Francesco Crispi came to power as the first Sicilian Prime Minister of 
Italy with a foreign policy  platform focused on proving Italy’s worth as a Mediterranean power 
and a domestic interest in trying to ease unrest in the South’s agricultural regions, two issues he 
linked in his colonial ambitions.87  The French occupation of Tunisia in 1881 dashed the hopes of 
Italian imperialists for what seemed like a natural expansion across a small stretch of the 
Mediterranean and had the embarrassing consequence of placing a large community of Italian 
emigrants in Tunisia under French sovereignty.88  Facing the prospect of being locked out of the 
Mediterranean’s southern shore, Italian diplomats began a series of negotiations with European 
powers to obtain recognition of Italy’s right to claim Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in the event that 
the Ottoman Empire should lose control of its remaining North African territories.89  At the same 
time, Crispi initiated a project intended to use a collection of Italian commercial posts in East 
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Africa to expand Italian influence while avoiding what promised to be a costly colonial war in 
North Africa.  With the successful conclusion of an alliance with Emperor Menelik in the Treaty 
of Wuchale in 1889, Crispi announced the creation of an Italian protectorate in Ethiopia and 
generated a new level of enthusiasm for African adventures among former opponents of the 
colonial project.90
 As a mark of the link between the expansionist foreign policy and Italian emigration, 
Crispi reorganized the Foreign Ministry  in 1887 and created a new section in the Ministry 
dedicated to dealing with the issues of Italian emigration, expatriate colonies, and Italian schools 
abroad.91    Crispi’s inability to pass a bill to reform Sicily’s latifondisti system—in which a few 
land owners controlled access to agricultural holdings—in 1894 buttressed his resolve to engage 
in a colonial war both as a solution to the problems in the South and to answer the nationalists’ 
cry to unify the Italian nation through a “baptism of blood,” and he popularized the idea of 
broadening Italy’s claims over Eritrea and Ethiopia by  claiming that its value lay  in territory for 
Italian settlement.92  The defeat of Italian troops by African forces in the Battle of Adwa in 1896 
signaled the failure of Crispi’s colonial project and coincided with a surge in the rate of Italian 
emigration abroad, primarily  to the Americas.  More Italian soldiers died in Adwa than during 
the entire process of Italian unification, and the disaster contributed to the fall of Crispi’s 
government.93  
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Insabato and the “Pro-Islamic” Approach
 After Crispi’s fall from power, colonial wars and attempts at  territorial aggrandizement 
fell into disfavor, and nationalist interest groups focused on spreading Italian cultural and 
financial presence through emigration and commerce.94  The 1901 Law on Emigration signaled 
state commitment to a form of demographic colonialism through the protection of Italian 
communities abroad in programs that sought to use Italy’s high rate of emigration to the nation’s 
advantage while avoiding the costly and risky  business of territorial expansion.  The law 
established a new independent entity  to maintain contact with Italian emigrants around the world 
and created an emigration commissariat under the aegis of the Foreign Ministry.  Instead of 
seeing emigration as a sign of national weakness, Giolitti’s administration recast  the movement 
of Italians abroad as an expansion of Italian strength and an opportunity for commercial 
development.95   Publications like the Rivista Coloniale took up the cause and wrote about 
investment opportunities among the growing ranks of Italian communities in foreign lands, and 
the Ministry  of Foreign Affairs promoted education programs for Italian emigrants to encourage 
them to maintain ties to the homeland.  
 In this context of a turn away from the territorial aggrandizement of the Crispi era, liberal 
politicians returned to their previous agreements with British and French authorities recognizing 
Italian claims to the Libyan territories with an emphasis on the desirability  of indirect forms of 
colonial rule through local intermediaries.96   After his election as Prime Minister in 1902, 
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Giovanni Giolitti sent agents to Cairo to establish contacts with notables in the Libyan territories 
to deepen Italian ties in the region and try to determine possible reactions to an eventual Italian 
occupation.   Picking up  on the importance of the Sanusiyya in French literature, Giolitti’s 
administration identified the Sanusi elite as less of a threat to Italian imperial ambitions than a 
potential tool in an agenda of generating good will for Italy in North Africa and selling the Italian 
nation as friendly to Muslim interests on the international stage.97
  One of the most important figures in Giolitti’s outreach to Libyan elites was Enrico 
Insabato.  Insabato first went to Cairo in 1902 to attend a conference on colonial medicine, and 
he remained for the next decade as a personal agent  reporting directly  to Giolitti to develop 
programs of intellectual, cultural, and economic exchange meant to improve the image of Italy 
among Libyans in Cairo, particularly among theological students planning to become judges or 
officials upon their return to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 98   Insabato became an outspoken 
advocate of what his detractors called a “pro-Islamic” approach to Italian colonial rule, calling 
for the establishment of shari’a law in Italian-controlled territories, the construction of a mosque 
in Rome for Arabic instruction, and active outreach to the leaders of Sufi ṭuruq in North Africa to 
generate support for an eventual Italian occupation.  Insabato tried to form an alliance with the 
recognized head of the Sanusi family, Ahmad al-Sharif, through an intermediary, Muhammad 
‘Ali ‘Alawi, an Egyptian adherent of the Sanusiyya who worked as an interpreter first for the 
Italian consulate in Cairo starting in 1899 and then for the Italian diplomatic agency starting in 
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1901.99  The Italian office in Cairo first sent a mission to establish contact  with Ahmad al-Sharif 
by sending gifts to the Sanusi leader when his uncle died in 1902, and based primarily  on the 
information Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Alawi provided, Insabato advanced a more favorable view of the 
Sufi ṭarīqa than the one found in French literature.100   Arguing against the dominant French 
interpretation of the Sanusiyya as fanatically  anti-European, Insabato claimed that the Italians 
could harness the power of the Sanusiyya to work in their favor, both in the Libyan territories 
and in improving Italian relations with the Muslim world at large. 
 Insabato’s identification of the Sanusiyya as potential allies in Italian expansionist 
projects hinged on his characterization of the Sanusi ṭarīqa as a civilizing force that promoted 
stability  in the region.  Whereas French colonial ethnographers of the nineteenth century 
depicted the Sanusiyya as dangerous anti-Europeans, Insabato understood the structure and 
religious practices of the Sufi order to be promoting a pure form of Islamic orthodoxy pitted 
against reformist tendencies in the Muslim world that, he argued, diluted the strength of Islam 
through a weak imitation of modern European mores.  
 Insabato’s unofficial status as a personal agent of Giolitti allowed him the freedom to 
associate with an unconventional cross-section of anti-British and anti-modernist activists and 
intellectuals in Cairo who supported his particular interpretation of Islamic orthodoxy.  One of 
the more colorful characters involved in Insabato’s projects was Ivan Aguéli, a Swedish artist 
and author who wrote about mystical practices in Islam and Sufism for the Parisian journal Le 
70
99 ASMAI II 136/1/1, “Senussia - varie sul suo atteggiamento”, 1912.
100 Daniel J. Grange, L’Italie e la Méditerranée (1896-1911) (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1994), 
1495; Carlo Gotti Porcinari, Rapporti Italo-Arabi (1902-1930): Dai documenti di Enrico Insabato (Rome: 
E.S.P., 1965), 76.
Gnos under the direction of the renown anti-modernist René Guénon. 101   Guénon dedicated La 
Gnose to seeking a “primordial doctrine” through the protection of “the tree of tradition” against 
what he considered “the parasitic vegetation” of the Catholic church and the bourgeois values of 
the Western Enlightenment.  The contributors to the journal wrote about a variety of non-Western 
religious traditions to search for esoteric truths, and Ivan Aguéli became the journal’s expert on 
Sufi mysticism.102  After an initial meeting in Paris, Aguéli accompanied Insabato to Cairo to 
help  him create two Italian-Arabic magazines: Il Commercio italiano about Italian commerce in 
the Arab world and Il Convito, known as Al-Nadi in Arabic.103  
 Insabato and Aguéil’s publications promoted an image of Italy as a champion of 
conservative Muslim interests in an age of secularization driven by  imperialism.  In the first issue 
of Al-Nadi in 1904, Insabato introduced the magazine as an effort to support orthodox Islam 
against reformist  and modernizing movements in the Muslim world which he argued were 
directed by  and for the benefit of British interests in the region.  He characterized modernizing 
movements in Islam as “a mongrel, restless, pretentious, and ridiculous world, composed of 
grotesque imitators of Europe.  I have seen them conserve Islam in name only, trying to change it 
into a type of Protestantism in tarbush.”104   Insabato promoted the idea that orthodox Islam 
served an essential civilizing role in the region, and he declared it his mission to show Europeans 
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a side of Islam that was neither fanatical nor anti-European while he demonstrated a pro-Islamic 
side of Europe to the Muslim world.  He identified Sufism as the best example of “true” Islam 
and Sufis as Muslims who resisted the nefarious effects of reformist movements calling for 
modernization in Islam.   
 Insabato saw his efforts simultaneously as an outreach to potential Muslim allies in the 
Libyan territories and as part of a broader program to improve Italian relations with the Muslim 
world at large.  He used his contacts in the region to distribute Al-Nadi to Sufi zawāyā in 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in the years leading up to the Italian occupation as propaganda to 
encourage a favorable opinion of the Italian administration, but he also intended the periodical 
for consumption by Muslim elites in Constantinople to encourage them to resist French and 
British pressure to rebel against the Ottoman Sultan’s claims to the role of Caliph.  Insabato 
championed pan-Islamic sentiment in his publications, though with a different emphasis from 
that promoted by Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1908).  “Al-Nadi preached a more federative unity 
presided over by  the Ottoman dynasty, in contrast to ‘Abd al-Hamid’s centralized concept of 
unity.  Ultimately, al-Nadi and Insabato had a political agenda as well: a diffused Islamic system, 
rather than a centralized system, would better aid in establishing an Italian presence in the 
Mediterranean basin.”105   
 Insabato began to focus on the Sanusiyya at the center of his projects in the region 
starting in 1905-1906, an era when the opening of the Banco di Roma branch in Tripoli signaled 
an increased interest among Italian elites in expanding their commercial presence in the Libyan 
territories.  In 1906, Insabato produced a long report for Giolitti and the Foreign Ministry in 
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which he posed the Sanusiyya as a growing force in Islam that the Italians could use against 
other European powers.  Citing their dominant position in regional trade routes as potentially 
beneficial to Italian economic penetration in both Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, Insabato 
recommended measures to further ties with the Sanusi family included a plan to send the sons of 
the previous spiritual leader of the Sufi ṭarīqa, Muhammad al-Mahdi, to universities in Italy  for a 
European education.106  Insabato’s insistence on the utility of an alliance with the Sanusi elite 
shaped the Italian approach to colonial rule in the Libyan territories for years to come.     
 Controversy surrounding Insabato’s attempts to cultivate ties with Muslim notables in 
Cairo led to his temporary expulsion from the region and a pause in Italian efforts to form an 
alliance with the Sanusi elite in Cyrenaica.  Insabato’s outspoken support of what he considered 
anti-modernist orthodoxy in Islam carried with it a critique of British policies that brought him 
into conflict with British officials and suggested the heightened international tensions 
surrounding the attempts to develope ties with Muslim notables in North Africa.  Through his 
collaboration with Aguéli, Insabato formed a connection to ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Ilaish, the head of 
the Sufi ṭarīqa al-‘Arabiyya al-Shadhiliyya in Egypt.107  ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Ilaish was the son of 
Muhammad ‘Ilish, the Egyptian Maliki mufti in the 19th century who led opposition to Western 
reforms instituted by the Khedive Isma’il (1863-79) and one of the leading figures in the ‘Urabi 
revolt (1881-82) against growing foreign influence in Egypt and the predominantly  Turkish 
control of the Ottoman army.  Muhammad ‘Ilish died in prison following the British repression 
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of the ‘Urabi revolt, and Abd al-Rahman ‘Ilish probably  saw his involvement with the Italians 
and the journal Al-Nadi as a way to further the anti-British and anti-reformist activities of his 
father. 108  
 In 1906, Abd al-Rahman ‘Ilish marked his goodwill towards the Italians in a highly 
controversial commemoration of a small mosque in Cairo to the memory  of Umberto I, Italy’s 
former king.  The construction of the mosque inspired Insabato to declare Italy a pro-Islamic 
country, but it induced writers for Rashid Rida’s journal Al-Manar to portray Abd al-Rahman 
‘Ilish as a handmaiden to Italian plans to take control of Libya and Somalia.  The issue even went 
to court  in Cairo, and Insabato was found guilty of conspiring against Muslims despite his pro-
Muslim rhetoric.109   The controversy surrounding the Umberto I mosque prompted British 
officials to request the Italian diplomatic agency in Cairo to eject Insabato from the region in 
1907.  Anxious to avoid antagonizing the British until they could clarify the uncertain border 
between Egypt and Cyrenaica, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tommaso Tittoni, 
instructed the consulate in Cairo to comply with the request, and Insabato was forced out of 
Egypt in 1908.110   The Italian Minister of Colonies sent Insabato back to Cairo in 1910 in 
preparation for the occupation of the Libyan coast, but his ejection from North Africa in 1908 
underscored the volatility of international competition for alliances with Muslim notables in the 
first decade of the twentieth century.  Insabato hoped to leverage Italian influence in the Libyan 
territories and an alliance with the Sanusi elite to increase Italian prestige throughout the Muslim 
world.  As I will demonstrate further below, Insabato lost credibility as a regional expert after the 
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Italian invasion of the Libyan coast when Ahmad al-Sharif and the Sanusi ikhwān refused to 
support Italian claims to sovereignty  in the region, but his advocacy of the Sanusiyya as effective 
colonial intermediaries continued to influence Italian approaches to colonial rule, especially 
among Italian officials who saw the colonial project as part of a broader strategy for foreign 
policy focused on presenting Italy  as a bridge across the Mediterranean linking Christian Europe 
with Muslim North Africa.
Territorial Expansion in National Politics
 While Insabato stirred controversy in Cairo, a renewed interest in colonial expansion 
developed among a wide cross-section of political and financial elites in Italy.  In an era of mass 
politics and universal male suffrage, shifting political alliances increasingly featured the popular 
call to territorial aggrandizement as a central theme.  Opponents to Giolitti’s government began 
to cite the inability  of the Italian state to protect Italian interests in the Mediterranean as a sign of 
the state’s weakness, adding weight to complaints among Italians with commercial ties to the 
Libyan territories that they faced increased discrimination from Ottoman officials after the Young 
Turk revolution of 1908.111  Renewed demands for direct territorial expansion also shaped the 
populist rhetoric of the group of intellectuals and political activists who founded the 
Associazione Nazionalista Italiana (ANI) in Florence in December 1910 and then began to 
publish L’Idea Nazionale in March 1911 to mark the fifteenth anniversary of the Battle of Adwa. 
Calling for the development of a strong state presence in international affairs, the founding 
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members of the ANI criticized liberal democracy as being “incompatible with modernity and the 
need for expansionism.”112  
 Support within the ANI for colonial expansion centered on the call for increased 
territorial space to mitigate the international embarrassment of mass emigration, a call that 
became a popular national cause and spurred the Italian invasion of the Libyan territories. 
Enrico Corradini, the original founder of the ANI and a widely-recognized intellectual father of 
twentieth century  Italian nationalism, seized on emigration as a key sign of liberalism’s 
failures.113   The nationalist desire for territorial expansion resonated in the speech Corradini 
made at the first congress of the ANI in 1910: “It is necessary either to conquer colonies, or to 
emigrate, or to become Malthusian.  But to become Malthusian is vile, to emigrate is servile, and 
only the conquest of colonies is worthy of a free and noble people.”114  The younger generation 
of primarily  Roman nationalists involved in the ANI did not necessarily stand against the goals 
of the liberal elite; in the case of the occupation of Libya, for example, they shared an interest in 
expanding Italian presence in the region.  The distinction lay more in their enthusiasm for state 
expansion and their celebration of violent war as a means of unifying the Italian nation.  
 The invasion of the Libyan coast in 1911 had a galvanizing effect in Italian domestic 
politics in generating support for Giolitti’s ministry and in the formation of new political 
alliances with long-term effects for Italian nationalism and the development of colonial policies 
in the Libyan territories.  Prominent politicians and Freemason lodges joined the call for state 
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protection of Italian interests in North Africa.115   The popularity  of the expansionist project 
among Catholic interest groups contributed to the success of the Gentiloni Pact in the 1913 
general elections in which liberal and Catholic interests joined forces against the Socialist party, 
already weakened by divided reactions to the colonial project.  The increased involvement of 
Catholic interest groups in the 1913 elections led to the election of Luigi Federzoni to the 
Chamber of Deputies.  One of the founding members of ANI and later Mussolini’s Minister of 
Colonies, Federzoni won his seat on a platform against Freemasonry  and in favor of colonial war 
that gained him the support of pro-Catholic elites and secured his position as a vocal proponent 
of colonial politics and Catholic involvement in Rome.116  
 
Italian Expansion and the Catholic Financial Interests
 An increase of Catholic participation in national politics in support of the invasion of the 
Libyan territories represented a significant shift after decades of bitter public disputes between 
the Holy See and Italian state officials in Rome, but it  also reflected an increase in Vatican 
reliance on overseas investments that stood to benefit from Italian state intervention.  The 
involvement of Catholic politicians and voting blocks in the 1913 elections reflected an informal 
easing of Vatican directives against Catholic participation in national elections.   After the liberal 
state nationalized a large portion of Papal lands in 1860, the Holy See embraced an intransigent 
attitude against the Italian politics.  Starting with Pope Pius IX’s encyclical Syllabus Errorum in 
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1864, church officials declared the Italian nationalism anathema to Catholic interests and 
recommended against Catholic participation in national elections.  Leo XIII turned his 
predecessor’s recommendation that Catholics abstain from national politics into a prohibition 
against voting in Italian national elections that lasted until Pope Benedict XV declared an end to 
the non expedit in the elections of 1919.117 
 The inflammatory rhetoric of Catholic intransigency masked a gradual incorporation of 
moderate Catholics into the national political hierarchy largely through investment of Church 
capital in state projects and corresponding state protection of Church debts.118  The continued 
influence of Catholic elites in Rome and international support for the Pope gave weight to 
moderate voices in the negotiations for a post-unification Law of Guarantees in which the state 
offered to recognize the Pope as a spiritual authority with the “personal prerogatives of a 
sovereign” and exemption from taxes in papal territories in exchange for his renunciation of the 
Papal States.  Determined not to lend credibility to the Italian state and convinced of the 
fundamental instability of parliamentary acts, the Pope denounced the Law of Guarantees and 
rejected the state’s corollary offer of financial assistance to maintain his staff and properties. 119  
 The Pope’s refusal of state funding put the Holy See’s already weakened finances in a 
precarious position and eventually led the Church to increase its capital investments in Rome and 
abroad.  During much of the nineteenth century, the Papal States experienced weak economic 
78
117 Alice A. Kelikian, "The Church and Catholicism," in Liberal and Fascist Italy 1900-1945, ed. Adrian 
Lyttelton, The Short Oxford History of Italy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 46; John Pollard, 
Catholicism in Modern Italy: Religion, Society, and Politics since 1861 (London: Routledge, 2008), 29, 
47.
118 Luigi Ganapini, Il nazionalismo cattolico: I cattolici e la politica estera in Italia dal 1871 al 1914 
(Rome: Laterza, 1970), 15-18.
119 Owen Chadwick, A History of the Popes 1830-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 228.  
growth due, in part, to an ideological imperative to avoid direct involvement in liberal 
capitalism.120   By the time of Italian unification, the Holy See had accrued sizable debts that 
compounded when the state seized over two-thirds of papal land.  The loss of these properties led 
to a drastic reduction in revenue from taxation for the Holy See, but the Pope refused to reduce 
the pomp and ceremony in the Vatican or the Holy See’s diplomatic missions abroad as he sought 
to maintain an international presence to support his claims to political authority.  With a 
reduction in revenue from the loss of papal properties and no corresponding reduction in 
expenditures, the Vatican became almost entirely dependent on the income generated from 
donations.  Though funds poured in from Catholics as a sign of piety and a symbol of protest 
against state policies towards religion throughout Europe, the revenue could not cover the 
Vatican’s heavy  costs.  In 1864, the Italian state took responsibility for two-thirds of the Vatican’s 
debt in a secret agreement to compensate for the properties lost by the Holy  See during Italian 
unification.121 
 The late 1870s witnessed a changing of the guard in the Vatican with the election of Pope 
Leo XIII and the appointment of a new head of Vatican finances, Enrico Folchi who proved more 
willing than his predecessors to invest the surplus from Catholic donations in Italian state and 
private enterprises leading to an increase in direct financial involvement of Vatican funds in state 
development on the peninsula and throughout the Mediterranean.  Previous financial advisers to 
the Holy See considered investments in Italian industry and commerce too risky, but under 
Folchi’s guidance, Vatican finances largely funded the Rome building boom in the 1870s and 
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early 80s.  Between 1870 and 1914, the Holy  See invested on average about 5 million Lire of its 
income from Peter’s Pence in the local economy.122  During this period, members of the Papal 
aristocracy  also tied up  their fortunes to the massive construction projects around the new capital 
city, and their financial contributions gave them political weight in local elections.  When the 
building boom collapsed in 1887, the Holy See lost  a large portion of its patrimony, but the 
finances of the Holy See and the Catholic nobility were deeply intertwined with the Italian 
national economy.  
 A network of personal interests tied the financial fate of the Holy See to the successful 
expansion of the Banco di Roma in North Africa, and in the years leading up to the Italian 
occupation of the Libyan coast, the Vatican used its media outlets to generate support for Italian 
state intervention in the Ottoman territories.  The connection between the Holy See and the 
Banco di Roma originated with the bank’s founders, Borghese princes who counted among the 
aristocracy  of the Papal States.  The two founded the Banca di Roma in 1884 with direct 
assistance from Pope Leo XIII who instructed Folchi to make a sizable investment in the bank 
from the Vatican’s coffers.123  As one of the new forms of Italian mixed banks that developed in 
the 1880s, the Banco di Roma collected capital from deposits then invested that capital, mostly 
in real estate construction in Rome.  After the building bubble collapsed, Folchi was forced out 
of his position in control of Vatican finances, and Leo XIII turned to the advice of Ernesto 
Pacelli.  The president of the Banco di Roma until 1916, Pacelli came from the same family as 
the later Pope Pius XII, and he directed the investments of the Holy See to help  drive the 




 Through its ties to the Banco di Roma and a network of personal and political 
connections, the Holy See gained a clear interest in the Banco di Roma’s investments in North 
Africa and the eventual Italian invasion of the Libyan coast.  The Banco di Roma became 
directly  involved in national politics by backing the election of Tommaso Tittoni, the Foreign 
Minister from 1903 to 1905 and the brother of one of the directors of the bank.  Soon thereafter, 
the Banco di Roma began investing in banking, shipping lines, agricultural projects, and 
commercial enterprises on the Libyan coast with the explicit support of the Italian Foreign 
Ministry.124   In 1905, the Banco di Roma opened a new branch in Alexandria with Vatican funds 
as an attempt to outmaneuver its competitors by focusing on international expansion instead of 
Italian industries.125  Pacelli worked closely with Italian authorities and became an outspoken 
advocate for Italian expansion in Libya as he looked to North African shores for investment 
opportunities.
 Ultimately, the Banco di Roma and Vatican finances suffered losses from the Libyan war 
which it never recovered.  The terms of the ultimatum the Italian state issued to the Ottoman 
Empire on the invasion of Tripoli and Benghazi implied that the war was being fought at least in 
part to defend the interests of the Banco di Roma, but in the peace negotiations following the 
Ottomans’ capitulation in 1912, the Banca Commerciale—the Banca di Roma’s primary 
competitors—gained the upper hand in investing in Italy’s new colonial territories.126  However, 
the early involvement of Vatican funding expanded Italy’s foothold in the Libyan territories, and 
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the vocal support of an associated Catholic press  helped sell the idea of colonial expansion to 
the Italian public as a civilizing mission and a confirmation of the nation’s Catholic identity.
 
Italian Expansionism and the Catholic Press
 The Vatican maintained an official position of neutrality towards the issue of Italian 
expansion abroad, but the Catholic Press joined a wider media campaign calling for the Italian 
occupation of the Libyan territories that pushed Giolitti to declare war in Libya sooner than he 
intended.127   During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Holy See established two 
media outlets: L’Osservatore Romano opened in 1861, and La Civiltà Cattolica opened in 1854 
and came under direct control of the Vatican in the 1880s.128  These semi-official publications 
constituted a small part of a wider spectrum of mostly  regional popular Catholic newspapers. 
After widespread alliances between clerical and liberal interests in regional elections in 1904, the 
majority  of these pro-Catholic newspapers and journals adopted conciliatory tones towards 
national politics, and they championed the invasion of the Libyan territories as an opportunity to 
promote cooperation between the Church and the liberal elite against socialist  and Freemason 
influence.  Catholic enthusiasm for the Italian occupation of Libya spread on a massive scale as 
priests called for holy war in the pulpits and the Catholic Press extolled the benefits of nationalist 
expansion.129       
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 The Catholic Press propagated a widespread expectation in Italy that  the Libyan 
population would approve of the Italian occupation as a welcome change from the Ottoman 
administration, and seized on the opportunity to extol the virtues of projecting a decidedly 
Catholic form of Italian nationalism as a means of securing the support of local populations 
through a shared recognition of the centrality  of religion in Italian and North African culture 
against a rising secularism in Istanbul.  Having developed ties with Hassuna Caramanli and the 
Muntasser families—prominent merchant and political elites who suffered from a loss of 
influence after the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) came to power in Istanbul in 1908—
the director of the Banco di Roma in Tripoli widely reported that the local population had no 
opposition to the prospect of an Italian occupation, and a call to help the local elite rid 
themselves of an oppressive regime became a standard theme.130   Voices in the Catholic Press 
urged Italian state intervention in the region to counter what was characterized as Muslim hatred 
towards Christians in Ottoman restrictions on Italian property  ownership and regional trade 
practices, but the appeals for state assistance escalated with the murder of Giustino Pacini, an 
Italian missionary  sent to Derna in 1903 to build a new station on behalf of the Franciscan order 
of the Frati Minori di Lombardia.  Pacini died in March 1908 in suspicious circumstances, and 
La Civiltá Cattolica accused Ottoman officials in Derna of ordering the murder of the Franciscan 
missionary as part of a pattern of consistent anti-Christian behavior.131  
 With public sympathy for the plight of Catholic missions at a height, the Catholic Press 
used the murder of the Italian missionary as an opportunity  to extoll the benefits of a Catholic 
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form of Italian national identity in facilitating imperial expansion.  La Civiltá Cattolica argued 
that in embracing their religious identity, Catholic Italians could appeal to the religiosity  of 
Muslim populations in North Africa as a favorable contrast to secularizing inclinations among 
political elites in the CUP to undermine the influence of the Ottoman administration.  “The lack 
of religion is not in fashion in the Orient, and they know well of the burning of the churches and 
of those who scoff at the clergy  in Italy, their sacrilege dissolves the patria at its frontiers and 
defames it abroad, stopping its impulses and initiatives.”132   In January  1911, the Catholic daily 
of Turin, Il Momento, went a step further and depicted Catholic Italians as true nationalists and 
imperialists struggling against the pernicious influence of anti-clerics, socialists, and 
Freemasons.  The paper claimed to have uncovered a plot involving members of the CUP and 
Freemasons in the Italian government who agreed to refrain from challenging Ottoman 
sovereignty in North Africa out of loyalty to their mutual ties to Freemason lodges.  The editors 
of La Civiltà Cattolica cited the story  as evidence of a confluence of international and national 
interests pitted against increased Italian presence in Ottoman territories.133 
 Though the Catholic Press celebrated Italian annexation of the Libyan territories, La 
Civiltá Cattolica proved less supportive of the occupying forces’ attempts to gain the trust of 
religious notables by promising religious toleration.  Soon after the invasion, the commanding 
officer of the occupation, General Caneva, issued a declaration promising that  Italian troops 
would defend Islam in the territory and guarantee the rights of Muslims to continue their 
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traditions and practices under Italian rule.134   Caneva’s proclamation reflected a fairly 
conventional claim to religious tolerance from European imperial powers in Muslim territories in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but an article in La Civiltá Cattolica criticized 
Caneva’s attempt to appease the religious sensibilities of the local population for falsely 
representing Italian culture and denying Italian religious identity.  “The Italian authorities also 
tried, and please excuse the term, to ‘muslimize’ themselves, using phrases from the Qur’an and 
appropriating Muslim religious sentiments that in their mouths are a fiction and an ugly  and 
misleading political action.”135   Efforts of colonial officials to cultivate relationships with 
Muslim notables and to claim a role as defenders of Islam in the Libyan territories proved a 
constant source of tension for political figures and media outlets in Italy as they  engaged in 
debates over the nature of religious and national identity in Italian overseas expansion.  For 
Italian missionaries in the Libyan territories, these debates posed immediate consequences for 
their mission and the possibilities of their alignments with Italian state activities.       
Catholic Missionaries and Crispi’s Colonial Project
 In the last  decades of the nineteenth century, Church and state officials in Rome found 
common ground over the issue of Italian emigration abroad as Italian political leaders of the 
Crispi administration enlisted the help  of Catholic missionary networks to maintain a sense of 
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Italian identity among emigrant communities around the world.136   Missionary groups also 
collaborated in Crispi’s expansionist programs in East Africa, though the relationships between 
colonial officials overseeing the tentative extension of Italian influence and missionary groups 
often depended more on the political and religious persuasions of the particular individuals 
working in the region rather than on an overarching plan.  Among the predominately Christian 
populations of East Africa, Italian state officials and missionaries expected to face less 
opposition to Catholic missionary work compared to Muslim North Africa, and their 
collaboration seemed to offer the possibility of carving out a zone of Italian-Catholic influence. 
Several local Italian officials, however, blocked effective expansion of Catholic missions in 
territories of Italian influence; citing the need to prevent local opposition often served as an easy 
excuse for an ideological impulse to prevent Church involvement in the colonial project.   
 When Crispi declared Eritrea an Italian colony in 1890, he appointed Oreste Baratieri, a 
devoted Catholic, to the position of its first military governor, and in line with a politics of 
reconciliation, Baratieri promoted the involvement of Catholic missionaries in the Italian 
colonial project throughout his tenure.  Baratieri collaborated in this cause with Geremia 
Bonomelli, a moderate Bishop who founded the Associazione nazionale per soccorrere i 
missioni cattolici italiani (National Association to Aid Italian Catholic Missions) in Florence in 
1886.  Bonomelli’s Association sought to end the reliance of Italian missionaries on subsidies 
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from foreign governments by  increasing Italian state funding.137  His project reflected an attempt 
to decrease the influence of French state funding, which had sustained Catholic missionary 
activity for much of the nineteenth century, and it provoked a confrontation with French 
missionaries in the region.  When Italy declared Eritrea a colony in 1890, the Catholic missions 
there fell under the jurisdiction of the Vicariate of the French Lazzarists in Ethiopia, and 
Baratieri and Bonomelli worked together to try  to remove the French control as a means of 
solidifying Italian claims to the region.  Citing concerns that  the disparity in language between 
the missions and state officials would confuse the native populations, Baratieri enlisted 
Bonomelli’s assistance to request the Vatican to transfer the mission in Eritrea to Italian control. 
Initially, Propaganda Fide refused out of deference to the Missionary Institution of Lyon, but  in 
1894, the Vatican finally  placed the missionaries in Eritrea under the control of Italian 
Capuchins.138  Having achieved their initial goal of nationalizing the Catholic mission, Baratieri 
and Bonomelli organized a Catholic settlement program to bring Italian agriculturalists to Eritrea 
in 1895 to compete with a similar Parliamentary  project  under the direction of the conservative 
Baron Leopoldo Franchetti.  Both projects failed after Baratieri’s disastrous defeat at Adwa in 
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1896 led to the withdrawal of Italian troops and settlements, but they presented contrasting 
visions for the link between religious and national identity in Italian expansionist policies.
 The collaboration between Baratieri and Bonomelli in Eritrea stemmed in part  from their 
mutual dedication to reconciliation in national politics, but it also reflected a widespread belief 
that, in contrast to Muslim North Africa, the Christian populations of Ethiopia and Eritrea would 
prove fertile ground for Catholic missionary activity.  In 1889, the journalist Filippo Tolli 
founded the Societá antischiavista d’Italia [The Italian Anti-Slavery Society] in Rome and began 
to advocate the establishment of Italian missions in the territories under Italian protection in East 
Africa as a means of both promoting the unification of Church and state interests in Rome and 
defending the region against the linked threats of the slave trade and Muslim expansion.139  Lucia 
Ceci has pointed to the language of the Vice Secretary  of the Societá antischiavista d’Italia, 
Gennaro Angelini, on the occasion of its first meeting in 1892 as promoting the hopes of 
conciliatory circles for the potential of colonial expansion to unify Church and state interests 
against the influence of Islam or secular imperial state in Africa:
Convinced that colonial expansion in Africa will be providential for opening the black 
continent to the Christian civilization and to rescue from the predominant and fatal 
Islamic influence, frankly I declare myself happy  that for Italy as well, more faithful for 
the most part to the old religion, there has been reserved a part of this glorious crusade 
against barbarity offering thus to our valorous Missionaries a most extensive field of 
action for the benefit of the civilization of the Patria.140   
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Soon after, Angelini, on behalf of the Societá antischiavista d’Italia, proposed that Propaganda 
Fide establish an Italian mission in Benadir in the Italian-controlled portion of the Somalian 
coast under the direction of the Trinitarians, an order that dated its origins to the end of the 
twelfth century when it was dedicated to freeing Christians held captive during the Crusades. 
 Propaganda Fide followed his recommendation in 1904 and formally declared the 
creation of an apostolic prefecture of Benadir within the Vicariate of Zanzibar under the direct 
control of Trinitarians, but they faced a long and difficult  road in gaining the approval of state 
officials who cited Muslim opposition as justification for blocking the proposal.  The head of the 
mission, Padre Leandro, waited two years before colonial officials gave him permission to enter 
the region.  The refusal to grant him entry surprised Vatican officials given that the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Tomasso Tittoni, was known for his familial ties with the Catholic hierarchy and 
the Banco di Roma.  Tittoni did approve of the establishment of a small mission with the hopes 
that it  would promote “agricultural development, medical services, and aid to freed slaves,”141 
but the consul general of Zanzibar, Luigi Mercatelli, blocked the mission’s entry  into Italian 
Somaliland and convinced Tittoni that the presence of a Catholic mission in the colony at that 
time would inflame anti-Italian sentiment by provoking Islamic fanaticism.   
The subsequent standoff between Mercatelli and Padre Leandro inspired bitter disputes in 
ministerial communications, popular press, and parliamentary debates over the relationship 
between colonial expansion and missionary  activities.  Like many military  and state officials at 
the time, Mercatelli self-identified as a Freemason and anti-cleric, and when Padre Leandro 
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established a mission just over the border of British Somaliland without causing any sort  of 
negative reaction, the absence of an Islamic backlash revealed the underlying personal and 
political grounds for his prevention of the mission.   The account of the Italian explorer Enrico A. 
D’Albertis, who happened to arrive in the region on the same ship as Padre Leandro, further 
challenged the rationale of the Italian authorities for their refusal to allow entry to Padre 
Leandro.  D’Albertis argued that the hostility of the native population towards the Italians 
stemmed not from the possibility of a Catholic presence in Benadir, but was the result of the 
ineptitude of the colonial administration.  He claimed that Italian colonial officials were hiding 
behind the mission as an excuse for their own failures to generate local consensus, and he 
pointed to examples from French, British, and German cooperation with missions as evidence of 
the potential benefits of collaboration in helping increase national influence abroad.142
 In Rome, political opponents seized on the events surrounding Padre Leandro as a 
political instrument to denounce Mercatelli and by extension Tittoni and the entire liberal 
approach to Italian colonial administration he represented in debates in the Italian House of 
Deputies.  The introduction of a new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonino Di San Giuliano, in 
December 1905 introduced a general shift in attitudes among central officials in Rome in favor 
of using missionaries for the benefit of Italy’s imperialist ambitions, though the relationship 
between Italian missionary activity and colonial expansion remained fraught with tension in the 
Libyan territories where European officials feared the potential of religious convictions to derail 




 Missionaries in Libya and the Italian Occupation
A variety  of factors paved a smoother path of cooperation between missionaries and state 
officials in Rome in the preparations for the Italian invasion of the Libyan territories.  By the 
time Giolitti initiated the occupation of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1911, moderates on both sides of 
the Roman Question were eager to find a path to reconciliation in domestic politics.  The future 
of the liberal government depended on maintaining the support of Catholic voters against a 
Socialist opposition.  The popularity  of the colonial project in Libya proved to be a key factor in 
securing Catholic support in the 1913 elections as the Catholic Press sold the invasion as the 
opportunity to cooperate in spreading a particularly Catholic brand of Italian civilization in 
Africa.  The personal attitudes of the church and state officials involved in the region also 
facilitated cooperation, at least at the beginning of the colonial occupation.  Tittoni served a 
second term as Foreign Minister under Giolitti’s third cabinet (1906-1909), but he had learned 
the risks of excluding missionaries from the colonial project in the public debacle caused by 
Mercatelli’s conflicts with Padre Leandro in Benadir.  This time around, Tittoni advocated state 
support of the Franciscan mission as a reliable and relatively  inexpensive source of education 
and health care and as a means of increasing Italian presence in the region.  The Catholic mission 
in Tripoli and Benghazi under the control of the Franciscan order of the Frati Minori di 
Lombardia possessed the further advantage of having already firmly established a monopoly on 
missionary  activity in the region by the time the Italian forces arrived.  The Franciscan order 
claimed to be able to trace its presence in the region back to the seventeenth century, but its 
activities relevant to the current story began in 1810 when the order instituted a school in Tripoli.  
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In the decade preceding the invasion of the Libyan coast, the mission of the Frati Minori 
di Lombardia in the Libyan provinces sought increased financial and political ties to the Italian 
state as they  signaled their support for the expansionist project.  Like other Catholic missions, the 
Frati Minori received political protection and financial subsides from France in the nineteenth 
century.  As part of an effort to extend French cultural influence in the Middle East and Africa, 
the French state fostered positive relationships with missionaries through direct material support. 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the mission steadily increased its educational activities 
in the region by opening a girls’ school in Tripoli and another boys’ school in the eastern Libyan 
city of Benghazi, all with French financial backing.  In 1882, the Franciscan mission signed a 
contract with the Frères Maristes, a French lay  order dedicated to educating young Catholics, to 
bring them in as the primary  instructors and managers of the mission’s schools for boys.144  The 
formation of a new government in France in 1899 under the republican Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau 
marked an end of France’s official protection of Catholic missionaries when Waldeck-Rousseau 
severed ties between Church and State, expelled religious orders from France, and broke 
diplomatic ties with the Vatican.  The French government stopped short of expelling missionaries 
from French Africa, but they severely curtailed their subsidies.145  
 The repeal of French political and economic support at the turn of the century  left the 
Italian Franciscans in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica looking for new patrons for both financial and 
diplomatic assistance, and the lack of state support provoked clashes with Ottoman officials in 
the province.  At the beginning of 1901, the Apostolic Prefect of Tripoli, Giuseppe Bevilacqua, 
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complained in his annual report to Propaganda Fide that the mission did not receive the support 
they  needed from the French, especially when it came to dealing with the local Ottoman 
government.  The point of contention centered on a request the Prefect  had been making for three 
years for the French Ambassador in Constantinople to obtain the necessary permission from the 
Ottoman government for the mission to buy land and construct a new Church in al-Khoms, a city 
about 100 kilometers southeast of Tripoli.146  Once they received permission, the lack of funding 
prevented its construction.  Propaganda Fide sent the mission 1000 Lire in response, but it was 
far less than what was needed.147  By 1904, the Apostolic Prefect  reported a severe financial 
situation due to the lack of funds and overextension of their activities, and they began to receive 
extraordinary subsidies from Propaganda Fide on a regular basis.  
 Recognizing the increased interest in expanding Italian presence in the region, the 
Apostolic Prefect began writing requests to the Italian consulate in Tripoli in November 1905 
asking that the Italian state assume official protection of the Franciscan mission.  Bevilacqua 
pursued an aggressive tactic of nationalizing the mission and promoting increased Italian 
presence in the region to garner favor for the mission’s work.   When the mission officially 
renounced French backing in 1908, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Tittoni agreed to grant Italian 
protection and promised to pay  the Franciscan mission an annual sum of 12,000 Lire in exchange 
for an increased emphasis on teaching Italian language in its schools and promoting a positive 
image of Italy through the provision of medical services.148  
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 With state funding secured, the Franciscan missionaries became vocal advocates of the 
Italian occupation and called for projects for mass emigration of Italian settlers to increase the 
Catholic presence in the region.  In their support of settlement schemes in the Libyan territories, 
missionary  leaders denounced the influence of the Sanusiyya for promoting a uniform and 
exclusionary culture that threatened to impede the joint expansion of the Italian state and the 
Catholic mission.   The new Prefect of the Franciscan Mission, Buonaventura Rossetti, favored 
projects for Italian settlement in part as an opportunity  to assist the mission in its plans to convert 
freed slaves, mostly subsaharan Africans.  According to Rossetti, local Muslim populations, 
especially those affiliated with the Sanusiyya, refused to integrate or employ  former slaves 
because of their religious and racial status, and the danger that they would face isolation impeded 
the mission’s connected efforts at conversion and abolition.  Besides the risk of inciting religious 
opposition, Rossetti believed converted ex-slaves would find it near impossible to secure 
employment or start families.  Being “moretti,” they would never find wives among the Maltese, 
Italian, and French Catholic population of Cyrenaica, and being Catholic, they would never find 
wives among anyone else.  They would be trapped in a no-man’s land of race and religion.  
 The best solution, Rossetti speculated, would be if the Banco di Roma could complete a 
proposed project to colonize territories it had purchased in the area around Benghazi by bringing 
in Italian families who could then hire the baptized former slaves to work in their homes.  As part 
of their increased financial investments in North Africa, the Banco di Roma began acquiring land 
in Cyrenaica in the first decade of the twentieth century.  Initially, they focused on fertile oases 
thought to be abandoned in the vicinity of Benghazi with the intention of renting or selling plots 
to Italian emigrants who were to cultivate crops for consumption in the urban centers along the 
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coast.  Opposition from Ottoman officials forced the Banco di Roma to renounce its settlement 
schemes, though the territory  they acquired initially later became one of the first planned 
agricultural villages of Cyrenaica under state management. 149   Rossetti cited the opposition of 
Ottoman officials as further evidence of the need for state occupation of the region to support the 
financial and civilizing missions of Catholic interests against the opposition of what he called 
“Arab-Turco fanaticism” exacerbated by the presence of the Sanusiyya.150  In identifying the 
influence of the Sanusiyya as a barrier against the Italian occupation, Rossetti voiced a popular 
perspective on the opposition between the Sufi order and the expansion of European presence 
and aligned himself and the mission with advocates of mass emigration.  The move positioned 
the mission against the relatively  small body of political elites in the colonial administration who 
continued to follow the prescriptions of Enrico Insabato intent on promoting an image of Italy  as 
a pro-Islamic colonial power and developing an alliance with the Sanusi family  to facilitate state 
expansion in the Libyan interior.  
 Like nationalist advocates of Italian settlement schemes, the Franciscan mission saw 
itself as engaged in a campaign to carve out a position for Italian and Catholic interests against 
the influence of rival religious and national groups with competing claims to influence in the 
region.  In trying to carve out a position for the mission in the Libyan territories, the Franciscans 
at times tempered their advocacy of a strong state expansion with a recognition of the need to 
accomodate local religious sensibilities to assuage fears among Italian state officials of the risks 
of associating with the Catholic organization.  The mission sought to strike this balance as a 
means of edging out potential competition for the missionary  territory by  assuring their relative 
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cooperation with the goals of state officials to minimize local opposition to the Italian presence. 
The Congregation of St. Joseph represented the most immediate threat for its conversion 
activities among freed slaves in the region of Benghazi, and Rossetti requested the Propaganda 
Fide prevent them from expanding their practices beyond aid work to active proselytizing.151  As 
part of the strategy for securing their position, Rossetti assured Italian central officials in Rome 
that the Frati Minori would respect the difficulties of governing a Muslim population, and he 
characterized his mission as uniquely capable of preventing the level of anti-Christian fanaticism 
among local Muslim elites the Congregation of St. Joseph threatened to engender with its 
abolitionist activities.  In contrast, Rossetti suggested that the Franciscan mission would abstain 
from active proselytizing or engage in abolitionist projects to reduce opposition to Italian 
influence.  The Franciscans’s willingness to abstain from anti-slavery activities helped solidify 
state support, and an increasing in Italian funding induced the Franciscans to issue a new set of 
regulations to confirm their monopoly over the mission and its schools in the face of a new wave 
of Catholic populations.  
 The Franciscan mission’s support for Italian expansionist programs generated a 
prolonged conflict with the community  of Catholics in the region made up primarily  of Maltese 
fishermen and their families who objected to the mission’s turn towards Italian nationalism.152  In 
96
151 Frati Minori, Busta 6, Annual Report from Bonaventura Rossetti to Card. Gotti at Propaganda Fide, 19 
December 1908.
152 Clancy-Smith.  Mediterranean, 250.  In the years preceeding the occupation, the Italian population of 
the Libyan territories was small.  The only census data for the population for years 1909-1911 
distinguished by faith instead of nationality, but representatives of the Maltese community in Tripoli 
estimated that they made up around 3,500 out of a total Catholic population of 6,000. For the estimate of 
the Maltese population in 1909 see Archivio Storico De Propaganda Fide, NS Vol. 490, Rubrica N. 
141/1910, Petition signed by representatives of the Maltese community, 11/6/1909.  For the estimate of 
the Catholic population in general in 1910, see  Archivio Storico De Propaganda Fide, NS Vol. 520, 
Rubrica N. 141/1912, P. Bonaventura Rossetti to Card. Gotti at Propaganda Fide, November 1911.
February 1905, the Franciscan Prefect wrote to Propaganda Fide complaining that the mission 
faced challenges not only  from the local government and the exigencies of international politics, 
but also from the very Catholics the mission served because they  represented different 
nationalities.153  The opposition of the Maltese community presented an unexpected source of 
hostility towards the Italian occupation that underscored the commitment of the Fransiscan 
missionaries to the agenda of Italian expansionism.  In his clashes with the Maltese community, 
the Apostolic Prefect, Giuseppe Bevilacqua, envisioned a future of Italian expansion that would 
negate the Maltese influence in the prefecture, and towards that goal, he instituted reforms of 
Church services and education to promote the use of Italian language in the Libyan territories by 
eliminating masses in Maltese and replacing French education with Italian in the mission’s 
schools.  The Maltese community  complained about the lack of Rosary and mass services in 
Maltese, but Bevilacqua assured Propaganda Fide that the issue would be resolved naturally  with 
time as the Maltese children learned Italian in the mission schools.  The Prefect called the desire 
of the Maltese community to maintain services in their language “pure fanaticism” since the 
most common language in the region after Arabic, he claimed, was Italian.  “If the mission has 
Maltese priests,” he added, “it is just to satisfy these fanatics and maintain peace in the Christian 
colonies.”154  Complaints from the Maltese community  against the Prefect continued to pour in 
from the summer of 1904 through 1906 and contributed to the hesitancy of the Italian Foreign 
Ministry to provide state funding to the Franciscan mission as they tried to minimize local 
opposition to Italian influence.  The upheaval informed Propaganda Fide’s decision to replace 
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Bevilacqua with a new Prefect, Bonaventura Rossetti, in the summer of 1907 which paved the 
way for the Foreign Ministry’s subsequent agreement to provide state funding in 1908.155  
 To reflect the mission’s official reliance on the patronage of the Italian state, the Frati 
Minori established new regulations that further nationalized the mission’s activities and 
provoked the opposition of the Maltese community.  The new directives called for an increase in 
Italian instruction, a decrease in French instruction, and a diminished role for the French Marian 
Brothers who had been managing and teaching in the mission’s schools since 1882.   The 
Franciscan’s regulations called for a mix of Franciscan and Marian Brothers as teachers, but the 
Marian Brothers chose to leave the colonies instead of accepting a reduction of their control over 
the mission schools.  The dispute between the Marian Brothers and the Franciscans worked in 
favor of increased ties between the mission and the Italian administration as officials in the 
Italian state sought to discourage French influence in the region in the years preceding the Italian 
occupation.  In December 1909, the Undersecretary of State Scalea recommended continuing the 
monthly stipend to the mission as a way  to diminish the threat of French presence as a possible 
erosion of Italian influence despite questions within the Foreign Ministry  concerning the utility 
of the state subsidies for Church activities.156
 The changes in the mission schools invoked further protests from the Maltese community 
and a general strike of the mission’s students.  In a failed attempt to appease the Maltese, the new 
regulations for the mission included a clause warning against nationalization of the mission’s 
work and admonished the missionaries to, “avoid every discourse of nationality  and do not get 
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involved in things that are even broadly political; but instead concern yourself with the politics 
of Jesus Christ … looking on those near you as brothers no matter what nationality they  belong 
to.”157  As an attempt to accomodate the exigencies of the Italian Foreign Ministry to minimize 
opposition to the expansion of Italian influence, the new regulations called on younger 
missionaries to learn both Maltese and Arabic to make themselves useful to the Maltese 
Catholics in the colonies and a signal of their recognition of local culture.  Despite these 
measures, the Maltese in Tripoli signed a petition in 1909 asking for the Archbishop of Malta to 
fund the construction of an exclusively Maltese church to break away from the Italian mission.158 
Propaganda Fide sent a representative to Tripoli to consider the possibility of establishing an 
exclusively  Maltese church in the region, Father D’Apreda, and he supported the Maltese claims, 
emphasizing the Maltese status as British subjects in an Ottoman territory.  “The Church is not 
Italian, much less the land,” he wrote.  Then he argued, “If Propaganda really  wants to save its 
sons, it should give [the mission] to the Maltese Franciscan Province.”159  
 The arrival of the occupying forces in the fall of 1911 put an end to any debates over the 
national identity of the mission or its commitment to spreading Italian linguistic and cultural 
influence through the mission schools and medical services.  Of course, the mission’s leadership 
complained of a new set of challenges to the Franciscans’ control over Catholic services in the 
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region with the increased military  and state presence.  The notoriety of anticlerical sentiment 
among military  officials was cause for concern in the Catholic Press and among the Franciscan 
mission as they tried to secure a position in Italian expansionism.  In parliamentary debates 
preparing for the invasion of the Libyan coast, the Italian Minister of War spoke against state 
provision of religious education or chaplains to accompany the Occupying Forces as a presence 
of Church representatives that he argued would threaten to undermine national unity in the 
colonial war.  Civiltá Cattolica celebrated the final decision to send Catholic chaplains into the 
Libyan invasion as recognition of the prevalence of Catholic soldiers in the Occupying Forces 
and the patriotism of Italian priests.160  The provision of army chaplains represented a triumph 
for Catholic influence in Rome, but it posed a challenge to the Franciscan mission.  Eager to 
maintain the predominance of the Franciscan mission, Rossetti complained about the quality of 
some of the chaplains, claiming that many  of them seemed to have gone to Libya “more to take a 
pleasure jaunt than to lend their spiritual work for the benefit of our soldiers.”  Since he did not 
have control over the selection of military chaplains, Rossetti required them to present 
themselves to the mission as recognition of the Fransicans’ authority in the region.161     
 The Italian occupation led to a sizable increase in the Catholic community in the Libyan 
territories that seemed to promise a growing field of activity for the Fransiscan mission. 
According to the mission’s data, the number of Catholics they served increased from 4,000 in 
November 1911 to 15,000 in December 1912.162  The mission incurred damages due to the war 
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between Italian and Ottoman forces, in particular damage done to the mission’s school in 
Benghazi, but by March 1912, the immediate danger to missionary  properties in the coastal 
region seemed to have quieted and the mission’s Prefect asked Propaganda Fide permission to 
travel to Rome to secure permits and funding from the Church and from military personnel to 
build new missionary stations in Tobruk, Misurata, and Zlitan to serve the military population 
and the expected rise in Italian settlers.163  The Prefect’s excitement over the mission’s potential 
for expansion and his enthusiasm for state programs of colonization infused his official 
correspondence as he formulated programs in line with expectations for the Libyan territories to 
become a fully Italian space with a dominant class of Italian settlers.164     
Catholic Missionaries and the Pro-Islamic Approach 
 The establishment of a more permanent Italian colonial administration in 1912 and 1913 
brought welcome resources to the Franciscan mission, but it also led to tensions between the 
missionaries and officials trying to promote an image of the Italian administration as friendly to 
Muslim interests.  As a sign of the region’s increasing importance for the Catholic Church, the 
region was elevated from an Apostolic Prefecture to an Apostolic Vicariate in the summer of 
1913.  To fill the new role of Titular Bishop, Propaganda Fide decided not to keep  Rossetti, but 
instead chose Ludovico Antomelli, a Milanese Franciscan who proved less eager to embrace the 
Italian colonial project than his predecessor.  Antomelli’s tenure as Titular Bishop then full 
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Bishop in Tripolitania from 1913 to 1919 was marked by  incessant conflicts with state authorities 
as the colonial administration tried to cultivate relationships with Muslim leaders and local 
notables to support Italian rule.  Antomelli’s conflicts with colonial authorities began before he 
even landed in Tripolitania when the Minister of Colonies, citing political and safety concerns, 
prohibited the mission’s plans for public festivities to celebrate his arrival.  In a letter to the 
Director of the Fondo pel Culto, the Minister of Colonies claimed that just the preparations for a 
procession from the port to the church and related festivities had made the local Arab population 
“uneasy” as a sign of Italian disregard for local customs.165   Antomelli’s conflicts with the 
colonial authorities took on bitter personal tones at times, especially in his tumultuous 
relationship  with General Ameglio who served as Governor of Cyrenaica and Governor of 
Tripolitania during the Bishop’s stay in Tripoli.166     
 Though state and military officials on the ground in the Libyan territories often saw the 
presence of the mission as an impediment to their more immediate political objectives in 
generating local consensus, the central administration in Rome took steps to reaffirm their 
financial and logistical support of  the mission after signing of the Treaty of Lausanne and the 
establishment of the new Italian Ministry of Colonies.  In August 1913, the Minister of Colonies 
increased the regular state funding for the mission in recognition of its value as a source of 
education, medical services, and as a representation of Italian culture abroad.  The Minister of 
Colonies also cited the examples of other imperial powers providing subsidies to religious 
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missions in the colonies as a model for his decision to increase state funding for the Franciscan 
mission.  “Other Nations, and especially Germany and France, spend considerable sums in 
subsidies of this kind in the certainty that doing so they benefit from expanding the influence of 
the motherland abroad.”167  Maintaining positive relations with the Franciscans served as part of 
an arsenal for increasing Italian presence in the region and proving Italy’s stature as one of 
Europe’s imperial powers. 
 The affirmation of support from state officials in Rome did little to preclude the conflicts 
between local colonial administrators and the Franciscan missionaries in the Libyan territories 
who clashed not only  over the issue of religious politics in a Muslim population, but also over 
the provision of services in the colonial territories under Italian state control.  For the 
missionaries, the biggest threat the Italian administration posed was the prospect of a competing 
state-run system of education that would eliminate Catholic influence and detract from the 
mission’s services.  As early as 1910, the mission began to complain about secular state schools 
diverting students away from the mission.  Rossetti proposed a solution whereby the mission 
schools would be responsible for elementary  education while the state schools would take the 
lead in education after the sixth grade.168  State officials advocated maintaining both to allow a 
choice between the two parallel school systems, but  in 1911, Rossetti complained that the Italian 
consulate had pressured Italian families to attend the state schools, revealing what he 
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characterized as a pervasive obstruction of the Catholic mission including efforts to attract the 
Maltese students to state schools and thus fomenting discord among the Catholic population.169    
 The Franciscan missionaries frequently voiced their suspicions that references to the need 
to project an image of religious toleration and sensitivity to local custom served as a facile cover 
for anti-clerical sentiments and Freemasonry among Italian officials and military  officers in the 
colonies.  The Catholic Press claimed that the rationale behind state restrictions on missionary 
activities in the Libyan territories as provided by state-affiliated experts on Islam and the region 
masked an anti-clerical agenda.  The Civiltá Cattolica published an article in 1912 to dispute a 
study by Leone Caetani, a frequent consultant to the Italian colonial administration and a famous 
expert of Islamic history, that focused on conflicts between Islam and Catholicism as two 
uniquely universal religions with opposing missions to spread through the world.  Caetani’s 
argument explained and justified the decisions of state officials to prevent the Franciscan mission 
from constructing new churches or schools in the initial years of the occupation as a measure to 
prevent such a conflict, but the Civiltá Cattolica argued that the study revealed the widespread 
anti-clerical biases of state officials and their semi-official advisers in the Libyan territories.  The 
article devolved into a derogatory  lecture on Islam as a religion that threatened civilization and 
promoted war, a common theme in Catholic literature on the culture of Islam in colonial 
territories, but it is instructive in the impression it gives of Catholic interest groups in Italy 
embattled against a political culture they saw as hostile to the Church and thwarting their 
attempts to take part in the nationalist expansion abroad.170 
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Conclusion
 After the Ottoman Empire renounced sovereignty  over the Libyan territories in October 
1912, the opposition against the Italian occupation from Arab and Bedouin forces with continued 
Ottoman financial and strategic backing curtailed the mission’s plans for expansion.  For the rest 
of the decade, Italian colonial officials employed a combination of military campaigns and 
attempts to appeal to the political and financial interests of elites in the region to expand state 
presence into the Libyan interior.  After the outbreak of the First World War, the Italian state 
officials—with substantial pressure from British officials in Egypt—became increasingly  reliant 
on a series of agreements with Idris al-Sanusi to establish Cyrenaica as a buffer against the threat 
of Ottoman-Arab attacks from Tripolitania and to prevent a total loss of Italy’s claims to 
sovereignty in the Libyan territories. 
 Broadly  speaking, the Franciscan mission’s agenda correlated to a popular understanding 
of the Italian occupation of the Libyan territories as a means of obtaining land for Italy’s 
emigrant population, and it  conflicted with the political and financial objectives of the Italian 
colonial administration as it attempted to negotiate with Idris al-Sanusi and other Muslim 
notables in the Libyan colonies.  The messy business of trying to infiltrate regional political and 
financial networks, however, often muddied the distinctions between state and missionary 
objectives.  Conflicts between Church and state officials did not necessarily  focus on attempts to 
incorporate Muslim notables into the Italian colonial state or the broader efforts to promote an 
image of Italian rule as friendly to Islamic culture.  I have pointed to moments when prominent 
Catholics called for greater Church involvement in Italian expansionist projects precisely 
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because they believed evidence of Italian religiosity would endear the Italian financial and state 
enterprises to the Muslim elites of North Africa, and as we will see further along, some military 
and state officials subscribed to models of state expansion in the Libyan territories that excluded 
further involvement of the Church.  For the majority of the first  decade of Italian occupation of 
the Libyan coastal region, state and Church authorities clashed over issues of education, 
proselytizing, public celebrations, and the building of churches as the political elite of the liberal 
administration promoted an image of the Italian occupation as friendly  to Muslim elites in an 
attempt to incorporate them in Italian development schemes in the region.  But the expansionist 
rhetoric of the Catholic press and the Franciscan mission conformed to a rising movement among 
nationalists in Rome and military officials in the colonies in pitting the transformation of the 
Libyan territories into a fully Italian space against the influence of the Sanusi elite in the Libyan 
interior.  As we will see, those calling for direct state control of the region often envisioned a 
distinctly  secular nature for an eventual colonial state, but by the time of the disintegration of the 
Sanusi-Italian agreements and the growing momentum for military operations in the interior of 
the 1920s, Catholic politics and the Franciscan mission had secured an integral role in national 
expansion abroad.       
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Ch. 3. The Italo-Turkish War and International Competition for a Sanusi Alliance 
 As popular opinion moved in favor of an Italian occupation of the Libyan territories, the 
Ministry of the Interior sent Enrico Insabato back to Cairo to resume his attempts to negotiate 
with Libyan notables in 1910, this time in an official capacity.  Insabato produced reports that 
circulated widely  among personnel in the Foreign Ministry and the Political Office of the military 
forces recommending an alliance with the Sanusiyya to generate consensus for an Italian state, and 
he renewed contact with Ahmad al-Sharif in the year leading up  to the Italian invasion.171  After the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) came to power in the Young Turk revolution of 1908, 
the relationship  between religious elite and the central Ottoman government grew strained as the 
inner circles of the CUP sought to curtail the political influence of Islamic institutions as part of a 
broader movement for modernization.172  As a result, Insabato saw the Young Turk revolution as 
an opportunity to convince Ahmad al-Sharif to support Italian rule as a defense of orthodox 
Islam against reformist tendencies in Istanbul.  While popular calls for Italian expansion in Rome 
centered on programs for direct territorial control and eventual settlement of Italian emigrants, 
Insabato’s recommendations as an expert with direct contacts in the region molded an 
expectation among the political elite of the colonial administration that the Sanusiyya would 
facilitate the Italian occupation.  
 The attempt to negotiate with Ahmad al-Sharif fit  into a broader strategy to appeal to high 
profile political figures and merchants, many of whom felt marginalized after the Young Turk 
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revolution and seemed willing to support  the Italian occupation.  Italian agents secured the 
support of financial and political elites in the coastal cities, but  the Italian Occupying Forces 
faced stronger armed opposition than they expected from a coalition of Ottoman and regional 
forces in the rural interior.  After the Sultan renounced Ottoman sovereignty  in the Treaty of 
Ouchy in 1912, a succession of tribal leaders declared their formal recognition of Italian 
sovereignty in ceremonies of submission or sottomissione, but  a number of powerful tribes in the 
interior refused to hand over their arms or negotiate with Italian representatives.  The Italians 
cited the Mogarba in the areas along the border between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania as a major 
impediment to gaining control over the region’s interior; a large tribe with cultural and 
commercial ties to the Zuwaya in the interior oases, the refusal of the Mogarba to submit  to 
Italian authority  prevented state officials from checking the continued movement of arms and 
ammunition either from the coast or across the Egyptian border and represented a significant 
block against attempts to extend Italian state presence from the coastal region into the interior.  
 In the first few years of the Italian occupation, the newly created Italian Ministry  of 
Colonies and the Occupying Forces combined diplomatic and military tactics as they tried to 
cultivate alliances among regional elites to alternatively encourage and force the submission of 
the tribes of the interior to state sovereignty.  The strategy worked to greater effect in Tripolitania 
where Italian agents managed to play regional rivals against one another to establish garrisons in 
the Fezzan and the region of Sirte which, besides securing the interior of Tripolitania, they  hoped 
would serve as a launching pad from which they would gain control of the Mogarba stronghold 
in western Cyrenaica.  But the Italian territorial gains proved short-lived; their attempts to play 
regional rivalries against one another backfired at the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915 
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when a series of military losses forced the Italian military out of the interior to a few holdings 
along the coast. 
 In Cyrenaica, the Occupying Forces made more modest territorial gains.  Officials in the 
Ministry of Colonies and the Governor in Benghazi continued to focus on the possibility of 
cultivating an alliance with Ahmad al-Sharif to encourage the formal submission of Sanusi-
affiliated tribes in the Cyrenaican interior, though the strategy conflicted with a growing chorus 
of interests in the region that objected to a coalition with Islamic notables as an abdication of 
Italian state authority with little reward for the security of the colonial state.  A body of official 
reports and colonial ethnographies from Italian military officers based on their direct contact 
with regional opponents of the Sufi ṭarīqa developed a more critical view that rejected Insabato’s 
recommendations and challenged dominant European characterizations of the Sanusiyya as a 
highly  centralized political power.  The military  reports pointed to internal and regional divisions 
as a sign of weakness that could be used to Italy’s advantage, and they advocated simultaneous 
negotiations with individual Sanusi shaykhs and tribal leaders throughout the region to 
undermine the moral and political authority of Ahmad al-Sharif and the Sanusi family with the 
eventual goal of replacing the Sanusiyya with a strong Italian state.  Contrary to Enrico 
Insabato’s characterization of the Sanusiyya as a civilizing force, these military  reports depicted 
the Sanusi elite as a parasitic organization that misused the resources of the pious masses for 
their own material gain, and they called for Italian intervention to save Libya’s Bedouin tribes 
from the nefarious influence of the Sanusi hierarchy.
 The negative views of the Sanusiyya played into a strategy to seek out alternative 
regional leaders and Sanusi family  members who might be more willing than Ahmad al-Sharif to 
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lend their moral and political weight to the Italian colonial state, and Italian agents began 
compiling detailed charts tracing tribal affiliations to particular zawāyā and the relative influence 
of various Sanusi family  members.  Nevertheless, the strategic value of an alliance with Ahmad 
al-Sharif only increased in the years between the Treaty of Lausanne and the outbreak of the First 
World War as Ottoman military  officials became dependent on the Sanusi leader to lead 
opposition to the Empire’s rivals in the region.  The international competition for an alliance with 
the Sanusi family only raised the stakes for the Italian administration to consolidate their hold on 
the Libyan territories with Sanusi support as they tried to secure their tenuous claim to 
sovereignty in the Libyan territories.  
The Italian Invasion and the Production of Knowledge
 During the Italo-Turkish War, conflicting reports on the attitude of the Sanusiyya towards 
the Italian occupation emerged from informants in the region and in Ottoman press, but Enrico 
Insabato continued to claim success in negotiating with Ahmad al-Sharif.  Soon after the Italian 
invasion, Insabato managed to secure a limited agreement from Ahmad al-Sharif via Muhammad 
‘Ali ‘Alawi—the Egyptian Sanusi adherent who had served as an intermediary  in Insabato’s 
previous communications with the Sanusi family.  While Ahmad al-Sharif did not declare his 
support of an eventual Italian administration, he promised to instruct the shaykhs of Sanusi 
zawāyā throughout Cyrenaica to refrain from engaging in anti-Italian combat.  Insabato insisted 
on his continued good intentions even after reports circulated that Ahmad al-Sharif supported the 
Ottoman war against the Italian occupation, and his informants recommended that  the Italians be 
“indulgent” with the Sanusiyya until the situation had stabilized, assuring the Italians that  years 
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of shortages in goods and resources had undermined Ahmad al-Sharif’s relationship with 
Ottoman state officials.  Insabato reported that after an initial period of neutrality, the Sanusi 
family would support the Italian occupation as a welcome change from Ottoman rule and as an 
opportunity to ally with the Italians against Ibadiyya forces under Suleiman al-Baruni in the 
Nafusa Mountains of western Tripolitania.173  As evidence of Ahmad al-Sharif’s good intentions, 
Insabato even brought Sanusi representatives on a trip  to Rome in November 1912 to meet with 
central authorities.174 
 The arrival of officers from the Italian Political Military section in the Occupying Forces 
during the war for occupation introduced competing sources for information concerning the 
Sanusiyya and regional politics as they generated a series of reports meant to fill in gaps in their 
understanding of the kind of political situation they faced in the Libyan territories.  The 
assessments of Italian military  officials, based on their initial experiences on the ground, 
projected a more nuanced understanding of regional and tribal divisions in the region and 
challenged Insabato’s interpretation of the Sanusiyya as a civilizing force promoting Islamic 
orthodoxy with the potential to general broad consensus for Italian rule.  The analyses of military 
commanders in the Occupying Forces instead portrayed the Sanusi elite as a parasitic force using 
the religious beliefs of the Bedouin tribes for their personal financial gain, and they focused on 
divisions within the Sanusiyya and between Sanusi elite and tribal leaders to find the potential 
weaknesses to undermine the Sufi ṭarīqa.  Though they did not deny the utility of an initial 
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173 “Ha poi assicurato Mohmmed Ali che il Gran Senussi favorirà in qualsiasi modo le iniziative italiane e 
che la pace non sarà mai turbata.  Inoltre i senussiti si metteranno a nostra disposizione per combattere gli 
Abadita a Tripoli caso mai essi resistessero all’Italia.” ASMAI II 136/1/1, Insabato, Report on 
communications with the Sanusiyya, 15 April 1912.
174 French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Colonies, “Présence à Rome d’envoyée du Grand 
Senoussi,” 16 November 1912.
alliance with Ahmad al-Sharif to promote stability, the military  command advocated a more 
direct form of colonial administration by gradually weakening Sanusi authority and replacing it 
with a strong Italian state presence.  
 The development of a plan to divide and conquer the Sanusiyya reflected the increased 
contact with regional notables who opposed the influence of the Sanusi elite, but the 
identification of divisions within the Sanusi ṭarīqa also pointed to the nature of Sanusi authority 
as contingent on generating the consent of tribal leaders throughout the region that would 
eventually weaken the attempts of the Italian administration to use the alliance with Idris al-
Sanusi to extend control into the interior.  In March 1912, the commander of the Second Division 
of the Occupying Forces, Captain Bianco, wrote a report on Sufi ṭuruq in Cyrenaica based 
primarily  on information from members of the Madaniyya, a Sufi ṭarīqa that  developed in 
Tripolitania, Fezzan, Egypt, and Tunisia during the nineteenth century as followers of 
Muhammad bin Hasan bin Hamza Zafir al-Madani.  Captain Bianco’s report called into question 
dominant characterizations of the Sanusiyya among European experts as a unified source of 
centralized authority in the region with the potential to generate political consensus; according 
the Bianco’s Madani informants, this representation of Sanusi authority  originated from Sanusi 
adherents who wanted to convince colonial authorities to value the Sanusiyya and  bolster their 
power in the region.  Bianco’s report also criticized European scholarship  on the Sanusiyya for 
depicting the head of the Sufi ṭarīqa, Ahmad al-Sharif, as having absolute authority over the 
zawāyā and through their religious adherents, over the entire region.  “Around this individual has 
been created a proper legend that depicts him almost like a star around which moves, in a fixed, 
immutable orbit, this entire world.  This simplistic and almost mechanical idea of the society in 
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which we live does not correspond to the truth of the matter.”175  Captain Bianco agreed with the 
assessments of Enrico Insabato and others that the Sanusiyya had enormous moral authority as 
religious leaders in Cyrenaica, but he pointed to divisions within the Sanusiyya and within 
broader structures of Cyrenaican society  that could effectively  nullify any agreement the Italians 
might make with the Sanusi leader and eventually serve Italy’s advantage to circumvent and 
eliminate the Sanusiyya as a potential threat.  
 Captain Bianco identified three sources of divisions that could undermine the authority of 
Ahmad al-Sharif both within the Sanusi hierarchy and in the relationship  between the Sanusiyya 
and tribal leaders of the region.  First, within the Sanusiyya, Bianco claimed that Ahmad al-
Sharif, in his position as the “Grand Senusso,” did not posses the level of power over the ikhwān 
and the  network of Sanusi zawāyā that European observers attributed to him.  As evidence of 
Ahmad al-Sharif’s incomplete hold on authority within the Sanusiyya, Bianco cited the 
inconsistency of reactions among the Sanusi ikhwān to the Italian invasion.  After conversations 
with Abd al-Aziz, the shaykh in charge of the zāwiyya of Benghazi and one of the few Sanusi 
elites with whom the Italian administration had developed a relationship during the Italo-Turkish 
war, Bianco confirmed that Ahmad al-Sharif had assumed a position of neutrality towards the 
Italian occupation and had told the shaykhs of individual zawāyā to neither fight against the 
Italians nor accept them.  But Ahmad al-Sharif’s neutrality generated a variety of responses from 
individual Sanusi shaykhs.  Bianco argued that, “while an order of hostility  against [the Italian 
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175 “Intorno a questo personaggio si é creata una vera leggenda che lo raffigura quasi come un atsro 
attorno al quale si muove, in un’orbita fissa, immutabile, tutto questo mondo.  Questa idea semplicista e 
quasi meccanica della società in cui viviamo non risponde alla verità dei fatti.”  AUSSME L8/233/10, 
Captain Bianco, “Relazione sulle confratnerite in Cirenaica e specie su quella Senussita,” 15 March 1912, 
p. 24.  The same document can also be found in ASMAI II 147/1/2.  Copies were sent to the Ministry of 
War, the Commander in Chief of the Military, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
The Commander of the Occupying Forces, General Caneva, attached a note of support. 
occupation] would certainly have provoked a concordant action, the order instead to “remain in 
place” did not induce all the heads of the zawāyā to a position of neutrality, but rather prompted 
several leaders to rule differently, some in a sense weakly  favorable, other in a sense of open 
hostility.”176    
 The variety of reactions, Bianco claimed, reflected the relative independence of 
individual zawāyā to respond to local issues rather than answering to a centralized authority and 
suggested dissatisfaction with Ahmad al-Sharif among the Sanusi elite. Some Sanusi notables in 
Benghazi compared him negatively  to his uncle, Muhammad al-Mahdi, and accused him of 
acting more in self interest than for the good of the Sanusi community  as a whole.  Captain 
Bianco also pointed out that some of the Sanusi shaykhs had accumulated wealth and authority 
around their individual zawāyā to the extent that  Ahmad al-Sharif depended more on their 
support for his own position of authority rather than the other way  around, as in, for example, the 
shaykh in the zāwiyya of Tilimun, in the region of Benghazi.  The reliance of Ahmad al-Sharif on 
individual Sanusi shaykhs and the possibility of widespread dissatisfaction with his activities 
suggested an avenue for acquiring Sanusi support for the Italian occupation without depending 
solely on Ahmad al-Sharif.
 Bianco identified tension in the relationships between the Sanusi elite and tribal leaders 
in the Cyrenaican interior as a second potential point of division that could weaken Sanusi 
power.  Bianco characterized the Sanusiyya as a “parasitic organization” in the region that had 
consistently wronged tribal leaders resulting in an undercurrent of opposition to Sanusi authority. 
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176 “…mentre l’ordine di esserci ostili avrebbe certamente provocato un’azione concorde, unanime dei 
capi della zauie, l’ordine invece di “restare al proprio posto” non ha indotto tutti i capi delle zauia alla 
neutralità, ma ha lasciato adito a parecchi capi di zauie di regolarsi diversamente, alcuni in senso 
debolmente favorevole a noi, altri in senso apertamente ostile,” Ibid., 5.
In Bianco’s analysis, this tension stemmed from the interdependence of the Sanusiyya and the 
Ottoman state who used the religious organization to control local tribal politics.  While Insabato 
and other pro-Sanusi officials in Rome hoped to emulate the Ottoman authorities in using Sanusi 
intermediaries, Bianco advocated a destruction of the Sufi ṭarīqa so that the Italian state could 
gain the alliance of tribal leaders anxious to get out from under the weighty demands of the 
Sanusi elite.  “The true friends of the zawāyā were the Turkish government and the bullies who 
leaned on it to govern and misgovern, the poor who found aid there, the troublemakers and 
thieves who took advantage of the right of asylum and the camel drivers who went undisturbed 
under their watch along their long travels.” 177  Bianco identified opposition to the Sanusiyya 
among “healthy” and relatively sedentary  populations of the Bedouin tribes, those communities 
whose primary interest  lay in cultivating the land and grazing their livestock.  Bianco advocated 
a process of generating consensus for Italian colonial rule by gradually replacing the Sanusiyya 
as the local power structure through a process of replacing the benefits provided by the zawāyā 
like protection for trade and assistance for the poor with a civil structure and cultivating the 
strength of those tribes he recognized as stable.      
 Bianco’s analysis of the divisions within the Sanusiyya and within the broader social 
context of Cyrenaica constituted both a warning of the inadequacy of negotiating only with 
Ahmad al-Sharif and a recommendation for taking advantage of his weaknesses to undermine 
Sanusi authority and replace it  with a strong Italian state.  Captain Bianco did not deny the 
potential utility  of some form of an agreement with the Sanusi elite.  He argued that the 
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177 “I veri amici delle zauie erano il governo turco e i prepotenti che si appoggiavano as esse per 
governare e sgovernare, i poveri che vi trovano un soccorso, i facinorosi ed i briganti che si 
avvantaggiano del diritto di asilo ed i cammelieri che compiono indisturbati sotto la loro salvaguardia i 
loro lunghi viaggi.” Ibid., 18.
widespread recognition of the moral authority  of Ahmad al-Sharif made the approval of the 
Sanusi leader valuable for securing the consensus of the individual shaykhs and the leaders of 
Cyrenaican tribes.  However, the diffuse nature of authority among the various zawāyā, he 
claimed, meant that Sanusi adherents would not automatically follow any agreement they might 
establish with Ahmad al-Sharif, and he recommended that  state officials negotiate 
simultaneously  with individual Sanusi shaykhs and tribal leaders as a means of undercutting 
Sanusi authority  in the region and protecting against what he considered the inevitability  of 
Ahmad al-Sharif’s rejection of the Italian state presence.  Bianco argued that they could not 
predict which way Ahmad al-Sharif would decide to go in his response to Italian attempts at 
friendship, but he warned that even if he agreed to enter into negotiations with the Italians, the 
Sanusi leader would eventually recognize that a full Italian occupation could only spell doom for 
the regional power of his ṭarīqa.  
He must have recognized that the Italian conquest  of this land did not represent  a pure 
and simple substitution of Turkish troops with Italian troops, rather it  represents a 
profound political and social mutation in the regions we occupy.… In the place of a 
weak, inert, and incapable government, in need of the support of all of the most  desperate 
elements of this society and especially of the Sanusiyya, so firmly organized and 
powerful, and therefore constrained to total favoritism, to grant  all of the concessions that 
allowed him to immobilize and weaken the Bedouin masses, now will be replaced with a 
strong government, active and just, that  can depend primarily on its own abilities and the 
spontaneous result of the good and grand works that it  will know to complete to awaken 
all the dormant or sleeping energies.178
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178 “Egli non può non aver sentito che la conquista di queste terra all’Italia non rappresenta una pura e 
semplice sostituzione delle truppe turche con truppe italiane, ma rappresenta un profondo mutamento 
politico e sociale delle regioni da noi occupate.… Ad un governo debole, inerte ed incapace, bisognoso 
dell’appoggio di tutti gli elementi più disparati di questa società e specialmente dei Senussi, così 
saldamente organizzati e potenti, e constretto percìo a tutte le parzialità, a tutte le concessioni verso coloro 
che lo aiutavano ad immobilizzare e a rendere docili le masse beduine, si sostituisce ora un governo forte, 
attivo e giusto, che può contare essenzialmente su se stesso e sul risultato spontaneo delle opere buone e 
grandi che saprà compiere per risvegliare tutte le energie assopite o spente.” Ibid., 6.
Bianco called for the establishment of a strong state that would completely  transform the Libyan 
territories into an Italian space and, after an initial period of economic advantages for the Sanusi 
zawāyā with the influx of Italian trade, would eventually weaken and perhaps “annihilate all of 
the parasitic institutions including that of the Sanusiyya.”  In Bianco’s plan, the Italian army 
would replace the functions of the Sanusiyya as a source of aid for the poor and protection for 
regional trade routes.
 An introductory  letter accompanying the report from the general in charge of the Second 
Division noted the widespread approval of Bianco’s conclusions from officials within the 
Occupying Forces, and Bianco’s assessment echoed through a series of reports from the Political 
Office of the Occupying Forces as personnel on the ground began to collect data concerning 
tribal divisions, membership  in specific zawāyā, and information on particular Sanusi shaykhs to 
identify potential sources of Sanusi division to be used for the benefit of Italian state expansion. 
Bianco’s report and its focus on the power of the individual Sanusi shaykhs informed a handbook 
that the Political Office of the Occupying Forces distributed to colonial officials to prepare them 
for regular contact with Muslim leaders in the Libyan colonies.  The handbook emphasized the 
negative characterization of Sufi ṭuruq from the Bianco report, depicted them as preying on the 
submission of its adherents for their own material gain, and projected an image of the Italian 
nation as a civilizing force that would save the Bedouin tribes from the perils of religious 
fanaticism by promoting secular policies.  The inherent divisions of the Sanusiyya, the handbook 
claimed, would prevent the Sufi elite from fulfilling the menacing threat of a pan-Islamic 
opposition to European colonial rule and provide the leverage the Italians needed to gain control 
of the region’s political situation, but not without some effort  on the part of the Italian 
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administration to prevent anti-Italian collaboration.  “We must put our hearts at rest against the 
fear of this pan-Islamism of which the ṭuruq would be at once the foundation and the keystone. 
Without  doubt, however, we must not lull ourselves into a false state of tranquility; cases may 
occur at any moment that these orders forget their dissension to take up  a common cause against 
a common enemy.  But it is the task of the secular colonial policy  to know how to make this 
impossible, using with tact the current schisms and making an effort, as needed, to maintain and 
accentuate them.”179    
Signs of Division and Weakness within the Sanusiyya
 The characterization of the Sanusiyya as weakened by internal divisions gained further 
credibility in September 1912, shortly before the Ottoman Empire relinquished sovereignty, 
when the Italian Occupying Forces published translations of documents concerning the 
Sanusiyya from the offices of the former Ottoman representatives in Tripoli and Benghazi.  The 
Ottoman documents provided evidence of dissent among Ottoman officials concerning the utility 
of Ahmad al-Sharif as a regional ally in the year leading up  to the Italian invasion of the Libyan 
coast.  The Ottoman documents in the Italian archives present a rare glimpse into the relationship 
between Ottoman officials in Tripoli and Benghazi and the Sanusi elite of the Cyrenaican interior 
after the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and suggest a promising field of inquiry  for further 
research in the Ottoman archives.  Debates over the reliance on the Sanusiyya as regional 
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179 “Dobbiamo mettere il cuore in pace contro il timore di questo panislamiso del quale le Tariche 
sarebbero ad un tempo la base e la chiave di volta.  Senza dubbio dobbiamo tuttavia non addormentarci in 
una falsa tranquilità; dei casi possono verificarsi qualora momentaneamente questi ordini dimentichino le 
loro dissenzioni per fare causa comune contro un nemico comune.  Ma è compito della politica coloniale 
laica di saper rendere impossibile questo avverarsi, utilizzando con tatto gli scismi attuali e facendo 
sforzi, al bisogno, per manterli ed accentuarli.” AUSSME L8/232/5,  Ufficio Politico Militare, “Le società 
religiose in Tripolitania,” March 1912, 62.
intermediaries in the Cyrenaican interior reveal the lack of a unified or systematic approach to 
dealing with regional Muslim elites during the Second Constitutional Era.  The Ottoman debates 
echoed discussions in the Italian, French, and British archives concerning the Sanusiyya and 
local power structures, suggesting that, at least after 1908, the Sultan’s claims to the title of 
Caliph yielded little additional insight to Ottoman officials concerning the inner workings of the 
Sufi ṭuruq of North Africa or their connections to the political and military  tribal leaders. 
 In a theme that was to become a constant source of anxiety  for imperial authorities 
concerning their relationships with the Sanusi family, the Ottoman Vali of Tripoli argued that the 
very recognition of Ahmad al-Sharif as a religious figure and the reliance on his political 
authority to govern the remote interior of Cyrenaica had the perverse effect of increasing his 
power in such a way that could undermine state control.  “To grant them greater advantages, and 
in this precise moment make them imagine such a possibility, it would be as if we made their 
importance grow and multiplied their follows; something that is not permissible in any way.”180  
 The mutassarrif of Benghazi favored cultivating the authority of Ahmad al-Sharif as a 
means of gaining consensus for the establishment of an administrative center and military 
garrison in the oases of Kufra to defend against French incursions in the region.  The Ottoman 
minister of the interior followed his recommendations and began paying Ahmad al-Sharif a 
monthly salary of 4,000 piastres181 and exempting the Sanusi zawāyā from taxes as part of an 
119
180 “L’accordar loro vantaggi superiori, ed anch nell’attuale momento far loro concepire una tale speranza, 
sarebbe come accrescere la loro importanza e moltiplicare i loro seguaci; il che non è ammissibile in 
alcun modo.” Ibid.
181 The piastre generally referred to kuruş in European texts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  In 1910, 100 silver kuruş=1 gold Ottoman lire = 1.1 British pound sterling, so 4,000 piastres 
would have been equal to about 36 British pounds sterling.  See Şevket Pamuk, “Money in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1326-1914,” in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, eds. Halil 
Inalcik and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 972.
effort to win over opposition to an Ottoman plan to build a garrison in the oases of Kufra as part 
of a defense against French and Italian military  expansion in the Northern Sahara.  Local 
Ottoman officials in Homs and the Jebel al-Akdhar disagreed with increased reliance on the 
Sanusiyya, claiming that  at least certain Sanusi elite were taking advantage of the resources the 
Ottoman state sent to the Sanusi zawāyā and using them to bolster their individual authority 
against the interests of the central state.  The Vali of Tripoli cited the arguments of these 
Cyrenaican officials to support his critique of the Sanusiyya in a letter to the Ottoman Minister of 
the Interior: “The Sanusi living in this Vilayet not  only do not lead a life in conformity with 
political and social norms, but they have never lent an important service to the Governor. 
Conversely, they  have always focused on their own interests.  In this era of constitutional regime, 
I would consider it an illegal act to give them a more exceptional position.”182  The issue posed a 
common predicament for state officials in central governments funding and supporting the 
jurisdiction of local intermediaries in overseas territories while simultaneously trying to prevent 
them from gaining leverage to act against state authority. 
 The contradictory assessments of the Sanusiyya in the Ottoman documents also reflected 
disagreements among the political elite of the CUP concerning the role of religious authority in 
the late Ottoman provinces as either a fundamental component of anti-Western ideology or a 
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182 “I Senussi abitanti questo Vilayet, non solamente non menano una vita conforme alle norme politiche e 
sociali, ma non hanno mai prestato un importante servizio al Governo.  Viceversa, essi non hanno avuto di 
mira che i loro propri interessi.  In quest’epoca di regime costituzionale, l’accordar loro una posizione 
eccezionale maggiore è da me considerato come un atto illegale.” Letter from the Vali of Tripoli to the 
Ottoman Minister of the Interior 8/4/1910: translated into Italian in AUSSME L8/154/7, “Relazioni fra 
Turchi e Senussi” by the Ufficio Poltico Militare of the Occupying Forces of Tripolitania, September 
1912.
potential challenge to the modernizing goals of the Young Turk Revolution.183   The Italian 
invasion of the Libyan territories led to a heightened challenged to CUP authority in Istanbul, the 
formation of an alternative party, and general elections in 1912.  The CUP turned to the theme of 
Islamic unity  familiar from the reign of Abdulhamid to maintain the party’s hold on power, and 
there seemed to be little doubt among the political elite of the CUP of the desirability of an 
alliance with Ahmad al-Sharif in what became an increasingly important region on the eve of the 
First World War as a position bordering British, French, and Italian territories.184
 In the aftermath of the Ottoman renunciation of sovereignty in the Libyan territories, 
French officials in Equatorial Africa echoed the skepticism of Italian and Ottoman reports 
concerning the strength of Sanusi authority in North Africa.  French diplomatic agents in Cairo 
and military officers in French Equatorial Africa had been actively seeking the support of Ahmad 
al-Sharif since early in 1911 when French forces began a campaign to push into the region of 
Borkou and Ennedi in northern Chad and sultanate of Dudmurrah in Wadai.  Sanusi zawāyā in 
the Borkou and Wadai regions provided crucial transit points in regional trade routes, and the 
Sanusi ikhwān blocked the movement of essential goods into the region in protest against the 
French occupation and seizure of Sanusi properties in the region.  The French diplomatic 
services in Cairo sent a mission to Ahmad al-Sharif in July 1911 to try to reopen trade to the 
region and secure his support  in convincing Dudmurrah to submit to French rule.  In his response 
to their attempt at communications, Ahmad al-Sharif accused French forces of having targeted 
Sanusi zawāyā in the region of Kanem, stealing their valuable reserves of books and arms, and 
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183 For an account of the divergent viewpoints of religious and political authority within the Young Turk 
movement, see, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu,  The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 13-15.
184 Amit Bein, “‘Ulama’ and Political Activism in the Late Ottoman Empire,” 79.
chasing the Sanusi ikhwān into Ain Galakka where the French soon followed them.  Despite 
these acts of brutality, Ahmad al-Sharif agreed to resume normal trade in the region if they, in 
turn, recognized his regional authority  by refraining from dealing directly  with individual local 
Sanusi shaykhs without first contacting him and if they established a demarcation between 
Sanusi and French territories.  He also requested the return of the Sanusi books of around 700 
volumes and arms of around 4,000 guns lost to the zāwiyya during the French offensive.185  
 Ahmad al-Sharif’s requests suggested that he might be losing whatever control he once 
had over the activities of individual Sanusi shaykhs as they  increasingly came into contact  with 
French state expansion.  The French Ministry of Colonies refused the demands of Ahmad al-
Sharif and French officials in the region began to question the level of authority of Ahmad al-
Sharif within the Sanusi ṭarīqa and among the regions’ tribes.  For the next few years, French 
officials, similar to their Italian colleagues to the north, oscillated between representations of the 
Sanusiyya as a civilizing force that benefitted the French colonial presence, a dangerous threat, 
or an irrelevant religious figure.  When international competition for an alliance with Ahmad al-
Sharif intensified in the months leading up to the onset of hostilities associated with the First 
World War, the French commander of the territory of Chad, Colonel Largeau, agreed to resume 
negotiations with the Sanusi leader with a caveat that engaging with Ahmad al-Sharif ran the risk 
of exaggerating his authority to make him believe, “that the French government is disposed to 
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treat him as one power to another; it could, in effect, exaggerate the importance of what is, in our 
view, his very relative authority.”186  
Ottoman-Sanusi Relations During the Italian Invasion
 If divisions within the Sanusi elite had developed to threaten the regional position of the 
Sufi ṭarīqa, the Sanusi family increased its political and military clout during the course of the 
Italo-Turkish War as Istanbul became increasingly reliant on the Sanusiyya to organize defensive 
forces, and after the Ottoman Empire renounced sovereignty  over the Libyan territories, 
international competition for an alliance with the Sanusi family intensified as a result.  Italian 
naval superiority and pre-existing claims on Ottoman resources prevented the Sultan from 
sending a large army against the Italian invasion, but the Ottoman Ministry of War did assign a 
group of military officers from the Teskilet-i Mahsusa, to assist military  officials already in the 
Libyan territories in organizing defensive strategies among local populations.  The defense of the 
Libyan territories proved a popular cause among a cohort of elite officers in the CUP, many of 
whom later became important figures in Turkish nationalism including Enver Pasha (director of 
the Teskilet-i Mahsusa and later Ottoman Minister of War) and Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk). 
Having espoused models of modernization to seek entry to a Euro-centric world order, the Young 
Turk movement embraced a renewed sense of anti-European Islamic unity in response to the lack 
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of international censure against Italy for the invasion of the Libyan coast.187  In Cyrenaica, the 
Ottoman-directed war contributed to the militarization of the Sanusi zawāyā as the training 
grounds and arms depots for a coalition of regional forces that surprised the Italian Occupying 
Forces with the strength of its opposition to the invasion.  In battles like the one at Sharr al-Shat 
on October 23, 1911, the Italian forces faced large losses and proof that Ottoman alliances with 
regional leaders like Ahmad al-Sharif or Suleiman al-Baruni in the Gebel Nafusa could 
effectively prevent the extension of Italian military  presence beyond a few cities along the 
coast.188  
 Italian aggression in the Dodacanese Islands and the revolt of Muhammad al-Idrisi 
against the Ottoman government in Yemen—funded in part by Italy as a distraction—weakened 
the resolve of central authorities in Istanbul to continue providing military supplies and training 
in the Libyan territories and contributed to the decision to renounce Ottoman sovereignty over 
the Libyan territories in the Treaty  of Lausanne in October 1912.  Italian imperialists hailed the 
Treaty as an opportunity  for Italy to finally  become one of Europe’s Great Powers through the 
expansion of direct territorial control, but the renunciation of sovereignty did not mean the end of 
Ottoman influence.  The strength of the Ottoman-Arab forces in fighting against the occupation 
and their total lack of preparation for governing in a Muslim territory convinced the Italians to 
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accept a clause in the Treaty  of Lausanne required the Italian state to recognize the continued 
religious authority of the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph, a position which allowed him to retain a 
representative in the region with the power to name qadi or judges in civil courts and direct the 
management of waqf properties.189  The presence of a representative of the Ottoman Caliphate 
proved a constant source of anxiety for Italian colonial officials until the hostilities of the First 
World War provided an opportunity for them to annul the agreement and dispense of the position. 
 The Treaty of Lausanne led to an increase in the regional and international influence of 
Ahmad al-Sharif as the Ottoman Minister of War continued to channel funding from Egyptian 
banks, local taxes, and donations from throughout the Muslim world for anti-Italian activities 
under his command.190  With the formal end to the Italo-Turkish war, most Teskilet-i Mahsusa 
officers, including Enver Pasha, left the region to deal with the situation in the Balkans, but a 
handful remained in the region under the leadership of ‘Aziz ‘Ali al-Misri, the former 
commander of Ottoman forces in Cyrenaica.  The remaining Ottoman officers trained Bedouin 
troops in the Sanusi zawāyā with the understanding that the ultimate goal in ejecting the Italian 
occupation and recovering Ottoman control would be the establishment of a local semi-
independent government under Ahmad al-Sharif and with the military support of the Ottoman 
officers under his command.191  The collaboration between Ahmad al-Sharif and ‘Aziz ‘Ali al-
Misri derailed, however, after rumors spread in the spring of 1913 that the military  commander 
125
189 Ibid., 160.
190 BNA PRO 30/56/43, Intelligence report from Constantinople, 22 November 1912;  El-Sh’ab, 15 
January 1913; Erik J. Zürcher, Storia della Turchia (Rome: Donzelli Editore, 2007), 130; Abdulmola S. 
al-Horeir, “Social and Economic Transformations in the Libyan Hinterland During the Second Half of the 
Nineteenth Century: The Role of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi.”  UCLA, 1981, 169.
191 Anwar Bey had suggested calling the proposed administration “The Union of African states” to try to 
limit Sanusi influence, but Ahmad al-Sharif insisted that the theoretical state would be al-Hakuma al-
Sanusiyya, or the Sanusi Government. el-Horeir, “Social and Economic Transformations,” 174. 
had accepted funds from Italian officials in exchange for providing geographical information that 
helped them make territorial advances into the Cyrenaican interior, and ‘Aziz al-Misri left  the 
Libyan territories for Alexandria in July 1913.192   According to the historian of the Sanusi 
monarchy, Muhammad Fu’ad Shukri, he took large stockpiles of Ottoman weapons and funding 
with him, paralyzing the Bedouin forces in the Sanusi zawāyā. 193  
 The departure of ‘Aziz ‘Ali al-Misri signaled a possible break in Ottoman-Sanusi 
relations and offer a new opportunity  for Italian attempts to negotiate with Ahmad al-Sharif.194 
In the summer and fall of 1913, imperial officials throughout the region competed for Ahmad al-
Sharif’s favor as French, Italian, and Ottoman officials hoped to gain a strategic advantage in 
Cyrenaica.  Despite their attempts, a small handful of Ottoman officials remained in the region, 
and along with German officers, they continued to provide shipments of arms to Sanusi zawāyā 
through the Western Desert of Egypt and German submarines along the Libyan coast, nurturing 
the militarization of the Sufi ṭarīqa that they tried to use to their advantage in the North African 
battles of the First World War.195 
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The Italian Ministry of Colonies and the Politica dei Capi
 After the Ottoman Empire renounced its sovereignty over the Libyan territories in 
October 1912, Rome marked its new status as one of Europe’s colonial powers with the creation 
of the Ministry of Colonies in November 1912.  In January of 1913, the first Minister of 
Colonies, Pietro Bertolini, started the new year by  declaring his commitment to securing 
pacification of the Libyan territories through political policies instead of military aggression in a 
letter to General Briccola, the commander of Italian forces in Cyrenaica.  Citing his opposition to 
a more militant approach proposed by the Minister of War, Briccola called for winning local 
consensus to Italian rule through peaceful means to avoid alienating potential Italian allies in the 
future administration.  Bertolini meant his tactics to encourage economic development, a goal he 
considered central to Italian expansion.  Though he left open the possibility of using force in 
situations that seemed to require it, Bertolini advocated a diplomatic cooperative approach 
whenever possible.196  
 Bertolini’s attempts to pacify the region through political alliances fit with a wider 
directive established in Royal Decrees issued in January 1913 and January 1914 that prescribed a 
“politics of chiefs” or politica dei capi built on collaboration with local notables to rule the 
broader population in exchange for a payment of regular stipends from colonial state coffers.197 
The question of how to identify the appropriate local notables to incorporate in the Italian 
administration led the separate administrations of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania to generate detailed 
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charts tracing tribal affiliations to try  to determine which tribal leaders they could pay in 
exchange for securing the submission of local populations.  The process of identifying tribal 
chiefs seemed haphazard at best, and they  frequently identified and paid tribal leaders based on 
who appeared before state officials to submit to colonial authority.198  In the application of the 
politica dei capi, Italian officials attempted to accentuate traditional divisions and rivalries to 
prevent a concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals or families, and similar 
principles informed the development of new methods to approach relations with the Sanusiyya as 
the Italian administration applied a variety of strategies to gain an alliance with the Sanusi elite. 
 In the first two years after Italy gained official sovereignty over the Libyan territories, the 
policies of politica dei capi seemed to be working in Italy’s favor in Tripolitania as an increasing 
number of notables signaled their support for the Italian occupation, but the plan to use regional 
rivalries to their advantage soon backfired in an attempt to establish Italian garrisons in the 
interior.  Initially, the Italian administration relied on alliances with notables in the coastal region 
who had attained high positions in the Ottoman administration, including Omar Pasha Muntasir 
and his extended family of powerful merchants in Misurata.  Having gained prominence as local 
functionaries during the reign of Abdulhamid III, their marginalization after the Young Turk 
Revolution convinced members of the Muntasir family to support the Italian occupation, and 
their relationship with the Italian state secured them immediate benefits against their political 
rivals.  Omar Pasha Muntasir occupied Sirte in December 1912, taking it  from the control of 
Enver Pasha’s brother Nuri bey and expanding the Muntasir family  domain in the name of the 
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Italian colonial administration.199  Soon after the Muntasir family claimed control of Sirte, Italian 
forces defeated Suleiman al-Baruni, a staunch supporter of Ottoman control and a leading figure 
of the Ibadiyya of the Nafusa Mountains of western Tripolitania, in the spring of 1913.  
 With the coastal area largely secured, the Italian administration turned to consider the 
possibility of extending the occupation into the Fezzan with the ultimate goal of using the 
position as a base for operations into the territories of the Mogarba tribes in western 
Cyrenaica.200   The occupation of Fezzan thus promised to secure the Italian authority in the 
Tripolitanian interior and provide entry  into the oases of the Cyrenaican interior even if attempts 
to negotiate with the Sanusi family  failed.  With the shift  in objective, the Italian administration 
abandoned its earlier alliance with the Muntasir family to cultivate a relationship with the Saif al-
Nasir clan, a rival family of notables from the Awlad Suleiman tribes in the interior region of 
Sirte and the Fezzan,  The Saif al-Nasir family famously led an opposition to Qaramanli taxation 
policies in the region in the 1820s, and they  later played an important role in spreading the 
Sanusi ṭarīqa into the Lake Chad region.201   In the summer of 1913, Colonel Antonio Miani 
arrived with Italian troops on the coast of Misurata in the city of Sirte, and for six months, he 
stationed his troops in Sawkna, a stronghold of the Saif al-Nasir family  as a staging ground for 
military operations in the Fezzan.  
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 During his campaign, Miani also relied on the assistance of Abd al-Nabi Belkhir, a 
leading figure of the Warfalla tribe who the Italian state paid to act as a political guide and to 
facilitate in obtaining supplies and local troops.  Though both the Saif al-Nasir family and Abd 
al-Nabi Belkhir helped the Italian mission in the initial occupation of the Fezzan, they later 
turned to use their resources and political influence against Italian state presence, Abd al Nabi 
Belkhir in 1915 and the Saif al-Nasir family sometime in the 1920s.202  But  in December 1913 
and January  1914, Miani and his troops occupied a succession of oases in Fezzan with their 
assistance, and he declared the region pacified.203  The occupation resulted in formal acts of 
submission or sottomissione to Italian state authorities from a number of tribal leaders in the 
Libyan interior.
Pacification and the Act of Submission
 Colonel Miani’s entourage photographed their expedition in the Fezzan, and the images 
of the submission of tribal leaders in the Fezzan, reproduced on a limited bases in Angelo Del 
Boca’s study of Miani’s ultimately failed occupation of the region, offer a rare glimpse into what 
the formal act of submission entailed during the Italian occupation of the Libyan territories. 
Formal submission to Italian authority entailed a written statement recognizing Italian state 
sovereignty and accepting Italian protection and a physical ceremony presented before Italian 
and native officials.  During the occupation of the Libyan territories, Italian military  and civil 
officials chased after the formal submission of tribal notables and some Muslim elites like the 
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Sanusi family  as evidence of advances in state control and Italian influence, but there is no 
indication of a standardized code for formal submission from the central authorities in Rome.  It 
seems more likely  that the practice of submission developed in a gradual process among officials 
with experience in colonial settings and that the associated ceremony changed accordingly. 
Precedents for the formal letters submission appear in the Italian colonial archives from Eritrea 
as early  as 1890.204  French authorities in present-day Chad also recorded acts of soumission to 
French authority from tribal leaders near Ain Galakka.205  
 In addition to a written statement of loyalty  to the Italian state, colonial officers also 
insisted that tribal leaders present themselves in a public act of submission.  The photographs 
from Miani’s campaign demonstrate a formal ceremony in which groups of tribal leaders 
encircled a table presided over by Miani and other colonial officials along with an Arab notable, 
perhaps a qadi lending his authority to the ceremony.  The warriors passed before a photograph 
of King Victor Emmanuel as they  stamped a document of formal submission.206  Submission to 
Italian authority  usually  accompanied a relinquishment of weapons, and it often gave military 
officials an opportunity to interrogate those who submitted to get information about the structure 
and location of opposition forces.  Among the rash of submissions in early 1914, some made 
reference to positions they held previously in the Ottoman military  or civil administration and 
requested or were offered similar positions within the Italian system.  These exchanges suggest 
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that the act of submitting to the colonial state reflected in part a demand for employment within 
the colonial state after the withdraw of formal Ottoman support.207
 Whether or not the form for the ceremony of sottomissione was established by the central 
government or created on the spot by military commanders in the colonies remains unclear, but 
the physical act of presentation to state officials held just as much importance as the written 
declaration of support for colonial authority.  The act of submission loomed large in popular 
Italian imagination as a sign of national strength.  Portrayals of local populations flocking to 
kneel down before Italian colonial authorities decorated magazine covers and school notebooks 
in Italy, though more examples remain from the later occupation of Ethiopia.  In the Libyan 
territories, however, the inability  to fulfill the corresponding responsibility to protect the tribes 
that submitted to Italian authority presented a constant source of anxiety for colonial officials as 
a sign of weakness and a point of critique against the policies of the colonial state.  The reliance 
on the political or moral authority of regional notables also detracted from the symbolic value of 
the act of submission to Italian colonial authority; in generating consensus for colonial rule or 
assisting in the expansion of official Italian territorial control, local intermediaries oversaw the 
act of submission in the place of Italian state officials. 208   
 While Miani and his troops used their alliances with the Saif al-Nasir family and Abd al-
Nabi Belkhir to move into the Fezzan, the governor of Cyrenaica, Giovanni Ameglio, initiated a 
more limited series of military campaigns to expand the Italian military presence in Cyrenaica. 
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Though Italian troops in Cyrenaica made relatively smaller territorial gains, Ameglio recorded an 
increasing number of acts of formal submissions to Italian rule from among tribes near Benghazi 
and Derna.209  In April 1913, a group  of tribal leaders from Cyrenaica joined the growing list in a 
ceremony of submission in Benghazi, and by  December 1913, the Italians calculated that 
135,200 out of a total population of 351,600 in Cyrenaica had submitted to Italian rule. 
According to their calculations, centers of Mogarba dominance in the oases of Kufra, Jalo, 
Jaghbub, and western Cyrenaica represented the largest  population in the region that had not  yet 
submitted to Italian rule.  The refusal of these highly influential affiliates of the Sanusiyya to 
recognize Italian sovereignty  suggested the development of Sanusi centers of opposition and 
demonstrated the imperative of either negotiating an alliance with the Sanusi family  or 
cultivating alternative sources of political and moral authority to support  the expansion of Italian 
state presence in the region.210 
International Competition for an Alliance with the Sanusi Elite
 The diversification of colonial knowledge production concerning the Sanusiyya informed 
a variety of strategies Italian officials in the Ministry of Colonies and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs employed to try  to win the support of the Sanusi elite in the initial years of the 
occupation, but the idea of establishing an alliance with the Sanusi family as intermediaries to 
negotiate the submission of the tribal leaders of the Cyrenaican interior remained an organizing 
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principle in the Italian approach to colonial rule in the eastern territory.  While Enrico Insabato 
continued to advocate direct negotiations with the Sanusi family, the military reports indicating 
divisions and weaknesses in Sanusi authority in the region and the overarching program set  out 
in the politica dei capi inspired attempts to force Ahmad al-Sharif into an alliance by first 
cultivating relationships with individual shaykhs in control of the various Sanusi zawāyā 
throughout Cyrenaica.  
 It became increasingly clear to Italian officials receiving conflicting reports concerning 
the attitude of the Sanusi shaykhs and Ahmad al-Sharif towards the Italian occupation that their 
ambivalence stemmed in part from caution as they watched to see which way the political tides 
would go and that even if Ahmad al-Sharif could command the loyalties of the Sanusi shaykhs, 
the attitude of the Sufi ṭarīqa depended largely on the positions of various tribal leaders in 
Cyrenaica.  In December 1912, newspapers in Constantinople reported that forty-two Sanusi had 
declared their intention to refuse a treaty “which authorizes the presence of the enemy in our 
country,” and had promised to continue to fight against the Italian presence both for the sake of 
the Ottoman Caliphate and in order to “purify our soil of the presence of the enemy.”211 
However, British intelligence in Cairo informed the Italian administration in January  1913 that 
Ahmad al-Sharif had met with various tribal leaders in the region, but they had not yet  decided 
whether or not to accept Italian sovereignty, suggesting an alternative route for gaining 
consensus by  appealing directly  to tribal leaders.  In an effort to take advantage of these 
possibilities, the Italian Minister of Colonies instituted a program of payments to Sanusi shaykhs 
and tribal leaders in exchange for their loyalty to the Italian state.212     
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 The ultimate goal of direct negotiations with Sanusi shaykhs and tribal leaders, however, 
remained an alliance with the Sanusi family  to establish a power sharing system; Italian officials 
hoped to use their relationships with other notables in the region to pressure Ahmad al-Sharif to 
enter into an agreement with the Italian state.  After the increase in the number of submissions to 
Italian rule among Cyrenaican tribes in the spring of 1913, the Ministry  of Colonies and the new 
governor in Cyrenaica, Giovanni Ameglio, saw an opportunity  to convince the Sanusi family to 
align themselves with Italy to prevent a loss of influence among the populations under Italian 
jurisdiction.  As the year progressed, they began to believe that if they won the submission of 
enough tribal leaders in the interior, Ahmad al-Sharif would follow their lead and thus create 
conditions to encourage further submissions.213
 The Italian administration also tried to use alliances with a number of high-profile 
political figures in the region to convince Ahmad al-Sharif to negotiate a position as a colonial 
intermediary.  In January 1913, the Italians pursued negotiations through Omar Mansur al-
Kekhiya, a Benghazi notable and a former representative in the Ottoman Parliament.  Ahmad al-
Sharif asked for autonomy in the Cyrenaican interior for all areas that the Italians had not 
successfully  taken control of by June 1913, meaning the vast majority of the province besides a 
few towns along the coast.214  The Italians refused at the time, though in October 1913, as his 
first act as the new Governor of Cyrenaica, Ameglio proposed recognizing Ahmad al-Sharif as an 
Emir in the Cyrenaican interior and granting him control over religious education in exchange 
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for his assistance in maintaining trade paths.215   The deterioration of conditions for the Italian 
administration in the months leading up to the First World War precluded further consideration of 
the option of granting Ahmad al-Sharif’s requests for regional autonomy, but they soon returned 
to the proposal of a Sanusi Emirate in negotiations with Ahmad al-Sharif’s cousin in 1916.
 In the year leading up to the outbreak of hostilities in the First World War, international 
competition for an alliance with Ahmad al-Sharif intensified as officials attached to intelligence 
and foreign services in Cairo watched one another for indications that rival powers could gain 
Sanusi support.  Italian agents in Cairo developed a secret scheme to enter into negotiations with 
Ahmad al-Sharif through a collaborative effort of local functionaries in the Banco di Roma and 
the Khedive Abbas II.  Italy had a history of supporting the Egyptian Khedive as a sort  of protest 
against British and French imperialism and a general call for the principles of nationalism that 
had informed the Risorgimento in Rome.  A community  of Italian expatriates in Cairo included a 
core of political radicals who fled the peninsula in protest against the dominance of moderating 
forces in the Italian unification, and many in this community of political and intellectual elites 
formed relationships with the Khedive and other Egyptian nationalists.  Their relationships 
inspired Khedive Isma’il to seek exile in Italy when the British forcibly removed him from office 
in 1879, and the Italian press hailed him as the Egyptian Garibaldi on his arrival in Rome.216  
 In October 1913, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs were able to use a relationship 
between the local manager of the Banco di Roma in Cairo, Abdul Hamid Shedid, and the 
Khedive Abbas II to persuade the Khedive to visit Ahmad al-Sharif in the hopes that he could 
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persuade the Sanusi leader to negotiate with the Italian colonial state.217  The agreement included 
political and commercial components that sought to increase Italian control over regional trade 
and infrastructure at the expense of British interests.  The Khedive agreed to help block the trade 
in weapons across the border into Cyrenaica, to enter into discussions with Ahmad al-Sharif, and 
to promote Italian trade and investments in the Banco di Roma in Egypt at the expense of British 
trade and banking.  In exchange, the Italian government promised to support the Khedive against 
the impending threat to his position by the British government and to promote Egyptian 
independence.218   Their secret negotiations also included provisions for the construction of 
Italian railways between Tripoli and Benghazi that would eventually extend all the way to 
Alexandria to facilitate regional trade.219
 The agreement between the Khedive and the Italian government did not remain a secret 
for long.  The Egyptian press publicized accounts of the Khedive’s visit to Ahmad al-Sharif, and 
British intelligence agents easily uncovered the agreement between the Khedive and the Italian 
government.  The Khedive’s mission to Ahmad al-Sharif was widely reported to have been a 
failure, but the implications that the Khedive could claim the authority to make international 
agreements and that the Egyptian railways could come under Italian authority  led to a series of 
tense exchanges between British and Italian diplomatic agents.  The possibility of establishing 
Ahmad al-Sharif as a connected force in anti-British designs across the Egyptian border 
compounded the issue, especially  when the British discovered that the Khedive had promised 
Ahmad al-Sharif control over the oases of Kufra and Jaghbub in territory of disputed control 
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between Egypt and Cyrenaica in his attempt to gain the Sanusi alliance.  Initially, the Italian 
government insisted that the entire project reflected the initiative of the Banco di Roma alone, 
but in the throes of the downfall of Prime Minister Giolitti’s administration in 1914, an Italian 
diplomatic agent in Cairo, Ernesto De Martino—later to serve as Governor of Cyrenaica—
admitted to the involvement of the Italian Ministry  of Colonies in paying the Khedive to 
negotiate on Italy’s behalf, leading to a series of inquiries into the political affiliations of local 
Banco di Roma employees and a shift in personnel.220 
  Despite the numerous reports from French agents on the ground in North Africa that  the 
Sanusi elite had little influence in regional politics, for example, evidence that both Rome and 
Istanbul sent missions to visit Kufra to try  to obtain Ahmad al-Sharif’s support convinced French 
intelligence agents and diplomatic officers in Cairo that the competition for an alliance offered 
proof of his considerable religious authority and influence in the region and that they would be 
remiss not to take part.221  French agents in Cairo urged the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
enter into the competition for Sanusi support, “in anticipation of circumstances still possible in 
which the support of this religious person would facilitate, in North Africa, the maintenance of 
our authority.”222  The push to continue negotiating with Ahmad al-Sharif reflected a sense of his 
importance in the region as a civilizing force and a competitive spirit bent on preventing the 
Sanusiyya from supporting the Italian cause instead.   “Let’s assume that the ambitions of our 
neighbors in the Alps are realized in full. Would we want to see a highly militant Muslim 
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congregation beside them, who because of their relations with Wadai and Darfor could, directed 
against us, hamper in a certain measure the development of our possessions in Central Africa?” 
223
 At the end of 1913, Ahmad al-Sharif’s public declaration of jihad against the presence of 
the Italian colonial state ended speculation on his official position towards the Italian 
administration and demonstrated the ultimate failure of their strategies to negotiate with a Sanusi 
alliance.  Over the following year, hostilities against Italian garrisons and supply lines increased 
as a coalition of tribal and Sanusi forces acquired material and tactical support from Ottoman and 
German officers hoping to use their relationships with the Sanusiyya to their advantage in 
undermining the security of Allied territories.  In assessing the failure to form an alliance with 
the Sanusi elite, Italian government officials and public opinion assigned primary responsibility 
to Enrico Insabato.  Some claimed that the Italian administration never had any possibility  of 
gaining the support of Ahmad al-Sharif and discredited any evidence Insabato had presented of 
his communications with Kufra.  The Italian Ministry  of Colonies decided that all letters and 
messages Insabato had produced from Ahmad al-Sharif declaring his neutrality  and eventual 
support for the Italian administration to be fakes, and an Italian correspondent and editor of the 
Turin newspaper Secolo claimed that  Insabato had passed off random merchants and caravan 
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drivers from the bazaars of Cairo as Sanusi shaykhs when he paraded them through Rome in 
November 1912.224    
 Discredited and disgraced, the Italian Ministry of Colonies ordered Insabato to leave 
North Africa permanently.  Though he was called in on occasion to consult  in further 
negotiations with the Sanusi elite, Insabato never held an official position in the Italian 
administration in the Libyan territories.  His arguments in favor of forming a power sharing 
system through a Sanusi intermediary, however, continued to influence a strain of thought among 
a cast of Italian colonial officials, regional experts, and agents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
who consistently returned to the plan to form an alliance with Ahmad al-Sharif as a way of 
expanding state control in the Libyan territories while promoting Italian relations in the wider 
Muslim world.   If nothing else, the presence of his friend Aldobrandino Malvezzi di Medici as a 
high level functionary  first in the Foreign Ministry  then in the Ministry of Colonies helped 
ensure continued influence of Insabato’s ideas.  The two were childhood classmates and worked 
together in Cairo when the Foreign Ministry sent Malvezzi to Cairo as an official representative 
to prepare for the occupation of Libya by contacting the heads of the Sufi ṭuruq in the region 
alongside Insabato.225   Malvezzi shared in Insabato’s opinions concerning the necessity of 
negotiations with the Sanusiyya for a successful Italian administration, and he remained in an 
official position as a high level functionary in the Ministry of Colonies during the rest of the 
liberal colonial occupation with the capacity to influence policy decisions.
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 In support of the efforts to negotiate with the Sanusi elite, Malvezzi published a book in 
1913 entitled L’Italia e l’Islam in Libia in which he depicted the Bedouin population as 
inherently  violent and driven towards independence.  He argued that the Italians should 
accommodate the interests of the Sanusiyya as a religious organization in order to supplant 
Ottoman religious and political authority with that of a religious group that would, as a result of 
their assistance, be more amenable to working with the Italians.    “We suggest for our native 
policy not only to make use of the natural tendencies for autonomy of the Libyan populations, 
but above all gain all the advantages that we can from supporting the aspirations for dominance 
of the religious congregations”226     Promoting the interests of the Sanusiyya, he argued, could 
also improve Italian standing in the Muslim world and mark them as distinctive from other 
European powers with Muslim subjects. “Not to mention that the day in which Italy  assumes the 
position of protector of the independent Senusso in Islam, we would gain great respect and 
power, not only in Libya and Yemen, but in most of the Muslim world.”227  
 Another call for indirect rule under the Sanusiyya came from Carlo Alfonso Nallino, a 
specialist in Arabic language and society and active participant  in forming colonial policy 
decisions.  Nallino established his credentials as a regional expert in 1902 when he published a 
book entitled Le odierne tendenze dell’islamismo in which he argued against popular perceptions 
of a decline in Islam and warned of the potential growth of a pan-Islamic movement to inspire “a 
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wave of fanaticism against Europe.”228   Though Nallino attributed the spread of pan-Islamic 
sentiment in Africa to the popularity  of mystical Sufi orders, he also recognized a civilizing 
function in the Sufi zawāyā in promoting education and property ownership.229  The depiction of 
Sufism as an intermediary stage of civilization between African barbarity and European 
modernity became a constant in Nallino’s work and a foundation in his arguments in favor of a 
Muslim intermediary government under the control of Sanusi leaders.  
Conclusion 
  By the summer of 1914, Sanusi zawāyā throughout  Cyrenaica had become centers of 
anti-Italian activity, and hostilities against Italian garrisons and supply lines increased throughout 
the region.  In December 1914, the Italians decided to pull out of the interior, and the prospect of 
regaining control became dramatically less likely as authorities in Rome diverted Italian military 
resources to the hostilities of the First  World War.  That Ottoman and German officers had won 
the support of Ahmad al-Sharif and the use of the military and tactical resources of the Sanusi 
forces and their affiliated tribes became clear when Ahmad al-Sharif led a series of attacks on 
Egypt’s western border and against French positions in the Northern Sahara in 1915-1916.
 The focus on establishing an alliance with the Sanusiyya persisted as the Ministery  of 
Colonies looked to regional experts to determine the best method of preserving Italian 
sovereignty at a minimum cost to the central state, but Italian intelligence reports describing the 
Sanusiyya as highly  divided both internally  and in terms of the ṭarīqa’s regional affiliations 
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informed the development of a new plan to cultivate an alternative Sanusi intermediary  with 
Ahmad al-Sharif’s younger cousin Idris al-Sanusi during the First World War.  Italian agents first 
began to consider him as a possible ally  when Idris al-Sanusi signaled his willingness to consider 
becoming involved in the development schemes the Banco di Roma and the Egyptian Khedive 
proposed to Ahmad al-Sharif in 1913.  In the years that followed, the Italian Minister of Colonies
—with substantial British assistance—established a series of treaties with Idris al-Sanusi to use 
his moral authority  and political influence in the region to generate consensus for Italian colonial 
rule and the expansion of Italian infrastructure into the Cyrenaican interior.  After the end of the 
First World War, Italian colonial officials credited the Sanusi administration of the Cyrenaican 
interior with having maintained relative order in the eastern region compared to a chaotic 
situation in the west as Tripolitania dissolved into civil wars.  But suspicions that the process of 
negotiating an alliance with Idris al-Sanusi risked exaggerating his political authority  or making 
the Italian state overly dependent on the waning influence of a secondary religious figure 
continuously troubled Italian officials in the Libyan territories.  Ultimately, the alliance between 
Idris al-Sanusi and the Italian colonial state collapsed under the weight of Italian ambitions for 
direct territorial control and evidence of Idris al-Sanusi’s inability to gain the approval of key 
tribal figures for Italian development schemes.
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Ch. 4: WWI and the Period of Accords
 The beginning of hostilities between Britain and the Ottoman Empire in November 1914 
altered the dynamics in the Libyan territories.  The shaky network of alliances that assisted 
Miani’s military operations in the Fezzan and Ameglio’s more modest incursions into the interior 
of Cyrenaica fell apart as regional elites, favoring a return to Ottoman influence in the region, 
aligned themselves with Ottoman and German interests in exchange for an influx of military 
supplies.  In the second half of 1914, Italian Occupying Forces in Tripolitania met a series of 
military defeats that eventually pushed them back to a few coastal holdings by the end of 1915. 
Ahmad al-Sharif echoed the Ottoman call to jihad in all territories under Allied control at the end 
of 1914, and Italy’s decision to join the war on the side of the Allies a few months later 
crystalized the opposition between the Sanusi leader and Italian state presence in Cyrenaica. 
Rumors that Ottoman and German agents were using the Sanusi zawāyā as training grounds for a 
Bedouin army stoked British and French concerns about their North African territories.  When 
Ahmad al-Sharif led Sanusi forces in attacks on the western border of Egypt in 1915 and lent 
logistical support and moral encouragement to anti-French rebellions in the Northern Sahara 
soon after, Italian officials grew anxious over their loss in credibility as an imperial power and a 
regional ally.
 The demands on resources for the war in Europe limited Italy’s capacity to respond to the 
loss of control in the Libyan interior with military force, making the idea of a Sanusi 
intermediary in Cyrenaica even more compelling.  With considerable pressure from British 
officials in Egypt, the Italian colonial administration expanded on previous contacts with Ahmad 
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al-Sharif’s more willing younger cousin Idris al-Sanusi to negotiate a series of accords limiting 
Italian state presence to the coastal region and cultivating Idris al-Sanusi as the leader of the 
Sanusi ṭarīqa and an intermediary  between the Italian state and tribal leaders of the Cyrenaican 
interior.  During the First  World War and in the first few years after, Italian colonial officials 
attributed a relatively peaceful situation in Cyrenaica to the influence of Idris al-Sanusi and his 
acceptance of a power-sharing system.  The apparent success of their initial treaties lent weight 
to Italian regional experts who promoted the Sanusiyya as a civilizing force in the Libyan 
territories and a potential ally in expanding Italian influence throughout the Muslim world.  The 
defeat of the Ottoman Empire suggested an opportunity to create new alliances with Muslim 
elites like the Sanusiyya in an emerging international order, and it allowed for the Italian colonial 
state to expand its influence in the legal order of the Libyan territories after renouncing the 
agreement in the Treaty of Lausanne that preserved the Sultan’s status as Caliph in the Libyan 
territories with the right to name qadi in the region’s civil courts.  
 The motivations behind Idris al-Sanusi’s decision to negotiate a power-sharing system 
with the Italian colonial state prove more difficult to determine from the colonial documents. 
According to Italian accounts, indications that some tribes in the coastal region of Cyrenaica 
intended to declare their formal submission directly to the Italian state inspired Idris al-Sanusi to 
agree to act as an intermediary so that tribal leaders would have to negotiate with a Sanusi 
administration.  Idris stood to gain financially from the negotiations; the Italian state provided 
him with a stipend in exchange for his position as an intermediary, and he increased his property 
when Ahmad al-Sharif left for exile in 1918.  Allies of the Sanusi family and prominent members 
of the Sanusi ṭarīqa also benefitted from the negotiations.  The Italian administration employed 
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the services of Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya, a notable from Benghazi and former functionary in the 
Ottoman administration, to communicate with Idris, and merchants in the coastal stood to profit 
from the promise of continued access to trade routes in the case of an Allied victory in the world 
war.  
 Italian and British agents involved in the negotiations with Idris al-Sanusi, however, 
recognized that the process of of establishing Idris al-Sanusi as an intermediary for a European 
colonial state risked undermining his already dubious claims to moral and political authority  in 
an era defined by the rhetoric of self-determination and a rising sense of Arab nationalism. 
Recognizing this risk, British agents involved in their negotiations warned the Italians to limit 
their demands on Idris concerning the extent of his concessions to Italian sovereignty in the 
region, and between 1916 and 1920, the Italian colonial state provided Idris with financial and 
military support to bolster his position.  The process of negotiations and the provision of military 
forces and for his protection solidified Idris al-Sanusi’s role as a major figure in regional and 
international politics.  For some Italian imperialists, the concession of a political and 
administrative position to Idris al-Sanusi represented an embarrassing loss of authority to a 
religious figure, but they reasoned that the arrangement would be temporary and that their 
collusion would lead to a decline in Sanusi influence in the region that would allow for a gradual 
transfer of power to an Italian civil administration.  
 The limitations of their arrangement became clear when the Italians tried to expand the 
state presence and Italian infrastructure projects through the creation of a Sanusi Emirate in the 
Regima Accord of 1920.  The reaction against the Regima Accords indicated that the consensus 
generated under Idris al-Sanusi had been based primarily on the corresponding limitations to 
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Italian state and private expansion beyond a few urban centers along the coast.  In this chapter, I 
will trace the process of negotiations between Italian authorities and Idris al-Sanusi before 
turning to look at  the disintegration of their relationship and the subsequent military operations 
of the fascist administration. 
The Failures of the Politica dei Capi
 The extension into Cyrenaica beyond the immediate surroundings of Benghazi halted as 
armed Sanusi forces attacked Italian supply lines in the Mogarba region between al-Ajedabiya 
and al-Zuwaytina in September 1914.230    Assaults against  Italian garrisons and supply  lines 
escalated and spread into Tripolitania in April 1915 when Sanusi forces led by Ahmad al-Sharif’s 
brother Saf al-Din joined the armed tribes of the Sirte region to defeat  the Italian Occupying 
Forces under Colonel Miani in the Battle of Qasr Bu Hadi or al-Qadarbiya, Italy’s most dramatic 
military disaster in the colonies since the Battle of Adwa in 1896.231   From that point, the 
colonial state presence remained confined to urban centers on the coast until the fascist 
administration initiated what they labeled as the “reoccupation” of the interior at  the end of the 
1920s. 
 Shifting alliances in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica contributed to Italy’s loss of the modest 
territorial gains they  had made in the interior as the shaky network of alliances with regional 
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elites Italian agents had formed through a combination of intimidation and promises of political 
influence in the colonial state fell apart.  Two influential notables from Tripolitania in particular
—Abd al-Nabi Belkhir and Ramadan al-Suwayhli—changed their positions towards the Italian 
military presence during the initial attempts to occupy the Fezzan, first  contributing troops and 
helping them establish garrisons in the region, then joining with Sanusi forces to rout the Italian 
troops and expel them to the Libyan coast.  Ramadan al-Suwayhli came from a notable merchant 
family in Misurata that benefited financially  and politically from close relationships to Ottoman 
officials.  After Italian officials held him under arrest briefly  in 1914 and threatened him with 
exile, Ramadan al-Suwayhli agreed to cooperate with the Italian administration and assist in 
Miani’s expedition into the Fezzan in exchange for a regular salary. 232  Abd al-Nabi Belkhir had 
been a tax collector in the Ottoman administration, and he had used his position to build support 
among tribal leaders until he became the recognized representative of the Warfalla tribes of 
eastern Tripolitania.233   Both individuals gained greater control over the territory  and its 
resources with the defeat of the Italian Occupying Forces.  
 The involvement of Sanusi forces in the attacks on Italian troops in Cyrenaica and 
Tripolitania seemed to indicate an attempt by the Sanusiyya to expand their influence and 
possibly unify the two territories against the Italian state.  The prospect of facing the combined 
forces of Sef al-Din and Ramadan al-Suwayhli with the increased military capacity from the 
weapons and ammunition they acquired with the Italian military retreat convinced the Governor 
of Cyrenaica of the necessity of negotiating a peace with Idris al-Sanusi to avoid the loss of 
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Italian control over Ajedabiya, a port town with ties to Sanusi trade routes.234  However, after the 
defeat of Miani’s troops, Ramadan al-Suwayhli proved eager to increase his regional power and 
prevent the extension of Sanusi influence into Sirte or the Fezzan.  He took possession of all of 
the weapons and supplies the Italian military lost during their retreat, and he pushed out Sef al-
Din and his Sanusi forces to prevent an attempt by the Sanusiyya to collect taxes in the region. 
As a sign of his commitment to limiting the influence of the Sanusi family and their allies in 
Tripolitania, he had three Sanusi shiekhs who were also members of the Muntasir clan arrested 
and executed in Misurata in 1916.  After gaining control of Misurata, al-Suwayhli turned to the 
territory of the Warfalla under Abd al-Nabi Belkhir to the south in 1920 sparking a widespread 
struggle that Libyan historians recognize as a civil war.  Fueled by Italian supplies to the 
Muntasir family  and to Abd al-Nabi Belkhir, the conflict  lasted until Ramadan al-Suwayhli’s 
death in November 1920.235 
 The expulsion of the Italian forces in 1914-1915 reflected in part a return of Ottoman 
influence in the region.  As tensions mounted leading up to the First World War, Ottoman and 
German military  officers increased their supply of military resources into the Libyan territories in 
a bid to gain the support of local notables and tribal forces as part of a wider strategy to damage 
British interests in Egypt and, to a lesser extent, the French in the Northern Sahara. Regional 
notables like Ramadan al-Suwayhli and Abd al-Nabi Belkhir had provided support to the Italian 
occupation in part to maintain their administrative positions in a new political order, but the 
Tripolitanian notables favored the possibility  of a return to Ottoman rule.  After defeating 
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Miani’s forces, Ramadan al-Suwayhli opened up  Misurata for use as a German navel base, and 
Ottoman and German officers encouraged Suleiman al-Baruni to increase anti-Italian military 
activities from the Jebel Nafusa region in western Tripolitania.236  The influx of Ottoman and 
German financial and military aid gave a number of notables in Tripolitania like Suleiman al-
Baruni and Ramadan al-Suwayhli, among others, the resources to establish spheres of individual 
influence throughout the region.  When the Ottomans and Germans withdrew from the region in 
1918, the multiplicity  of regional strongmen contributed to the outbreak of civil war in 1920 after 
a brief attempt at regional unity under the Tripolitanian Republic.237
 The Sanusiyya factored as a centerpiece in the German and Ottoman plans for an attack 
on British positions in Egypt and in a broader initiative of the Emperor Wilhelm to position 
Germany as a “protector of Islam” to undermine British influence around the world.238   The 
Ottoman call for jihad against Entente powers in November 1914 signaled an attempt to use the 
history of alliances between central powers and Muslim elites in the Ottoman provinces in the 
broader international conflicts, and given the recent history of training from officers of the 
Teskilat-i Mahsusa, the Sanusi troops centered in Kufra seemed natural allies.  With Italy 
maintaining a position of neutrality until May 1915, German and Ottoman officials tried to 
persuade the Sanusi elite to suspend their attacks on Italian troops to turn their forces instead 
against British and French interests in North Africa.  Ottoman-German strategy  was to be an 
assault on Britain in Egypt from three points: “from the east by the Turks in Palestine; from the 
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south by Ali Dinar, Sultan of Darfur; and from the west by the Sanusi of Cyrenaica.”239   They 
established this plan in late 1914, but it took on new importance after the failed attempt to take 
the Suez Canal from the Sinai desert in January 1915.240 
 The alliance with the Sanusi elite fit into broader German foreign policy goals as 
delineated in an eight-point  plan to incite violence against the Entente powers in regions 
stretching from Afghanistan and the Caucuses to Sudan and India.  With assistance from 
Istanbul, the plan called for “influencing of the Senussi tribes living in the frontier district 
between Egypt and Tripolitania against  England.”241 The head of German intelligence in North 
Africa, Otto Mannesman, proposed an agreement with Ahmad al-Sharif in which the German 
Government would act as his patron to secure for him religious freedom throughout North Africa 
and an “independent principality” in the Cyrenaican interior, a region Mannesman defined as the 
area between Tripolitania, Egypt, and Lake Chad.  German and Ottoman officers including Nuri 
Bey and Mannesman met with Ahmad al-Sharif in December 1914 to back up  the offer with 
financial support of 15,000 Turkish pounds.  In exchange, the German intelligence officers asked 
Ahmad al-Sharif to suspend hostilities against  Italy—reflecting in part the yet undefined position 
of Italy in the international alliances dividing Europe—and they requested that he focus his 
forces instead against the British in Egypt and Sudan and the French in Equatorial Africa.242 
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Arms Distribution and Military Training in the First World War
 A heightened flow of arms and military  resources into the region to Sanusi forces and 
their allies pointed to Ahmad al-Sharif’s acceptance of the German proposal, though a 
subsequent increase in the frequency and severity  of attacks on Italian military posts in 
November and December 1914 suggested a possible reluctance of the Sanusiyya to divert their 
attentions from the anti-Italian activities.  The expulsion of Italian troops from the Libyan 
interior facilitated the movement of military supplies from the Cyrenaican coast  and Egypt’s 
Western Desert into the Libyan interior.  As I have mentioned in an earlier chapter, the Sanusiyya 
and their associated trade networks had long been associated with facilitating an illicit market in 
weapons and ammunition in the region.  French and British agents in North Africa began to track 
the arms trade in the Libyan territories before the Italian occupation when weapons from 
conflicts around the world, including guns from Japan from the Russo-Japanese war, began to 
reach the Sanusi zawāyā in Cyrenaica and Egypt’s Western Desert and from there made their 
way into the hands of anti-French troops in Wadai, Dar Fur, and the Central Sahara.243  Despite 
international agreements to classify the arms trade in the Ottoman Empire’s North African 
territories as contraband, it  began to supplant the disappearing slave trade as a driving force in 
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the region’s economy.244  Gun smugglers and merchants identified the influence of the Sanusi 
elite as preventing Ottoman officials from policing the illicit trade.245   
 French officials in the Northern Sahara, after years of complaining about a lack of control 
over the movement of arms from the Mediterranean and the Egyptian border into the desert, 
hoped that the Italian occupation of the Libyan territories would finally “reduce the fanatics of 
Jalo, Jaghbub, and Kufra to a state of impotence” and curtail the armament of Ain Galakka where 
a Sanusi stockpile helped reinforce local forces fighting against French-Senegalese troops in 
their occupation of the Borkou region in the central Sudan.246  If anything, the Italian invasion of 
the Libyan coast increased the availability  of weapons in the Cyrenaican interior, though it did 
cause the Sanusiyya to divert their arms trade away from French enemies in the Borkou, Ennedi, 
and Wadai as they became increasingly  engaged in fighting against the Italian occupation in the 
Libyan interior, especially during the Miani campaigns in 1913 and early 1914.247  
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 Estimates for the number of arms in circulation in the Cyrenaican interior after the Italian 
invasion varied widely  from around 40,000 up to 150,000,248 but the First World War doubtlessly 
contributed to the armament and militarization of the Sanusi zawāyā throughout the region when 
the Ottoman and German militaries began to send shipments of weapons and supplies on a 
regular basis.  German and Turkish military instructors accompanied the shipments of arms to 
Cyrenaica, and they began using the Sanusi zawāyā to train Bedouin forces in techniques of 
fighting from horseback and on how to use the weapons.  French intelligence reported the 
presence of five or six German officers near Kufra at the beginning of 1914 to train Sanusi 
troops, and there was some indication of a remaining force of around 1000 Ottoman troops.249  
 British agents in Egypt watched the movements of Ottoman officers and military  supplies 
through Egypt’s Western Desert into Cyrenaica carefully from the beginning of the Italo-Turkish 
War, but they felt little concern that the formation of Sanusi troops posed a significant threat  to 
British interests along the Egyptian border.  Anglo-Egyptian border officials hoped to cultivate a 
positive but distant relationship  with Sanusi elites in the Cyrenaican interior, optimistic that the 
presence of a friendly Islamic authority near the western border of Egypt would contribute to a 
lasting peace among tribal factions whose conflicts as recently as 1910 had stymied trade 
through the region, but wary that attributing too much political authority  to a Sufi figure would 
set a dangerous precedent for claims to autonomy among religious notables throughout North 
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Africa.250  Border authorities had long been reluctant to enforce the international agreements 
banning arms trade into the region because they feared it would create problems with Bedouin 
tribes in Egypt’s Western Desert and Sudan, many  of whom claimed adherence to the Sanusi 
ṭarīqa.  The border town of Solum was known as a transit point for arms and supplies from 
Alexandria headed for the Sanusi zawāyā of Cyrenaica including uniforms for Sanusi forces with 
an insignia in Arabic for the “Senussi Government” after the Ottoman renunciation of 
sovereignty in 1912.251  Leading up  to the First World War, they had reason to believe that their 
tactics had secured the good will of Ahmad al-Sharif; officials in Egypt noted a marked 
preference among their Libyan contacts for the possibility of extending a British protectorate 
over the region as an alternative to Italian state expansion.252  Indications that Ahmad al-Sharif 
and the Sanusi elite in Cyrenaica favored the British over other European colonial powers in the 
region convinced some officials in Cairo to ignore warnings that  the Ottoman and German 
officers in the region intended the Sanusi troops to instigate an attack on the Egyptian border. 
 When Sanusi forces drove Italian troops out of Ajedabiya, al-Marj and other positions in 
the interior of Cyrenaica in March 1915, the Italian ambassador in Cairo issued a proposal for a 
joint Italian-British accord with the Sanusiyya based on the argument that the British would 
benefit from neutralizing the potential threat of a Sanusi attack on Egypt’s western border.253 
Citing past examples when the Sanusi elite reached out to British officials in Egypt for protection 
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against the Italians as evidence of Ahmad al-Sharif’s continued good will, the British initially 
refused to engage in joint negotiations; they were nervous that cooperating with the Italians in 
the Libyan territories would turn Sanusi adherents among the Bedouin tribes of Western Egypt 
against them and could set a dangerous precedent for other religious figures in Egypt and Sudan 
to claim positions of political authority  within the colonial system.254  British intelligence agents 
generally  defended the Sanusiyya against Italian accusations of violent attacks and characterized 
the Sanusi ṭarīqa as a mostly peaceful religious order defending against Italian aggression.  But 
the Italian entry into the European war on the side of the Entente powers in May 1915 placed the 
British in a delicate position from which the negotiation of some sort of peace between Italian 
colonial officials and Ahmad al-Sharif appeared to offer the means to avoid accusations of 
abandoning either.255  
 For the year between the Ottoman call to jihad and the eventual Sanusi attack on Egypt’s 
western border in November 1915, Ahmad al-Sharif stalled in fulfilling his agreement with the 
Ottoman and German officers due to a shortfall of resources and fear that aggression against 
British posts would cause the Sanusi tribes to lose access to food and military supplies that 
arrived in the region through the Egyptian border.256  In the meantime, British officials in Egypt 
engaged the services of Muhammad Idrisi, a notable from Luxor whose family had acted as 
intermediaries between the Idrisi of Asir and the Government of Aden in the Arab revolt of 1916, 
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to initiate negotiations with Ahmad al-Sharif.  Muhammad Idrisi met with Ahmad al-Sharif as 
late as July 1915 with an offer of British and Italian recognition of his position of religious 
authority and the payment of a small subsidy in exchange for his relinquishment of Sanusi 
prisoners in Kufra.257  References in the negotiations to a Sanusi government (al-hukuma al-
Sanusiyya) concerned British Foreign Office representatives, and after meeting with other 
regional notables in Kufra at  the end of the month, indications that Ahmad al-Sharif fully 
accepted the presence of German and Ottoman officers in Sanusi zawāyā convinced British 
agents to end communications.258
 After the Italian retreat  from the interior, British officials in Egypt became increasingly  
nervous concerning the marked increase in Ottoman and German supplies reaching the 
Sanusiyya through the poorly  guarded coastline in eastern Cyrenaica.259  Weapons supplies from 
a German ammunitions factory near Sollum and an increase in Ottoman and German financial 
and military  supplies to the Sanusi elite mitigated their previous reliance on trade routes through 
Egypt’s Western Desert, and by July 1915, it was well known that Sanusi troops planned to 
attack British posts on the Egyptian border under the leadership of Omar al-Mukhtar, a Sanusi 
shaykh known for his anti-European militancy and enthusiasm for continued armed resistance 
against the Italian occupation after the Treaty of Lausanne.260  Ahmad al-Sharif and the Sanusi 
forces initiated a series of assaults on Egyptian forces in November and December 1915.  The 
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Sanusi troops took control of the port of Sollum, in essence reclaiming it from the British who 
had used the instability of the Italo-Turkish War as an excuse to push out an Ottoman garrison 
and claim the port as part of Egypt.261  But despite the influx of Ottoman and German supplies, 
the Sanusi troops of around 20,000 against  an Egyptian force numbering around 60,000 had little 
hope of holding their ground.  The Egyptian Army regained control of Sollum in March 1916 
and drove the Sanusi forces out of Egypt.262   Ottoman and German officers subsequently 
redirected a greater portion of their shipments to Misurata to solidify their alliance with 
Tripolitanian notables like Suleiman al-Baruni and Ramadan al-Suwayhli.263  
  After the Egyptian Army pushed them out of the Western Desert, the Sanusi forces turned 
to French territories in the Northern Sahara where they provided arms and military  aid to Tuareg 
and Tibu (Teda) groups who had been displaced and financially damaged by  the French 
occupation of the Tibesti mountains in Northwestern Chad along the border of modern-day 
Niger.  The combined effect of Sanusi military resources and the general abandonment of the 
region by  French troops facing a restriction in resources due to the growing crisis in Europe 
allowed Sanusi and Tuareg forces in 1916-1917 to claim territories in the Djado Plateau, the 
Tibesti Mountains, Southern Fezzan, and the Tassili n’Ajjer mountains in Southwestern Algeria 
that had been occupied by the French.264   The Sanusi-directed attacks on British and French 
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territories in North Africa lent new urgency  to a movement among European officials in the 
region to neutralize the military threat through a political agreement with favorable Sanusi elites, 
and the continued access to Ottoman and German military  supplies among forces in Tripolitania 
and Fezzan made the Italian colonial administration particularly anxious to find an ally in the 
region to prevent a total loss of control throughout the Libyan territories.  After Ahmad al-
Sharif’s attacks on British and French territories, the European powers turned to his cousin, Idris 
al-Sanusi.  The process of negotiations between Idris al-Sanusi and British, Italian, and at times 
French authorities led to the establishment of a Sanusi Emirate in the Cyrenaican interior and 
laid the groundwork for the creation of the Kingdom of Libya after independence. 
 
Identification of Idris al-Sanusi as an Alternative Intermediary
 Italian officials in the Foreign Ministry identified Idris al-Sanusi as a potential 
replacement for Ahmad al-Sharif as a more compliant Sanusi leader as early as 1914.  The idea 
took root after the misguided plan of Italian agents in Cairo, including the later Governor of 
Cyrenaica, Ernesto De Martino, to have the Khedive of Egypt convince Ahmad al-Sharif to end 
hostilities against Italian expansion in the Cyrenaican interior in exchange for Italian protection 
of the Khedive’s position in Egypt failed.  While Ahmad al-Sharif refused to entertain the 
possibility of dealing with the Egyptian Khedive on Italy’s behalf, Idris al-Sanusi was known to 
stay as a guest in the Khedive’s residence in Egypt while the Khedive communicated with Italian 
representatives on his behalf.  Italian agents offered to recognize Idris al-Sanusi instead of his 
cousin as the rightful leader at the head of the Sanusi ṭarīqa—the position they  referred to as the 
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“Grand Senusso.”265  If the negotiations had gone through, Idris intended to travel to Istanbul to 
have the Sultan recognize him as his official religious representative in the Libyan territories in 
accordance with the stipulation in the Treaty of Lausanne calling for religious representation of 
the Sultan-Caliph.  The British Military Attaché in Rome likened the potential arrangement 
between Idris and the Italian colonial state to that, “obtaining between the Sudan and Dar Fur, 
whose Sultan pays tribute but enjoys autonomy in internal affairs.”266   
 Based on this idea that some factions of the Sanusi family  could be more easily 
persuaded to form an alliance with the Italian colonial state, officials began to expand on charts 
the Occupying Forces had previously  made of tribal alliances in the region, marking divisions 
within the Sanusi ikhwān and tying them to particular tribal factions in the Libyan interior.  It 
was known that the various members of the Sanusi family collected the revenue from particular 
zawāyā.267  Assuming a corresponding division in the loyalties of Sanusi adherents, the Political 
Office of the Italian governor of Cyrenaica identified a division after the death of Muhammad al-
Mahdi in 1902 between those zawāyā that followed Ahmad al-Sharif and his brothers and those 
that followed Idris al-Sanusi and his brother, Muhammad al-Reda.  Out of a total of forty-four 
Sanusi zawāyā in Cyrenaica, the Italian administration calculated nineteen belonging to Ahmad 
al-Sharif and his brothers and nineteen belonging to Idris al-Sanusi and Muhammad al-Reda; the 
remaining six fell within the territories under Italian control and therefore posed little interest in 
terms of gauging Sanusi influence in the region. 
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 Agents in the Governor’s office in Benghazi found evidence in their analysis of the 
divisions within the Sanusi family to support  theories of a decline in influence of Ahmad al-
Sharif as a religious and political figure in the region.  In the summer of 1915, Italian officials 
began to note indications of discontent among some populations in Cyrenaica concerning Ahmad 
al-Sharif’s arrangement to assist in the Ottoman and German assaults against British and French 
interests due to the increased demand the military project placed on local resources, taxation, and 
access to regional trade.268   Some Europeans cited their own doubts over the proper path of 
succession for an inherited title in Islam as evidence of a possible replacement of Ahmad al-
Sharif.  Furthermore, since the properties going to Ahmad al-Sharif’s branch of the family had to 
be divided among more members than that of al-Mahdi’s branch of the family, Italian informants 
concluded, the sons of al-Mahdi had more wealth at their disposal than Ahmad al-Sharif and his 
family, “which seems to be not a small preoccupation for the actual ‘Senusso’ [Ahmad al-Sharif] 
because wealth is an element of greater influence, and the aspiration seems not entirely dormant 
in Said Idris of having the title and the position that  passed, perhaps without absolute legitimacy, 
to Ahmad al-Sharif.269  
 After the Sanusi attacks across Egypt’s borders, British officials produced similar reports 
suggesting that a large portion of adherents of the Sanusiyya did not consider Ahmad al-Sharif to 
be the true leader of the Sufi ṭarīqa, and that many of them, including Idris, would prefer a 
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transfer in control of the Sanusiyya’s political activities.270   Idris al-Sanusi confirmed the idea 
when he contacted British and Italian officials in Cairo concerning the possibility  of resuming 
the discussions he had begun with the Italian administration through the mediation of the 
Egyptian Khedive in 1914, this time without the additional requirement of obtaining the approval 
of the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph since the Italians had renounced the Treaty of Lausanne when 
declaring war on the Ottoman Empire in 1915.271  
 
The Acroma Accords 
 In the summer of 1916, British and Italian officials began meeting with representatives of 
Idris al-Sanusi.  For months, they danced around the issues of formal submission to Italian 
sovereignty and plans for disarmament of the tribal populations in the interior until they finally 
agreed on a temporary  treaty  to end immediate hostilities in the spring of 1917 in Acroma, a 
desert town about twenty  miles from Tobruk.  After years of warfare in the region, Idris al-
Sanusi’s top priorities in the modus vivendi centered on stabilizing trade routes, improving 
access to basic goods in the Cyrenaican interior, and the restitution of Sanusi properties occupied 
during the war.  Idris also hoped to maintain, if not increase, Sanusi influence among the tribes of 
Cyrenaica in the process.  The possibility that factions of the Abeidat tribes in the coastal region 
of Cyrenaica would negotiate directly  with the Italian state prompted Idris al-Sanusi’s decision to 
enter into a power-sharing relationship with the colonial state.  The Acroma Accords assigned 
Idris the task of negotiating the submission of the tribes of the Cyrenaican interior, giving him 
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the responsibility  for security  in the interior and the power of enforcement.272  The arrangement 
limited Idris al-Sanusi’s functions as an intermediary and an administrator to the regions the 
Italians had not occupied in Cyrenaica; with some apprehension over Idris al-Sanusi’s possible 
reactions, colonial officials continued to negotiate directly  with tribal leaders who had already 
declared formal submission in the coastal regions.273  However, the settlement did not entail any 
further restrictions on a possible expansion of Sanusi authority  in the vast regions of Cyrenaica 
without an Italian presence, and it granted Idris the right to adopt symbols of his administrative 
powers, including the ability to fly his own flag.
 In their initial discussions for the modus vivendi, Idris al-Sanusi called for a position of 
almost total independence in which the Italian state would provide him with the resources to 
centralize his control over a Sanusi administration and expand his trade network through Italian-
funded infrastructure.  Citing the former Egyptian Khedive Muhammad Ali as a model for his 
ideal position as an independent ruler of the Cyrenaican interior, Idris asked that the Italian state 
provide him with arms, money, and officers for military  training to assert his authority  over 
potential opponents in the region.  The Italian officials in the negotiations, on the other hand, 
asked for the formal submission of Idris al-Sanusi to the Italian colonial state and the total 
disarmament of the Sanusi zawāyā and affiliated tribal forces in Cyrenaica.274  
 The British involvement in the negotiations compelled compromise on both sides, but the 
final agreement corresponded more closely to Idris al-Sanusi’s stipulations.  The British pushed 
163
272 Attilio Teruzzi, Cirenaica verde, (Rome: Mondadori, 1931), 32-33.
273 ACS Carte Luigi Pintor, Busta 1, Fasc. 1, Governor Ameglio to Pintor, 3/20/1917; ACS Carte Luigi 
Pintor, Busta 1, Fasc. 1, Governor Ameglio to Pintor, 16 May 1917.
274 BNA FO 141/651, Talbot, “Report on the Negotiations of the Anglo-Italian Mission with Muhammad 
IDris el Mahdi el Senussi,” July-September 1916.
Idris al-Sanusi to conclude an agreement with the Italian state by threatening to confiscate Sanusi 
properties in Egypt’s Western Desert after Ahmad al-Sharif’s failed attacks and setting the 
conclusion of a treaty between the Italian colonial state and the Sanusi notable as a prerequisite 
for the application of a separate British-Sanusi agreement.  British involvement in the 
negotiations also pushed the Italians to attenuate some of their demands.  As a young member of 
the Sanusi family 275 with relatively weak claims to moral or political authority  within the Sanusi 
ṭarīqa or among the tribes of the Cyrenaican interior, the British delegate to the negotiations, 
Colonel Talbot, warned the Italians against asking Idris to submit to Italian rule or attempt full 
disarmament as measures that would damage his prestige and negate any potential benefits they 
hoped to gain from their relationship with a Sanusi family  member.  Throughout the process of 
negotiations, the British officials went further and pressured the Italian authorities to provide 
Idris al-Sanusi with the material and military resources to create a friendly and strong Sanusi 
authority on Egypt’s western border.  The British arguments to the Italian government in favor of 
supplying Idris with arms and supplies cited his negotiations with European imperial powers as a 
source of weakness that damaged his religious prestige insofar as he required assistance to 
maintain his position as an authority figure in the region.276   Though opening markets and 
increasing trade helped augment his popularity and prestige, Idris al-Sanusi’s divergence from 
Ahmad al-Sharif and Ramadan al-Suwayhli in their support of the Ottoman objectives in the 
First World War threatened to undermine his position both within the Sanusi ṭarīqa and among 
the tribes of the Cyrenaican interior.277  
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 Idris al-Sanusi recognized the British government as more favorable to his requests and 
more dependent on his protection from further attacks on Egypt’s western border. He appealed to 
his British contacts when the Italian government failed to give him adequate supplies or funding 
to counter the activities of supporters of Ahmad al-Sharif or rebellious Tripolitanian notables 
from joining in anti-European assaults.  The close relationship between Idris and British agents 
grew increasingly embarrassing for the European parties as it  risked marginalizing the Italian 
administration, but the threat that Idris might abandon his position and allow anti-British attacks 
on the Egyptian border to resume prompted the British government to pressure the Italians to 
provide Idris with arms as a solution to gaining security in the desert at a minimal cost.278  The 
British Government offered to provide military  supplies but  insisted on channeling them through 
the Italian colonial administration to encourage Idris to communicate directly with the 
government in Benghazi and rid themselves of a difficult political situation with an Islamic 
leader whose followers stretched across the indistinct border between Cyrenaica and Egypt.279  
 The British and Italian officials involved in the process of negotiations hoped to limit 
their recognition of Idris al-Sanusi as a religious figure with no reference to political power or 
regional autonomy, but they recognized that the process of negotiations and the subsequent 
attempts to bolster Idris al-Sanusi’s position as a regional intermediary  necessarily  entailed a 
recognition of his status as a political figure.280  British authorities in Egypt feared the possible 
implications for claims to political authority among Muslim elites in other British territories, and 
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the Italian colonial administration acknowledged that assigning a political role to Idris further 
curtailed Italy’s weak claims to sovereignty beyond the urban centers along the coast. The issue 
of temporal versus religious authority  caused some confusion in the British approach to dealing 
with the Sanusi properties in Egypt.  Eager to promote their relationship with Idris, they  tried to 
distinguish between the zawāyā Idris could claim as personal property—which they  agreed to 
restitute to him and his family—from those that belonged to the Sanusi ṭarīqa more broadly. 
British officials in Cairo and the Frontier Districts Administration decided to destroy the Sanusi 
zawāyā in the Western Desert that did not belong directly to Idris al-Sanusi as “the outward 
symbols of the Senussist temporal power,” though they  promised not to damage the mosques 
connected to the Sanusi territories as proof of their respect for Islam and for the religious 
authority of the Sanusi family.281  
 Luigi Pintor, the Italian mediator in the negotiations for the Acroma Accords, cited the 
risk of acknowledging the temporal authority of the Sanusiyya as further justification for 
postponement of the disarmament of the Sanusi zawāyā and the tribes of the Cyrenaican interior, 
a deferment they  agreed to in part because they recognized the advantage of having their ally 
maintain arms to defend against possible attacks from German-Ottoman supporters or from those 
within the region who challenged his authority.  Fundamentally, Pintor doubted the ability of 
Idris al-Sanusi to convince the tribal forces to disarm, but he also argued against disarmament as 
a process that would confirm and solidify a political position for Idris, a position the Italian and 
British governments had implicitly recognized when they first contacted him to negotiate the 
settlement of the Acroma Accords.
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But having reached our goal which is temporary and not definitive, there is no reason to 
renew this recognition or to do acts that in any  case imply it.  Now, asking for and—in 
the best hypothesis—obtaining the disarmament of the tribes by means of Said [Idris] 
belongs precisely to this category of acts.  It would have the advantage of securing for us 
the—always quite relatively—better guarantees of tranquility  in the country; but this we 
will already obtain with the principle obligation of Idris to maintain the peace.  And on 
the other hand, it would have the great disadvantage, which I have already hinted at, of 
confirming and perhaps increasing his power over the populations.282
This anxiety over the potential for their agreements to empower Idris beyond his position as a 
religious figure and the tension between needing him to control the Cyrenaican tribes while 
wanting to make him dependent on the colonial state suffused the entire process of negotiations 
between Idris and the European state officials.  Officials in the fascist  administration criticized 
the colonial state of their liberal predecessors for conferring a disproportionate level of political 
authority to a religious figure and accused them of creating a local state where one did not 
belong with the capacity to challenge Italian sovereignty. 
Tripolitania and the Continued Influence of Ottoman Officers 
 The conclusion of the Acroma Accords produced immediate benefits for the Italian and 
British colonial administrations in Cyrenaica and Egypt that outweighed concerns over the 
recognition of Idris al-Sanusi as a political authority.  The Acroma Accords contributed to an 
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intensified threat of anti-Italian activities in Tripolitania that reinforced European reliance on 
Idris al-Sanusi to prevent similar disorder in Cyrenaica and to buffer against further attacks on 
British posts in Egypt from the west.  The Acroma Accords stipulated that Idris al-Sanusi expel 
Ottoman and Turkish officers from Cyrenaica, and the European officials emphasized their 
determination to get  rid of Nuri Pasha, Enver Pasha’s brother and a prominent Ottoman officer in 
the Tashkilat-i Makhsusah who had gone into the Cyrenaican interior to train Bedouin forces in 
the Sanusi zawāyā and persuaded Ahmad al-Sharif to lead the attacks on the Egyptian border.283 
In 1917, Nuri Pasha left Cyrenaica and turned to solidify ties between the Ottoman state and 
notables in Tripolitania against the influence of the Sanusiyya in the wake of the Acroma 
Accords.  Nuri Pasha redirected Ottoman resources from Cyrenaica to Tripolitanian notables, and 
he appointed Ramadan al-Suwayhli as a local governor in the Fezzan and Sirte, displacing the 
Warfalla notable Abd al-Nabi Belkhir.284  
 For British and Italian interests, the agreements with Idris al-Sanusi provided a defense 
against the threat that the coalition of Ottoman officers and local notables in Tripolitania could 
extend their territorial control into Cyrenaica to use it as a staging ground for further attacks on 
Italian garrisons along the coast and British posts in Egypt’s Western Desert.  After the 
conclusion of the Acroma Accords, Nuri Pasha and Ramadan al-Suwayhli targeted Sanusi 
shaykhs and their supporters in Tripolitania in protest against the political influence of Idris al-
Sanusi and his negotiations, but  at  the same time, they reached out to Ahmad al-Sharif and other 
members of the Sanusi family in search of a further alliance in favor of Ottoman influence.285 
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When Idris al-Sanusi effectively  blocked a plan for Ahmad al-Sharif to combine his Sanusi 
forces with those of Ramadan al-Suwayhli in assaults on the British border in March 1917, his 
willingness to block his cousin reconfirmed the utility of Idris al-Sanusi as an alternative leader 
of the Sanusi family  and the Sanusi ṭarīqa and encouraged the European powers to increase their 
provisions to the Sanusi forces in Cyrenaica.286  
 Despite this evidence of Idris al-Sanusi’s dedication to upholding the Acroma Accords, 
European agents in the region continued to express reservations concerning the nature of his 
relationship  with Ahmad al-Sharif.  Some suspected the Sanusi cousins of trying to hedge their 
bets in the uncertain international order of the First World War with Ahmad al-Sharif 
collaborating with pro-Ottoman forces while Idris negotiated a settlement with British and Italian 
authorities.  At times, Idris presented his relationship with Ahmad al-Sharif as cordial and 
defined primarily through their distinctive positions within the Sanusi ṭarīqa; he claimed that 
Ahmad al-Sharif had given him administrative duties in Cyrenaica among the Sanusi adherents 
during the attacks on the Egyptian border with the idea that Ahmad al-Sharif would retain 
spiritual leadership as a militant religious figure.287   In other instances, Idris portrayed the 
negotiations as an act of defiance against Ahmad al-Sharif and his followers within the Sanusi 
ṭarīqa such that Idris required the material and military assistance of the Italian and British states 
to defend his position against possible recriminations.  Idris used the fear of Ahmad al-Sharif’s 
influence and the possibility of his alliance with Tripolitanian notables to leverage further 
concessions and material assistance from state authorities.  Idris pressured British and Italian 
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officials to expedite a resumption of regional trade to provide basic supplies to a region where 
years of war and drought had produced chronic shortages.  The renewal of trade promised to 
affirm Idris al-Sanusi’s position and the legitimacy  of his agreements with the colonial state 
among merchant tribes and Sanusi elites who stood to benefit from the influx of revenue to 
Cyrenaican zawāyā.288  The European powers also increased their supply of arms and military 
expertise as a counterweight to the possible influence of Ahmad al-Sharif and the Tripolitanian 
notables among the tribes of Cyrenaica.  The central government in Rome issued a Royal Decree 
in the spring of 1918 to establish armed garrisons with government funding to bolster Idris al-
Sanusi’s nascent authority both within Cyrenaica and against possible incursions from 
Tripolitanian-Ottoman forces.  The directive called for two distinct categories of armed 
garrisons.  The “gruppi Idrissiti” were intended to defend against possible attacks from 
Tripolitania and consisted of two garrisons of about one thousand men each.  The “Campi armati 
senussiti” were meant to support Idris al-Sanusi’s hold on regional authority and security  of trade 
routes and consisted of a force of over two thousand men.289
 Ahmad al-Sharif went into exile in 1918 and was never to return to Cyrenaica. 
Intelligence reports documented a continued favorable relationships between Idris and Ahmad al-
Sharif, adding weight to the idea that Ahmad al-Sharif preserved his position as the religious 
leader of the Sanusi ṭarīqa.290  The possible return of Ahmad al-Sharif to Cyrenaica appeared as a 
constant source of anxiety among Italian colonial officials in the following years as an 
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embodiment of opposition to the Italian colonial state.  At times, Ahmad al-Sharif’s subsequent 
affiliation with international movements of Islamic and Arab nationalism seemed to represent an 
opportunity for the Italian Foreign Ministry  after the First World War to promote Italy as a 
friendly nation to Islamic nationalist  movements as an effort to damage British and French 
interests, but one that posed a threat to their power-sharing arrangement with Idris al-
Sanusi.291 
 Ahmad al-Sharif’s departure and the Ottoman defeat in the First World War sparked a 
crisis of leadership in Tripolitania among tribal leaders and coastal elites.292  Initially, Ottoman 
officers continued to organize armed forces in Tripolitania after the armistice ending the First 
World War, and a coalition of Tripolitanian notables declared independence and created the 
Tripolitanian Republic in November 1918.293  However, competition for Ottoman resources and 
for political influence in the region led to a series of power struggles some Libyan historians 
have characterized as a civil war.  The Italian colonial state contributed to the disorder by 
providing arms and supplies to provoke armed conflicts between Ramadan al-Suwayhli on the 
one hand and an alliance of the Muntasir family and the Warfalla leader Abd al-Nabi Belkhir on 
the other.  Their violent struggles only ended with the death of Ramadan al-Suwayhli in 1920.294 
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Religious Authority in the Era of Negotiations
 Italy’s declaration of war against  the Ottoman Empire in 1915 contributed to the loss in 
territory and the political and military  chaos in the Libyan interior for the following years as 
Ottoman and German officers funded anti-Italian forces in the region, but it also held the promise 
for the Italian Ministry  of Colonies to initiate a reconfiguration of the Islamic justice system. 
Soon after they entered the war, the Italian government repealed the Treaty  of Lausanne, thus 
removing the required recognition of the Sultan’s position as Caliphate.  Italian officials 
recognized the shift as an opportunity  to gain more direct control over the appointment of qadi, 
or Islamic judges to the civil courts in the Italian-controlled territories, but the end of the 
recognition of the Ottoman Caliphate also suggested a possible increase in the influence of the 
Sanusi ṭarīqa in religious matters.  The Minister of Colonies, Ferdinando Martini, advocated 
direct state involvement in collaboration with a commission of local notables to name the 
functionaries in the Islamic and civil courts in the Italian-controlled territories as check on Sanusi 
influence in religious matters.295
 With the guidance of a commission of local notables originally created in 1913, Italian 
state officials in Tripolitania established a new order of functionaries and religious elites in 1916. 
For the most part, Italian officials and their local informants culled from the ranks of notables 
and religious scholars who had gained prominence during the Ottoman administration.  The new 
order compounded the confusion among Italian state officials, especially in Tripolitania where 
colonial officials lacked a singular intermediary like Idris al-Sanusi to manage the plurality  of 
tribal chiefs and Muslim elites.  In an attempt to clarify the official hierarchy, avoid giving 
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offense, and provide a “tangible sign of the consideration for their function, their office, and their 
social status, the Governor established a system of identification based on color-coded cards 
issued to recognized notables, functionaries, and ulema.296     
 The end of Ottoman influence in local judicial system spurred the production of a number 
of studies concerning the Caliphate and Islamic law with recommendations for an approach to 
nominating functionaries that focused primarily  on balancing the regional authority  of the 
Sanusiyya.  When Martini had taken over the Ministry of Colonies from Bertolini in December 
1914, he formed an advisory panel of scholars and experts on Islamic issues in North Africa to 
correct what  he considered his predecessor’s deplorable lack of knowledge about the concerns of 
local populations, and he deployed the panel to formulate strategies for a new religious and 
juridical order in anticipation of a post-Ottoman era.  The panel included C.A. Nallino, Italy’s 
most famous scholar of Arabic language and culture, and Davide Santillana, a Tunisian-born 
Italian citizen who had experience working as a consultant for the French administration and as a 
representative promoting Italian interest in Tunisia before the occupation of the Libyan 
territories.  Martini intended the commission of Islamic experts to help the administration 
identify potential qadi whose position in shari’a courts would fit in with Italian strategic interests 
while avoiding any offense of the “religious sense of the populations.” 297  Martini also instructed 
the panel to determine the best plan of action for dealing with the waqf properties in the colonies 
to increase Italian state control over property ownership through the increased influence over 
local qadi.  
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  As part of the activities of this panel of experts, the Ministry  of Colonies published a 
study by  Nallino in 1919 discrediting the Ottoman Caliphate.  Nallino argued that the Italian 
administration and Europeans in general had mistakenly separated the role of the Sultan from his 
position of Caliph so they  thought he could have religious authority  in the Libyan territories 
without having political authority in a role he likened to that of the pope in his position outside 
the state.  The Treaty of Lausanne had formalized these mistaken ideas to give the Caliph 
absolute authority over the religious hierarchy in the Libyan territories and assigning the qadi the 
position of a local religious authority  instead of understanding that the qadi served as a judicial 
magistrate which, he argued, the Italian state should appoint to preserve its claims to 
sovereignty.298  Though not part of the advisory  commission on Islamic issues, Enrico Insabato 
produced a study  intended for an international audience in 1920 in which he echoed Nallino’s 
criticism against the Ottoman Caliphate as a political artifice.  True to form, Insabato presented 
the Sanusiyya as a civilizing force that would work to the advantage of colonial state authority. 
He argued that colonial powers could easily prevent pan-Islamic movements from forming by 
cultivating relationships with Sufi orders who counteract the risk that  the traditional Islamic elite
—ulema and qadi mostly in urban areas—might perpetuate the influence of the Ottoman Sultan 
or introduce pan-Islamic schemes to local religious, civil, and political affairs.  “The Sanusiyya is 
not a heresy, but it contains, in a latent state, the possibility of hostile attitudes, whether against 
the Caliph or against the orthodox ulema; this is why it  is of paramount interest to know their 
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potential thoroughly to use them when needed.”299   Davide Santillana addressed the issue of 
property  rights, especially in relation to an article in the Acroma Accords that required the Italian 
state to restitute all Sanusi properties.  Santillana recommended using the expected increase in 
state influence over local qadi after the First World War to have them generate detailed 
explanations for the terms of waqf ownership  in the Libyan territories, suggesting that  in certain 
cases, the state could retain ownership rights over Sanusi zawāyā and their related properties that 
had been abandoned during the war.300  
 The attempt to balance the authority  of Idris al-Sanusi through state control over the 
judicial system fit into the broader pattern that was a defining feature of Italian colonial rule of 
trying to play competing factions against one another in the regional competition for control over 
resources.301   As part of the colonial state’s efforts to distinguish between military and civil 
territories in the Libyan colonies, the attempt to reformulate the civil judicial system during a 
period of state retraction to the coast merits further attention.302   The formal cataloguing of 
functionaries, notables, and ulema embodied the endeavors of the Italian colonial state to 
increase their control over power structures in a shrinking territorial space while projecting an 
image of the Italian government as amenable to the interests of Muslim elites. 
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Religious Policies in the Post-War Era and the Catholic Mission
 The attempt to foster deeper ties between the Italian colonial state and the Muslim elite 
precipitated an intensification in the longstanding discord between Governor Ameglio and the 
Bishop of the Libyan territories, Ludovico Antomelli.  Repeated professions of religious 
tolerance and attempts to trace cultural affinities between Italy  and the Muslim world confirmed 
Antomelli’s long-standing suspicions that officials in the Italian colonial state—Ameglio in 
particular—harbored anti-Church and pro-Masonry sentiments.   The tensions between Antomelli 
and Ameglio came to a head when the Qadi of Tripoli—a judge appointed to the civil and 
religious courts by the Italian administration in consultation with the native commission—wrote 
an open letter to encourage local populations to accept  Italian rule stemming from parallels he 
traced between Islam and Christianity.  The author, Abd al-Rahman al-Busairi, equated the piety 
of Christians to that of Muslims and urged greater cooperation in the Libyan territories rooted in 
a shared sense of religiosity.  Attacking the article as blasphemous, Antomelli portrayed its 
publication as part of a larger pattern of pro-Islamic anti-Christian tendencies in the Libyan 
colonies.  Antomelli demanded an official denunciation of the article and greater protection of 
Christian values as part of Italy’s heritage and legal framework.   “I demand that in the same 
manner that  requires the respect of the Muslim beliefs, so at least you respect our holy religion 
and the divine Person of Jesus.  And in asking for this, I ask that which justice and fairness 
require: both because the Catholic religion is the religious of our Italian statutes, and for that 
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feeling that in any place, but especially  in the colonies, must be used by  everyone to avoid 
exasperating others and generating discord.”303  
 Voices in the Italian administration accused Antomelli of disloyalty in creating difficulties 
for the colonial state, and the hostility between the Bishop and the colonial state escalated.304 
When Antomelli wrote a pastoral letter in 1917 that aired his criticism of the colonial state 
practices, Ameglio and his administration accused the Bishop  of spreading unpatriotic messages 
that threatened to demoralize Italian troops for the colonial enterprise.  The nub of their disputes 
concerned the persistent issue of state versus Church control of education, an issue of particular 
importance as Italian state officials anticipated the demand for state education to train local 
functionaries.  In his letter, Antomelli accused the state schools in the Libyan territories of 
employing atheists as teachers, an accusation the director of the Technical School in Tripoli 
denied.305  Ameglio attributed a broader anti-Italian sentiment to the Bishop.  “It  is enough to 
read from beginning to end the pastoral letter to be convinced that under the mantle of religion, 
in the name of the heart of Jesus, he attempts a full attack, even as he pretends not to, against the 
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national war, the Government of the King, the authority, the institutions, and the customs of this 
Colony.”306  
 The missionaries painted the antagonism of Ameglio against Antomelli as a part of a 
larger pattern of anti-Church behavior and the influence of Freemasonry among Italian military 
officials and political elite.  There might have been some substance to those accusations.  A 
number of high-ranking military officers supported Freemasonry  and opposed Church influence 
in Italian politics at home and abroad.  More immediately, however, the tensions between 
Antomelli and Ameglio reflected the relative unimportance of the idea of spreading italianitá for 
Ameglio and the officials in his administration.  In an era of chaotic civil war in the Tripolitanian 
interior and the establishment of a Sanusi-Italian coalition in Cyrenaica, colonization schemes 
and the promotion of Italian civilization in the Libyan territories—including the Catholic Church
—took a back seat to the more immediate demand of stability.307   In an era of decreased state 
spending on colonial enterprises and the rising popularity of an international rhetoric calling for 
self-determination, Italian officials prioritized the incorporation of Muslim elites in power-
sharing systems as a stopgap  to prevent total loss of their claims to sovereignty in the Libyan 
territories.
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Economic Development and the Italian-Arabic Union
 The devastation of the First World War and the loss of territorial control in the Libyan 
colonies distracted national attention away from popular projects for economic development and 
mass colonization among Italian nationalists, and the prolonged conflicts among competing 
forces in Tripolitania precluded an extension of private or public development projects in the 
western region.  Both Idris al-Sanusi and the Italian colonial officials, however, saw the Acroma 
Accords as laying the groundwork for future economic and infrastructure developments in 
Cyrenaica.  Idris encouraged Italian state and private investments in projects to develop regional 
communications and transportation infrastructure to encourage trade and agricultural production, 
but he also took measures to ensure that he and his allies would benefit financially from the 
developments and retain or expand their control over regional trade.  In the original list of 
demands Idris al-Sanusi issued prior to negotiating the terms of the Acroma Accords, he 
requested that the Italians construct railways into the interior from the coast with the stipulation 
that half of the revenue from the railways would belong to him immediately and that the entire 
railway system would become his after ten years.308   In the subsequent process of negotiations, 
Idris dropped the issue of the rail construction.  Neither the British nor the Italian documents 
indicate why the idea of extending the small stretch of Italian railways along the coast into the 
interior of the region—a development from which both Italian imperial interests and the Sanusi 
participants in the negotiations clearly stood to benefit—failed to make it into the final 
agreements in Acroma.  
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 The plan to extend the railways into the Cyrenaican interior would come back in the 
negotiations for the Regima Accords in 1920 as part of a plan to expand state control, but it 
proved a highly  contentious issue among the Mogarba tribes of western Cyrenaica who saw the 
railways as a threat  to their controll over access to camels, caravan guides, and scarce water 
through a network of wells in the interior oases.  The inclusion of a program of railway 
construction would ultimately contribute to the failure of the Regima Accords and the subsequent 
resumption of armed conflicts in Cyrenaica between the Italian military and Sanusi forces with 
their allied tribes.  Most likely, the disappearance of the railway  development from the 
negotiations in the Acroma Accords reflected the urgency of establishing stability that took 
priority over unpopular projects for state-organized infrastructural development, projects that 
likely would have faced opposition in Italy  as well in a time of heightened economic strain.  The 
final agreements in Acroma did include provisions for the Italian state to provide telephone and 
telegraph wires between the coastal region and Sanusi zawāyā in the Cyrenaican interior as a 
way to improve communications between Italian state officials and their Sanusi ally, but all other 
development projects were deferred.309  
 A little over a year after the negotiation of the Acroma Accords, the relative peace in 
Cyrenaica and the end of hostilities in the First World War encouraged renewed interest in 
agricultural and economic development projects among Italian state officials and private 
speculators.  In October 1918, a group of Cyrenaican elites signed an agreement with Italian 
financiers to create an Italian-Arab Union for Agriculture and Commerce (Unione Italo-Araba 
per l’agricoltura e il commercio).  The charter for the Union established two associations: one of 
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regional notables centered in Ajedabiya and the other of financiers centered in Benghazi.  The 
organization promised a mutually  beneficial exchange of capital investments for the political 
influence of the Cyrenaican elite.  The association of local notables in Ajedabiya included Idris 
al-Sanusi, a handful of influential Sanusi ikhwān, and leading figures from the Mogarba and 
Awaghir tribes of western Cyrenaica.  The Cyrenaican elites agreed to negotiate terms with tribal 
leaders of the Cyrenaican interior to secure land, native labor, and livestock necessary for 
agricultural development.  In exchange, the financiers provided capital to pay for labor, seeds, 
and machinery, and they agreed to an even division of the revenue generated from subsequent 
exportation of Cyrenaican crops.  Through their collaboration, they hoped to become the 
“principle means of penetration among the populations of the interior.”310        
 The Italo-Arab Union marked the realization of a perpetual goal among liberal colonial 
officials for a full incorporation of a Sanusi authority in the expansion of Italian influence into 
the Cyrenaican interior.  The Union kept its agreements and activities secret to prevent the 
unpopularity of the Italian state occupation among tribal leaders of the interior from undermining 
the political influence of the Cyrenaican association in Ajedabiya, but the Italian Governor of 
Cyrenaica considered the covert involvement of Idris al-Sanusi in the association crucial to the 
success of Italian economic penetration of the interior and evidence of the successful results of 
the Acroma Accords.  “The concept is to give a joint interest to the natives in works of economic 
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penetration such that on one hand they act as its guardians while on the other, the government 
affirms and makes progress in such a way that it appears to be based on independent actions.”311  
 However, the Italian-Arab Union also underscored the importance of the tribes centered 
on Ajedabiya and the area stretching to the west into Sirte in Idris al-Sanusi’s attempts to 
consolidate his authority  in a centralized administration and systemize relations between the 
coastal areas and the tribes of the Cyrenaican interior.  The Regima Accords represented a 
formalization and extension of the incorporation of Idris al-Sanusi into Italian state and private 
plans for economic penetration into the interior, but the proposed system threatened a decisive 
shift in economic and political power away from Ajedabiya to the financial center of Benghazi. 
The related failure to gain consensus among the Mogarba and Awaghir tribes of western 
Cyrenaica ultimately contributed to the collapse of the agreements between Idris and the Italian 
state.   
Conclusion
 Though the Italian colonial state still officially considered Cyrenaica to be in a state of 
war during the secret negotiations for the Italian-Arab Union, the cooperation of local elites in 
Italian development schemes seemed to promise the possibility  of future expansion of Italian 
state presence to reinforce Italy’s status as an imperial power and eventual financial returns for 
the financiers and state agencies who had funded the colonial enterprise.  With the establishment 
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of a relatively stable administration in Cyrenaica and the mobilization of funding for 
infrastructure development, schemes to encourage mass colonization of Italian emigrants into the 
Libyan territories returned to the forefront of discussions among Italian nationalists and imperial 
interests.  When a group of Tripolitanian notables signed an agreement with Italian officials in 
April 1919 to establish the Libyan Statutes, the Italian government intended the Statutes to 
formalize the extension of Italian citizenship and the creation of an Italian-backed regional 
administration in Tripolitania. Italian nationalists heralded the Libyan Statutes an opportunity to 
prove Italy’s strength as an imperial nation through an expansion of state control and a transfer of 
Italian emigrants into a fully Italian territory  while seeming to comply with Wilsonian ideals of 
self-determination. 
 The rapid disintegration of Tripolitania into further regional conflicts revealed the 
shortcomings of the Italians’ understanding of regional politics and the deep unpopularity of the 
Italian state, but the relative peace in Cyrenaica inspired Italian officials to negotiate a new 
agreement with Idris al-Sanusi.  The resulting Treaty  of Regima312  represented an attempt to 
increase the scope of the Sanusi administration through the establishment of a Sanusi Emirate 
under Idris with the mission of applying the Libyan Statutes in Cyrenaica.  Italian officials in 
Benghazi and Idris saw the Regima Treaty  as an opportunity to realize development projects—
especially the construction of railways—that  would lead to a higher centralization of state 
control over the tribes of the interior and associated trade routes in the region.  Though the new 
accord affirmed Italian dependence on Idris al-Sanusi for control over the colonial territory, 
colonial officials wrote about the Regima Treaty  and the Sanusi Emirate as a temporary 
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institution that would inevitably  self-destruct due to the inherent weakness of Idris al-Sanusi and 
the proportionate increase in authority of the Italian colonial state.
 Three years after the conclusion of the Regima Treaty, the Italian Minister of Colonies 
revoked the treaties with Idris al-Sanusi, but only after he fled Cyrenaica for self-imposed exile 
in Egypt.  A variety of factors precipitated the disintegration of the agreements between Idris al-
Sanusi and the colonial state.  As we have seen, Idris al-Sanusi signaled his support for Italian 
railway construction in his original demands prior to the negotiations for the Acroma Accords in 
1916-1917.  The Regima Treaty reintroduced the primacy of railway construction as an 
instrument of an expansion of the Italian-Sanusi state, and Cyrenaican tribes who had previously 
favored the Acroma Accords opposed the new measures as a threat to their dominance over 
access to resources associated with traditional methods of caravan trade.  The emergence of a 
new political order in Rome contributed to the collapse of the Sanusi-Italian efforts at 
collaboration as Italian nationalists took the reigns of the Italian Ministry of Colonies and 
instituted a campaign for direct military control over the Libyan interior.  Characterizing Idris al-
Sanusi as simultaneously ineffective and posing a threat to Italian sovereignty, the fascist 
administration turned away from alliances with Muslim notables and initiated a series of military 
campaigns into the Libyan interior with the end goal of filling the colonial territory  with Italian 
emigrants and Italian culture.
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Ch. 5: The End of the Accords and the Fascist ‘Reconquest’ of the Interior
 
 The Italian Ministry of Colonies officially declared an end to the state of war in 
Cyrenaica in March 1921, just a few months after the conclusion of the Regima Accords.  As a 
measure of central importance to the Regima Accords and the application of the Libyan Statutes 
in Cyrenaica, Idris al-Sanusi agreed to assume responsibility  for disarming tribal forces in the 
Cyrenaican interior within eight months of their signing of the treaty.  Governor De Martino in 
Cyrenaica heralded the promised disarmament as establishing a new phase in Italian state 
expansion that would support increased private investments in Cyrenaican infrastructure and the 
eventual immigration of Italian agricultural workers, all while improving Italy’s international 
image as a friendly colonial power in a Muslim society.  But the declaration ending the state of 
war proved premature; notables from Mogarba and Awaghir tribes in western Cyrenaica rejected 
the Regima Accords as an aggressive extension of Italian state presence that threatened to upset 
regional trading patterns by shifting the Cyrenaican administrative center to Benghazi and 
replacing camel-based trade with rail and automobile transportation.  
 For two years, Italian officials watched from the sidelines as Sanusi elites and shifting 
alliances of tribal leaders debated whether or not to accept the application of the Libyan Statutes 
and the Sanusi Emirate.  The Regima Accords revealed divisions within the Sanusi family  and 
allied tribal leaders and sparked a struggle for control over the Sanusi coalition between Idris al-
Sanusi and Saf al-Din, the younger brother of Ahmad al-Sharif.  Unsure of who to trust, officials 
in the Italian administration complained of being trapped in a web of their own design, stuck 
defending the uncertain authority of Idris al-Sanusi for the expansion of Italian state control into 
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the Cyrenaican interior.  Given the unpopularity  of the Libyan Statutes and the Regima Accords, 
Italian officials agreed to postpone the issue of disarmament to prevent a widespread backlash 
against the Sanusi Emirate.  Increasingly  nervous about the possibility  of losing control over the 
narrow coastal territories, Italian officers reinforced the Sanusi garrisons established by Royal 
Decree in 1918 and placed them under joint Sanusi-Italian control as an attempt to remind Idris 
of his dependence on the Italian state.
 In the year following the signing of the Regima Accords, attempts to gain the consensus 
of the Mogarba and Awaghir notables of western Cyrenaica faltered, and the Mogarba notable, 
Saleh al-Ateusc, developed a plan to unify Cyrenaica and Tripolitania under a Sanusi Emirate in 
collaboration with nationalist activists in Tripolitania as a way of preventing an expanded Italian 
presence.  Alarmed at the prospect of a Sanusi state beyond Italian control, Italian agents in 
Cyrenaica began to advocate for an end to the collaborative approach with the Sanusi family and 
a stronger military presence at the beginning of 1922.  Initially, officials in Rome defended Idris 
against the accusations of Italian agents in Cyrenaica and held on to the belief that  a Sanusi 
intermediary offered the best solution for generating consensus among tribal leaders and 
preventing the political influence of pan-Islamism or Arab nationalism from generating 
widespread opposition in Cyrenaica to the Italian colonial state.  The shifting political landscape 
after the fascist March on Rome in October 1922 brought  a new cadre of officials to power in 
Rome who supported the move away from negotiations in favor of direct state control, and in the 
spring of 1923 the new Minister of Colonies, Luigi Federzoni, officially renounced the Regima 
Accords.  His subsequent replacement of civil functionaries in the colonies with military officers 
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signaled a distinct transition in the Italian administration and a new readiness to engage in 
military operations.  
 Scholarship  on the Italian occupation of the Libyan territories has focused either on the 
rise of fascism and the subsequent change in political leadership in Rome or on fear of Idris al-
Sanusi’s potential to unify  Cyrenaica and Tripolitania as the causal factors for the disintegration 
of the negotiations.  But while the changes in Rome led to an undeniable shift in the willingness 
of colonial officials to resort to force and the signs of a developing agreement between 
Tripolitanian and Cyrenaican notables to extend the Sanusi Emirate to the west in the Garian 
Conference indicated the possibility of a Sanusi authority out of control with ties to nationalist 
elements throughout the Arab world, the order of events also suggests that the inability of Idris 
and the Italian administration to gain the consent of tribal leaders in western Cyrenaica for the 
Regima Accords had signaled the ultimate failure of British and Italian officials to establish Idris 
al-Sanusi as a viable local intermediary, a failure punctuated by Idris al-Sanusi’s departure from 
Cyrenaica in January  1923 into a self-imposed exile in Egypt.  The idea that  opposition to Idris 
al-Sanusi’s involvement in Italian development schemes in the Regima Accords precipitated the 
downfall of the Sanusi-Italian negotiations is one that  has not garnered attention in the 
historiography of colonial Libya, but it offers an explanation for the redefinition of the Sanusi 
ṭarīqa as a force of anti-Italian opposition among a loose and uneasy  coalition of tribal leaders 
and Sanusi military commanders in the interior of Cyrenaica.  As we will see, continuities in the 
personnel of the colonial administration and continued attempts to reopen negotiations with Idris 
al-Sanusi after 1922 support the focus on the loss of support from local power brokers in the 
failure of negotiations instead of a simple shift in approach from Rome.
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 In the years after the departure of Idris al-Sanusi and the annulment of the Regima 
Accords, Sanusi shaykhs redefined the Sanusi ṭarīqa as an organized movement of anti-colonial 
armed resistance as the Italian colonial administration initiated a period of increased use of force 
to extend state presence into the Libyan interior.  Initially, the Italian administration focused on 
military operations in Tripolitania where General Rodolfo Graziani led a series of maneuvers 
against Warfalla and Awlad Suleiman forces to occupy  the oasis of Ghadames and Beni Ulid in 
the Nafusa Mountains.  In the first few years of the fascist administration, the situation in 
Cyrenaica saw relatively  little change apart from an initial occupation of the former seat of Idris 
al-Sanusi’s administration in Ajedabiya, but the Mogarba leader Saleh al-Ateusc, the Awaghir 
militant Abdullah ben Kheja, and the Sanusi shaykh Omar al-Mukhtar began to organize a broad 
coalition of “Sanusi” forces in collaboration with Saf al-Din, Ahmad al-Sharif’s brother and the 
military commander of the Italian-supported Sanusi garrisons.  
 During his second term as Minister of Colonies, Luigi Federzoni and his new Governor 
of Cyrenaica initiated aggressive military  operations in 1926.  Calling on an extension of Italian 
state presence into the Cyrenaican interior, Federzoni set forth a goal of establishing complete 
military control up to the 29th parallel, a line that reached the oases of Jalo, Awajil, and Marada 
—oases with primarily Mogarba populations that the Regima Accords had established as Sanusi 
territory.  Federzoni meant the series of occupations as a final solution to the problem posed by 
Mogarba dominance in Sirtica by cutting off supply lines leading into Egypt and the Cyrenaican 
coast.  The dissolution of the Sanusi administration fed the Italian nationalist  fantasy of mass 
colonization in the Libyan territories, and Federzoni proved an eager advocate of projects 
designed to transform the region into a fully Italian space.  The full force of the Italian 
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“reconquest” of the Cyrenaican interior did not begin until 1928 when Mussolini sent General 
Graziani to pacify the eastern territory with the same notoriously repressive methods he had used 
in Tripolitania, but Federzoni’s administration had set the tone and the expectations for a full 
territorial conquest.  As a vocal and public advocate of reconciliation between the Vatican and 
the Italian state, Federzoni’s vision for Italian expansion in the Libyan territories included a 
central role for the Catholic missionaries as partners in the effort to spread Italian culture and the 
Italian people across the Mediterranean; the end of the negotiations with the Sanusiyya seeemed 
to present  an opportunity for him to realize a program of Italian colonization that would reflect 
his particular vision of Italian nationalism.
Railroads and Camels: Trade and Resistance to the Regima Accords
 The Regima Accords did not have the effect Governor De Martino and the Italian 
Ministry of Colonies had envisioned of incorporating Cyrenaican tribes into the Italian colonial 
state system.  Notables from the Mogarba tribes and dissident Awaghir tribes in western 
Cyrenaica in particular opposed the application of the Regima Accords and the Libyan Statutes, 
and their refusal to hand over arms or recognize Italian state authority weakened the position of 
Idris al-Sanusi as a figurehead for the Sanusi ṭarīqa and an intermediary  with the Italian state. 
The Mogarba and Awaghir notables saw the Regima Accords as an insidious vehicle of state 
expansion at the expense of their local autonomy, and they  objected to Italian plans for 
infrastructural development that threatened to replace caravan trade with rail and automobile 
travel to devalue their dominant access to water sources and camels. 
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 From the beginning of their occupation, access to safe travel routes for supply lines 
proved a constant worry for Italian officials in the Libyan colonies, but during the 1910s, the 
combination of a lack of state funds, the disapproval of local populations, legal restrictions on 
land ownership, and technical difficulties with the Jebel al-Akhdar plateau near Benghazi 
restricted the construction of railroads in Cyrenaica.313   Governor De Martino considered the 
conclusion of the Regima Accords and the extension of the Libyan Statutes in Cyrenaica to 
represent an opportunity to initiate a new era of economic and state development in the region. 
Every  colonial context, De Martino claimed, passed through two phases.  In the first phase, the 
state limited its functions to political and military operation, and in the second, a heightened 
level of security allowed for greater private enterprise and a limitation of state functions to 
“guiding and collaborating” with private projects.   “Following the accords with the Sanusiyya 
and the application of the liberal Statutes, Cyrenaica has doubtlessly entered into the second 
period: it follows that development will follow from private initiative, strongly supported by the 
State.”314   De Martino had long been an advocate of combined state and private activities in 
Italian colonial expansion, including his involvement in schemes with the former Egyptian 
Khedive and the Banco di Roma in Egypt in 1913 to extend railway networks from Tripoli and 
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314 “In seguito agli accordi colla Senussia e alla applicazione degli Statuti liberali, la Cirenaica è entrata 
indubbiamente nel secondo periodo: conviene dunque che l’azione di valorizzazione muova 
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economic development in Cyrenaica.  The report does not have an author, but it is most likely be De 
Martino due to his references to similar development he initiated as Governor of Italian Somaliland in 
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Benghazi to Alexandria.315  With a promised end to anti-Italian hostilities, De Martino identified 
the construction of roads and railroads as a first step in the agricultural development of 
Cyrenaica and its eventual colonization by Italian immigrants, a step that would, he claimed, 
help  transform the region into its proper state as “a piece of Sicily  nestled in the African 
continent.”316  
 The push for the development of infrastructure in Cyrenaica represented the combined 
interests of political elites and capitalist enterprises in Italy who, like De Martino, expected 
immediate financial benefits in the Libyan territories with the more distant promise of its future 
transformation into an Italian space for emigrant workers.  The prospect of infrastructure 
development into the interior inspired a renewed interest in agricultural development schemes 
among colonial institutions in Italy  and encouraged Italian agents in their negotiations with Idris 
al-Sanusi.  In October 1920, a commission from the Sindacato di studi per la valorizzazione 
della Cirenaica, an organization founded in Milan by a senator Angelo Valvassori-Peroni, arrived 
in Benghazi just a few days before the conclusion of the Regima Accords.  The commission 
supported the plan for joint sovereignty  under Italian and Sanusi authority because they  argued 
that it would allow for the development of roads and railways in the region between Benghazi 
and Derna, the area with the best agricultural land in Cyrenaica.317  Following the commission’s 
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recommendations and the conclusion of the Regima Accords, the colonial technical services 
decided to focus the development of roads and rail in the area between Derna and al-Marj, a 
development that contributed to the transformation of al-Marj from a small village into a major 
town during the 1920s.318  
 Anticipating negative reactions against  road and rail construction, the Regima Accords 
charged Idris al-Sanusi with the specific task of using his influence to prevent tribal leaders in 
Cyrenaica from opposing Italian plans for infrastructural development in the region.  Article 
Nineteen of the Regima Accords noted the importance of Idris al-Sanusi’s willingness and ability 
to assure the application of the Libyan Statutes in Cyrenaica as a precondition for his continued 
good standing within the Italian state system and the corresponding financial and political 
benefits he stood to gain from his position.  In a stipulation that  has received little attention in 
scholarship  on the negotiations between Idris and Italian officials, this final article of the Regima 
Accords gave particular weight to the intended effect of the Libyan Statutes to promote private 
industry and the development of communications and transportation infrastructure.  “The Emir 
for his part  will undertake a project of persuasion by means of his high influence so that  there 
should be no obstacle on the part  of those who oppose the creation of roads and railroads, of 
postal, bus, telegraph and telephone lines, all works required for the progress of the country and 
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the interest and prosperity  of commerce.”319  As the final clause of the Regima Accords, Article 
Nineteen betrays the true thrust of the treaty  for the Italian officials and their regional allies 
involved in the negotiations.  They  intended the disarmament of tribal forces, formation of the 
Cyrenaican parliament, and the establishment of an Emirate under Idris al-Sanusi to promote 
conditions favorable to Italian private and public investment in Libyan infrastructure.     
 As a sign of the importance of the tribal leaders of western Cyrenaica in realizing the 
objectives of the Regima Accords, the Italian Ministry of Colonies wrote to leading members of 
the Awaghir and Mogarba tribes in Ajedabiya and the Jebel al-Akhdar regions to reassure them 
that the new system would not diminish their status or their local autonomy.  Italian authorities 
informed them that the state would keep  out of tribal politics and leave them to choose their own 
leaders and potential representatives to a future Cyrenaican Parliament they intended to establish 
in Benghazi.  Hoping to forestall any possible violent opposition to the new measures, the Italian 
authorities told the Mogarba and Awaghir notables that they could even choose to abstain from 
engaging in the Italian state system entirely if they wished.  “Those Tribes who do not wish to 
accept the Law will remain in peace in their country, but they will not  be represented either in the 
House of Deputies (Mabo’san) or in the Council of Administration, nor will their Shaykhs be 
granted any privileges by the Government.”320  However, the Italian authorities failed to address 
what proved to be the central issue for tribal leaders in the expansion of infrastructure.  
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319 “L’Emiro per sua parte, s’impegna a svolgere opera di persuasione mediante la sua alta influenza, 
affinchè nessuno ostacolo sia opposto da parte di chi ? alla creazione di strade ordinarie e ferrate, di linee 
postali, automobilistiche, telegrafiche e telefoniche, lavori tutti richiesti dal progresso del paese e 
dall’interesse e propserità del commercio.”  There are a few copies of the Regima Accords in the Italian 
colonial archives.  See for example ACS FG 1/2/2, Copy of the Regima Accords with agreements on 
salaries for Sanusi notables, 25 October 1920.
320 BNA FO 141/652, translation of a letter from Italian authorities to the Shaykhs of Barka, Military 
Administrator of the Frontier Districts Administration to the British High Commissioner in Egypt,  15 
December 1920.  The letter was dated 23 Gamad I, 338 = 23 Jumada al-Awwal 1338 (14 February 1920).
 The tribal leaders of Cyrenaica responded to the Italian authorities with a refusal to 
recognize the validity of any negotiations Idris al-Sanusi concluded with the Italian government 
that went beyond the boundaries established in the Acroma Accords from 1917.  Their opposition 
to the Regima Accords reflected a common concern with the potential centralization of authority 
in the Italian state center of Benghazi as a threat to their regional autonomy, but they focused on 
the threat Italian plans to extend the railroad and roads into their territory posed to existing trade 
patterns.  “As regards the election of the Council, we, the nomad Arabs, will have our Council in 
Agdabia [Ajedabiya], and will not agree to its being at Benghazi.  We do not consent to having 
any railways in our country, as this would cause a loss to us in the trade of hiring camels.” 321  De 
Martino’s proposed railway  construction and the establishment of the state center in Benghazi 
threatened to shift political power away  from the town of Ajedabiya and the nearby region of 
Sirtica where Idris al-Sanusi claimed the support of Mogarba notables.  Mogarba notables 
dominated trading patterns in their region based on their access to camels and their ties to 
merchants in the interior oases, many of whom came from Mogarba client tribes like the 
Zuwaya.  Besides detracting from camel-based trade, the construction of railway lines required 
digging new wells to supply  workers, thus diminishing the value of the Mogarba tribes’ control 
of wells in a network from Sirte to the oases of Kufra.322  The Mogarba and Awaghir shaykhs did 
not object  to Italian involvement in regional commercial activities; on the contrary, they noted 
their approval of the Acroma Accords because they understood it to limit Italian presence in 
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Cyrenaica to commerce and not government.  They understood the Regima Accords as the first 
attempt of the Italian state to assert its control over trade through the development of 
infrastructure.  “We accept in our country only the commercial purposes of the Italians (with the 
exception of railways).”323
 The refusal of the Mogarba and Awaghir shaykhs to accept the validity  of the Regima 
Accords undermined both the authority  of the Italian colonial state and the position of Idris al-
Sanusi as the figurehead of the Sanusi ṭarīqa and a colonial intermediary.  The shaykhs made it 
clear in their response that they recognized the validity  of the Sanusi government, but they 
refused the right of Idris al-Sanusi to negotiate on their behalf, rejecting the Italian and British 
project to cultivate Idris as an authoritative representative of the Sanusi ṭarīqa.  The Cyrenaican 
shaykhs referred to “our Senussi Black Flag, the flag of our Prophet” as a symbol of their 
freedom from Italian state control, and recognizing the Libyan Statutes as an initial move 
towards state involvement in the region through the development of laws and infrastructure, they 
declared that, “if the aim of the Italian Government is to spread its flag and to publish laws, we 
fully  disapprove of this, and any peace made between the Italian Government and Sayed Idris 
without our consent will be valueless.”324  The objection of the Cyrenaican tribal leaders revealed 
the symbolic value of the Sanusi ṭarīqa as a political movement for anti-colonial independence 
that could be entirely divorced from the figure of Idris al-Sanusi and, increasingly, from the 
entire Sanusi family  as an uneasy coalition of Sanusi notables—military leaders and tribal elite 
with prominent positions in the Sanusi ṭarīqa—took up the Sanusi flag against  the extension of 
Italian development projects into the interior.   
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 In protest  against the Regima Accords, Sanusi forces began attacking Italian road and rail 
construction projects in the region of Cyrene in May 1921.325  To pursue his interest in promoting 
railway construction in the region, Idris al-Sanusi organized meetings with shaykhs from 
Mogarba and Awaghir tribes twice between February and the end of October 1921 to try to bring 
them to agree to disarmament and the extension of the Italian administration in the Regima 
Accords, an extension that would limit the Sanusi administration to the oases of Awjila, Jalo, and 
Kufra to permit Italian state authority and development throughout the coastal regions and the 
plateau of Jebel al-Akhdar.326  The proposed construction of the railroad between al-Marj and 
Derna proved too unpopular among the Mogarba and Awaghir tribes, and the first meeting in al-
Abiar ended with the Cyrenaican shaykhs declaring their intention to oppose the application of 
the Regima Accords with force if necessary.327  After a meeting in October in Ajedabiya, Idris 
managed to gain the Mogarba shaykhs’ provisional acceptance of the Italian project  to build 
railways and a temporary halt in attacks on infrastructure projects with the stipulation that they 
be allowed to keep their armed adwar.328 
 Governor De Martino, focused on the immediate promise of security for Italian 
development projects, pushed for a temporary solution to postpone the issue of disarmament by 
placing the armed groups the Italian government established and funded in 1918 to protect Italian 
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and Sanusi interests under joint command of Italian and Sanusi leadership.329   The measure 
provoked objections from officials within the colonial administration and nationalists in Rome 
who saw it  as a loss of control and prestige for the Italian state.  The Minister of Colonies at  the 
time, Giuseppe Giardini, voiced concern that armed camps in Cyrenaica under joint Italian and 
Sanusi control would strengthen the Sanusi authority among local populations and would breed 
confusion about whether the Italians or the Sanusi family  had true control.330  But the fear that 
forced disarmament would lead to political and military catastrophe and Idris al-Sanusi’s refusal 
to take responsibility  for the potential chaos convinced the Minister of Colonies to accept De 
Martino’s plan for joint control of the armed camps.331   In November 1921, the Italian agent 
primarily  responsible for negotiating with the Sanusiyya, Luigi Pintor, met with the Sanusi 
intermediary in the negotiations, Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya in Bu Mariam, and they agreed to 
maintain four of the eleven garrisons the Italian administration had funded for Idris in their 
previous treaties.   In order to maintain an image of Italian control in the region, they  agreed to a 
ratio of ten Italian soldiers to every eight Sanusi men within the armed groups.332
 Giacomo De Martino died in Benghazi the same month as the conclusion of the Bu 
Mariam agreements, and Luigi Pintor was named Regent Governor to maintain a sense of 
continuity  in the discussions with the Sanusi family and the Mogarba tribes.  When Mogarba 
notables began to collaborate with nationalist  activists in Tripolitania at the beginning of 1922 
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for the establishment of a unified Libyan Emirate under Sanusi authority, Pintor became an 
outspoken critic of the very treaties he had negotiated with Idris al-Sanusi and Omar Mansur al-
Kekhiya.  Unsure if Idris al-Sanusi’s failure to gain compliance for the Regima Accords reflected 
his lack of authority among the Sanusi ikhwān and their affiliated tribes or a plot  by Idris and 
Omar Mansur to undermine the Italian colonial project, Pintor joined a growing chorus of voices 
among Italian imperialists and nationalists who saw their reliance on a Sanusi intermediary as a 
needless concession to pressures from international pan-Islamist networks and a symbol of 
Italian weakness.  
 Luigi Pintor exemplified a strain of continuity between the liberal and fascist 
administrations.  In Federzoni’s Ministry  of Colonies, Pintor would gain a prominent voice as an 
official with extensive experience negotiating with the Sanusi elite.  His inclusion in the fascist 
administration indicated the continued importance ascribed to the Sanusiyya among Italian 
officials after 1922, but his growing criticism of the process of negotiations with Idris after the 
failed application of the Regima Accords points to the importance of the opposition of the tribal 
leaders of western Cyrenaica in turning the tide of opinion in the Italian administration against 
the Sanusi Emirate as a useful intermediary to promote Italian infrastructure and claims to state 
control into the interior. 
Pan-Islamic Networks and the Possible Return of Ahmad al-Sharif
 As Italian colonial agents and Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya negotiated the Regima Accords 
and Idris tried to gain the support of notables among the Mogarba and Awaghir tribes in 
Cyrenaica for disarmament and the construction of infrastructure in 1920-1921, the possibility  of 
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establishing an agreement with Ahmad al-Sharif, Idris’ notoriously militant cousin, reemerged in 
the foreground of discussions among officials in the Italian Ministries of Colonies and Foreign 
Affairs.  While an alliance with Idris al-Sanusi seemed to provide stability in Cyrenaica, the 
possibility of a relationship  with Ahmad al-Sharif offered an advantage on the international 
stage.  However, Ahmad al-Sharif’s prominence as a religious and political figure in the Arab 
world suggested the need for a delicate balance between preventing a rise in nationalist 
opposition in Cyrenaica that his return could inspire and the potential benefits of negotiating an 
agreement with him both as a signal of Italy’s power in the Arab-Muslim world and a way of 
precluding rival imperial powers from gaining his support.
 Ahmad al-Sharif’s value as a symbol of Islamic resistance against European imperialism 
only grew after he left Cyrenaica when he became an active supporter and public promotor for 
the creation of a parallel government in Ankara under Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish nationalist 
later known as Ataturk who had participated in the Italo-Turkish War in 1911-1912.333   The 
involvement of Islamic leaders like Ahmad al-Sharif in the Kemalist  government against the 
religious condemnation of the pro-British Sultan-Caliph allowed the Turkish nationalist 
movement to broaden its appeal and sources of funding by  calling on anti-European Islamic 
unity.  The possibility that the Kemalist government might recognize Ahmad al-Sharif as an 
alternative Caliph to the Sultan gave renewed urgency to the idea of establishing an alliance with 
the Sanusi leader among the European colonial powers who feared his potential influence on 
Islamic anti-colonial movements in Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, and Libya.334  Rumors that he might 
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be given a position as Emir of Hejaz and Mesopotamia reached Italian officials as an indication 
of the level of popular and elite support  he had acquired in the process of fighting against 
European powers during the First World War.  For the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
news indicated that, “the faces of the most  intransigent representatives of Ottoman-Muslim 
nationalism had turned with intense attention on Sidi Ahmad as a possible valid contrast to 
figures, especially British creatures, in Eastern Anatolia and Arabia.”335  
 A temporary  alignment of interests between Soviet Bolsheviks and pan-Islamic/Turkish 
nationalist movements in 1920-1921 based on their shared anti-Western rhetoric added to the 
threat of Ahmad al-Sharif as a public figure with the potential to destabilize colonial territories of 
Western European powers.336   Ahmad al-Sharif’s position in pan-Islamic networks integrated 
Italy’s problems of colonial rule within a larger international framework that inspired a 
collaborative approach between the Ministry of Colonies and the Ministry  of Foreign Affairs. 
The Minister of Colonies, Giuseppe Giardini, underlined the confluence of international and 
colonial issues in a memo to the Minister of Foreign Affairs as they debated the best approach to 
dealing with the possibility  of Ahmad al-Sharif’s return to Cyrenaica.  “The vision that this 
Minister has always had of the situation in Libya that becomes clearer every day is that the 
events in Libya are not for the most part anything but the local manifestations of factors and 
actions that are prepared or matured in other places.  Thus it is not possible to conceive of a 
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Libya policy in itself.  Instead, it is necessary to consider it as a function of domestic, 
intercolonial, and international factors that contribute to its formation.”337  
 Ahmad al-Sharif actually made the first moves to re-establish contact with Italian 
officials several times after his departure to determine the possibility  of returning to Cyrenaica 
and claiming his properties in the Libyan territories, but colonial officials in the process of 
cultivating Idris al-Sanusi as an alternative authority within the Sanusi ṭarīqa found the idea of 
negotiating with Ahmad al-Sharif too risky  at the same time.  It  was only with his involvement in 
the Kemalist government that the possibility  of a relationship with Ahmad al-Sharif resurfaced to 
the foreground of discussions within the Ministry of Colonies.338  Worried that the British would 
help  him return to Cyrenaica if only to remove him as a threat in Anatolia, Italian officials 
renewed their attempts to communicate with Ahmad al-Sharif to try  to assure that if he returned, 
he might do so with a more favorable relationship to the Italian state.339  Luigi Pintor, the Italian 
agent acting as primary  contact with Sanusi representatives in the negotiations with Idris al-
Sanusi, began to argue in favor of establishing a relationship with Ahmad al-Sharif as a way to 
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337 “La visione, che questo Ministero ha sempre avuto della situazione libica va risultando di giorno in 
giorno più chiara, che cioè gli avvenimenti libici non sono per la massima parte che la manifestazione in 
loco di fattori o di azioni che si preparano o si maturano altrove.  Non è quindi possibile concepire una 
politica libica a sè stante. È necessario invece considerarla in funzione dei fattori interni della metropoli, 
intercoloniali ed internazionali che concorrono a formarla.”  ASMAI II 136/1/9, Minister of Colonies to 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 11 November 1921.  There was some ambivalence within the Italian 
administration concerning how to respond to the possible return of Ahmad al-Sharif which Claudia 
Gazzini has argued reflected divergent aims between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Colonies.  However, after initial reluctance of the Minister of Colonies, Giusppe Giardini, the Ministry of 
Colonies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaborated closely in the issue of a possible return of 
Ahmad al-Sharif.  More than an inter-ministerial conflict over objectives, the ambiguity reflected an 
attempt to balance among various forces as they tried to determine which posed a greater threat to Italy’s 
claims to sovereignty and prestige: the return of Ahmad al-Sharif to Cyrenaica or his possible 
involvement with other colonial authorities.  
338 ASMAI II 136/1/11, Notes for the Minister of Coloneis, July 1921.
339 ASMAI II 136/1/11, Minister of Colonies to Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Libia: Ex Senusso Saied 
Ahmad El Scerif”, 6 August 1921.
control the ramifications of his possible return, “with pacts and guarantees through our means 
rather than endure it unprepared, and without restrictions on his part and even with the fraudulent 
help of others.”340 
 Increasingly distrustful of British intentions, the potential to negotiate directly with 
Ahmad al-Sharif represented a possible way to inflict damage on Britain’s reputation within the 
Muslim world, and it fit into a movement among nationalists within Italy’s political elite that 
recognized an alignment of interests with the Kemalist government in Ankara in its opposition to 
British foreign policy after the shortfalls in Italian territorial gains after the First World War.341 
Some Italian nationalists conflated the Kemalist government with pan-Islamism or Arab 
nationalism.  The nationalist poet and general Gabriele D’Annunzio, for example, developed 
relationships with influential Egyptian nationalists and helped establish pan-Islamic associations 
in Rome as a way to undermine British foreign policy.342   Cosmopolitan Italians with ties in 
North Africa had long fostered ties with Egyptian nationalists as allies in extending Italian 
influence abroad at the expense of the British, but after the First  World War, Ahmad al-Sharif’s 
position within the Kemalist government as a spokesperson for anti-British movements 
throughout the Muslim world spoke to the frustrations of Italian nationalists and seemed to offer 
the possibility for a new order of negotiations between the Italian colonial administration and the 
Sanusi elite.   
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340 “con patti e garanzie per nostro tramite, piuttosto che subirlo inatteso e senza vincoli per sua parte con 
lo aiuto sia pure fraudulento di altri....” ASMAI II 136/1/9, Pintor to the Minister of Colonies, 22 
November 1921.
341 Fabio Grassi, L’Italia e la questione turca (1917-1923: Opinione pubblica e politica estera (Turin: 
Silvio Zamorani, 1996), 212.
342 Malek Badrawi, Political Violence in Egypt, 1910-1924: Secret Societies, Plots and Assassinations 
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000), 185.
 Ahmad al-Sharif’s influence in the Kemalist government added to his popularity in the 
Libyan territories—even in Tripolitania where political figures had long been wary of the 
Sanusiyya. Tripolitanian notables began calling for a return of Ahmad al-Sharif to the Libyan 
territories because they  hoped he could restore stability to a region devastated by a chaotic civil 
war between Ramadan al-Suwayhli on the one hand and an alliance of the Muntasir family and 
Abd al-Nabi Belkhir, a leading figure in the Warfalla tribes, on the other.  After Ramadan al-
Suwayhli died in August 1920 during an attack on Warfalla forces, a group  of Tripolitanian 
notables met in Garian in November 1920 to try to establish a consensus for unified political 
action.  Led by the Egyptian nationalist Abd al-Rahman Azzam and Ahmad al-Mraied, a former 
functionary for the Italian government in Tarhuna, they hoped to develop a system that would 
allow for relative autonomy from the Italian colonial state while promoting much-needed 
stability  in the region.343  Given his influence in Ankara, Ahmad al-Sharif offered the possibility 
of integrating the interests of Tripolitanian populations into wider pan-Islamic networks, and the 
previous negotiations between the Italian state and the Sanusi family  suggested that the 
establishment of a Sanusi Emirate under his leadership  in Tripolitania could prevent significant 
opposition from the Italian authorities.344  
 The possibility of a Sanusi Emirate in Tripolitania alarmed the Ministry of Colonies as a 
sign of ambitions among regional elite to unify resources of the two regions in opposition to the 
Italian colonial state and as a possible source of international influence that could undermine 
Italian authority in the region.  For most of the Italian occupation, rivalries between Tripolitanian 
notables—especially Ramadan al-Suwayhli—and Sanusi elite had reassured Italian officials who 
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343 Ahmida, Making of Modern Libya, 129-132; Anderson, “Ramadan al-Suwayhli,” 126.
344 ASMAI II 136/1/11, Notes for the Minister of Colonies, July 1921.
hoped to keep  a strict division between the territories as a way to prevent any one regional figure 
from gaining widespread authority.  In the summer of 1921, a coalition of notables in Tripolitania 
led by the Egyptian nationalist Abd al-Rahman Azzam showed interest in establishing an emirate 
under Ahmad al-Sharif as a plan to limit Italian authority  in the region.345  In January 1922, the 
notables of Tripolitania met for a second time in Sirte, and as a signal of their intentions to 
develop cross-regional ties, they invited Saleh al-Ateusc, the Mogarba notable from Ajedabiya 
who presented one of the primary  opponents to the realization of the Regima Accords, as a 
representative of Cyrenaican interests.346   In April 1922, the Tripolitanian notables issued a 
proposal to the Italian Ministry of Colonies for an Emirate under the leadership of Ahmad al-
Sharif in Tripolitania that would answer to Idris al-Sanusi.  Not all of the Tripolitanian notables 
approved of a Sanusi Emirate, but the proposal reflected their attempt to appease Saleh al-Ateusc 
and gain access to the considerable forces of the Mogarba tribes in Sirtica.347  
 For Italian administrators in Cyrenaica, the collaboration threatened to spread the unrest 
that had dominated Tripolitania after the First World War into Cyrenaica and further exacerbate 
the attempts to induce the Mogarba tribes to accept the application of the Libyan Statutes.348  The 
centrality of Saleh al-Ateusc in the plan for an extension of the Sanusi emirate into Tripolitania 
offers further evidence that the failure of Idris al-Sanusi to gain the support of the tribal leaders 
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346 ACS Carte Luigi Pintor, b. 4, f. 18, Pintor to Minister of Colonies, 3 January 1922.  The Tripolitanian 
notables included Muhammad Mraied (the kaymakam of Tarhuna), Ahmad al-Suwayhli (the son of 
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347 ACS Carte Luigi Pintor, b. 4, f. 18, Pintor to Minister of Colonies, 3 January 1922; ACS Carte Luigi 
Pintor, b. 4, f. 18, Pintor to Minister of Colonies, 13 March 1922.
348 ACS Carte Luigi Pintor, b. 4, f. 18, Pintor to Minister of Colonies, 26 April 1922.
of western Cyrenaica precipitated his departure and the Italian renunciation of negotiations. 
Italian state officials did not  necessarily  object to the extension of Idris al-Sanusi’s authority; the 
potential agreement between Saleh al-Ateusc and the Tripolitanian notables instead indicated the 
potential for anti-Italian forces with considerable control over resources in the region to hijack 
the Sanusi administration. 
Local Officials in Revolt against Rome: Volpi and Pintor vs. Amendola  
 By focusing on the opposition of the tribal leaders of western Cyrenaica to the appliaction 
of the Regima Accords, I have tried to turn our attention to the little-understood aspects of Idris 
al-Sanusi’s reliance on the support of regional power brokers for his position as a colonial 
intermediary.  This is not to diminish, however, the importance of a rising impatience among a 
cadre of political and military figures with increased influence in Rome and in the Libyan 
territories calling for aggressive measures and increased resources to secure the entire region 
conclusively  for Italian state development and settlement schemes.  In the year leading up to 
Mussolini’s March on Rome, the push for direct territorial control emerged among Italian 
officials in the colonial governments of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, leading to a distinct split 
with central authorities in Rome who remained focused on the potential benefits of indirect 
forms of colonial rule through a Sanusi intermediary.  The first division in the methods of the 
local and central governments occurred soon after the announcement of a proposal for a unified 
emirate under Idris al-Sanusi when the Italian Governor of Tripolitania, Giuseppe Volpi, ordered 
the occupation of the city  of Misurata to prevent Abd al-Rahman Azzam from establishing an 
independent administration in the coastal city with ties to Arab nationalist and pan-Islamic 
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networks in Egypt and Anatolia.349  An entrepreneur long interested in colonization schemes for 
the Libyan territories, Volpi saw his occupation of Misurata as an act of defiance against political 
actors in Rome who hoped to project an image of Italy as friendly  to pan-Islamic networks in 
alliance with Abd al-Rahman Azzam and Egyptian nationalists as part of an effort to diminish 
British and French influence in the Muslim world.350   
 The occupation of Misurata generated a public debate in Rome and energized a 
movement for greater direct territorial control, but officials in the Ministry of Colonies initially 
opposed an extension of Volpi’s aggressive tactics into Cyrenaica, prompting a rising 
dissatisfaction in the Cyrenaican administration over a subsequent shortage of resources.  Volpi 
initiated the occupation without the permission or knowledge of the central government in Rome, 
but when he announced the success of his mission in February 1922, he gained the approval and 
support of the newly appointed Minister of Colonies, Giovanni Amendola.  Amendola tried to 
strike a moderate tone; following Volpi’s lead, Amendola shifted away from his predecessor’s 
willingness to negotiate with the Tripolitanian notables or consider the possibility of extending 
the Sanusi Emirate to Tripolitania as a concession to international pressure from Islamic 
networks that threatened to weaken Italian authority.   In a speech before the Italian House of 
Deputies, Amendola signaled his discontent with directives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
who, along with certain nationalist circles in Rome, promoted the possibility of engaging pan-
Islamic networks to achieve Italian anti-British foreign policy objectives.  “It is recommended to 
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349 Enrico De Leone, Riformatori musulmani del XIX secolo nell’Africa e nell’Asia mediterranee (Milan: 
Giuffrè Editore, 1973), 35. 
350 See Volpi’s introduction to a volume on colonial policies presented to Mussolini during his 1926 visit 
to the colonies: Angelo Piccioli, ed. La rinascita della Tripolitania. Memorie e studi sui quattro anni di 
governo del Conte Giuseppe Volpi di Misurata (Milan: Mondadori, 1926).
the government to meet the views and objectives of the pan-Islamic movement.  But what good 
would it do for Italy?  In that case, we would have to allow for the constitution in Libya of an 
Arab national state, an advanced sentinel of Islamic revolt against European occupation in North 
Africa for which we would be granted the honor of paying the expenses; we would have to cover 
with our flag the reaffirmation in the Mediterranean of a principle of anti-Western and anti-
Christian conquest.”351   Amendola argued that seeking alliances among pan-Islamic or anti-
Western activists in the Muslim world would damage Italy’s status within the colonies and on the 
international stage by tying the future of the nation to the Mediterranean and excluding it from 
the ranks of the European powers.
 However, Amendola remained a staunch supporter of negotiating with local notables in 
the Libyan territories against  the rising voices of those who saw Volpi’s success as initiating a 
dramatic shift in regional power dynamics.  Calling for a “policy  of absolute sincerity and 
loyalty,” Amendola defended Idris al-Sanusi as an ally against pan-Islamic or nationalist 
influences against mounting criticism from Luigi Pintor, the Italian functionary who had served 
as the primary Italian representative throughout  the process of negotiations with Idris and was 
named Regent Governor after the death of Giacomo De Martino in November 1921.352  After 
years of negotiating with Idris al-Sanusi through the Benghazi notable Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya 
and pursuing measures designed to promote Sanusi political authority as an extension of the 
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351 “Si cosiglia, al Governo, di andare incontro alle vedute e alle finalità del movimento panislamico.  Ma 
quale vantaggio ne verrebbe all’Italia?  Dovremmo, in tal caso, consentire alla costituzione, in Libia, di 
uno Stato nazionale arabo, sentinella avanzata della rivolta islamica contro le occupazioni europee 
nell’Africa settentrionale, e del quale ci sarebbe concesso l’onore di pagare le spese; dovremmo coprire 
con la nostra bandiera, la riaffermazione nel Meditarraneo di un principio di conquista antioccidentale ed 
anticristiana.”  From a speech before the House of Deputies 22 June 1922 on spending in the colonies.  
Giovanni Amendola, Discorso Politici (1919-1925), ed. Sabato Visco (Rome: Carlo Colombo, 1968), 
128.
352 ACS Carte Luigi Pintor, b. 5, f. 21, Information from Senussi Gazzali, Benghazi July 1922.
Italian colonial state, Pintor grew suspicious of the Sanusi intermediaries in the spring and 
summer of 1922, and his communications with the Minister of Colonies took on an alarmed 
quality as he reported a growing frequency of attacks on Italian supply lines and sottomessi tribes 
in the coastal regions.
 Simultaneously  concerned that  Idris al-Sanusi had either lost control of the Sanusi ṭarīqa 
and its allied tribes or that he intended to coordinate with Saleh al-Ateusc and nationalist leaders 
in Tripolitania to expand Sanusi influence, Pintor’s suspicions increased with the news that Idris 
invited tribal leaders throughout Cyrenaica, including leaders from the sottomessi tribes who 
recognized Italian authority, to a conference in Ajedabiya for the first week in June 1922.  Pintor 
argued that  in bringing together all of the Cyrenaican tribal leaders, Idris either wanted to get 
their approval for the idea of a unified Emirate with Tripolitania or he was pushing for donations 
of money  or arms.  Evidence that Omar al-Mukhtar and other known militant Sanusi shaykhs had 
employed the Sudanese bodyguards of Idris to intimidate sottomessi tribal leaders into attending 
the meeting in Ajedabiya, Pintor claimed, revealed the true weakness of Idris al-Sanusi in the 
face of objections to the Regima Accords and suggested that Idris either lacked the authority or 
the desire to disarm the tribal forces in Cyrenaica.353   
    Pintor’s communications to the Ministry  of Colonies in Rome grew increasingly  insistent 
on the perils of relying on their agreements with the Sanusiyya and increasingly critical of the 
central authorities in the spring of 1922.  At the beginning of the year, Pintor seemed to feel a 
sense of competition with the Governor of Tripolitania over resources and troops diverted from 
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353 “Oggi la Senussia est constretta a scoprirsi, ed agire direttamente coi mercenarii suoi maggiori achuan, 
et persino coi sudanesi, fidata guardia del corpo dello Emiro.”  ACS Carte Luigi Pintor, b. 4, f. 18 Pintor 
to Minister of Colonies, 27 May 1922.
Cyrenaica to Tripolitania for the occupation of Misurata.354   As the months went on, Pintor 
increasingly  aligned himself with Volpi against the Ministry  of Colonies, and they  both called for 
a more forceful state presence that would lessen their dependence on local notables.355   After 
complaints against a number of Italian functionaries in the Cyrenaican administration by the 
Sanusi intermediary, Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya, induced Amendola to dismiss the offending 
parties, Pintor expressed a sense of embattled isolation against  the central office, and he grew 
increasingly vocal in his criticism of the process of negotiations with Idris al-Sanusi.
 The dispute between Pintor and Amendola escalated when Italian agents received 
confirmation that Idris al-Sanusi intended to accept the proposal of Saleh al-Ateusc and the 
Tripolitanian notables for a united Sanusi emirate in May 1922.  After years of negotiating with 
Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya and Idris, Pintor argued that the reliance of the Italian state on the 
Sanusi intermediary had backfired, and he called for a dramatic change in the approach to 
colonial rule.  Pintor placed primary responsibility  for the failures of the negotiations with the 
contradictory goals of the Italian Ministry  of Colonies which wanted the treaties with Idris to 
simultaneously  cultivate the political authority of the Sanusiyya and undermine it to prevent it 
from becoming too powerful.  He characterized the entire process of negotiations as a ruse on 
both sides, a relationship in which the Italians constantly sought to convince the Sanusi elite of 
their peaceful intentions and support for Sanusi authority.  “But such veils and treatments and 
fatally  insincere artifices could not hide the substance of a continuous attack against the Sanusi 
political structure, avoidance of which would require us not to follow Regima or Bu Mariam, 
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1922.
355 ACS Carte Luigi Pintor, b. 4, f. 18, Pintor to Governor of Tripolitania, 25 June 1922.
which are in fact essentially directed at dismantling the political structure of the confraternity, by 
now inextricably linked … to its organization as a ṭarīqa.”356  The Italian state, Pintor argued, 
had tied its fate to the diminishing power of the Sanusiyya which looked to establishing ties with 
notables in Tripolitania and British officials in Egypt to escape their reliance on the Italian state.
 Pintor recommended taking a similar move to develop relationships with alternative 
Sanusi family  members and tribal leaders.  Apparent divisions in the responses to the Regima 
Accords and the Bu Mariam agreements suggested a possible opportunity for the Italian 
administration to circumvent Idris as a local intermediary  and enter into direct discussions with 
the intransigent Mogarba of western Cyrenaica.  A meeting between the Mogarba leader Saleh 
al-Ateusc and an Italian agent in Zuwaytina in April 1922, for example, gave the impression that 
the Italian government could induce him to agree to support the state directly without the 
mediation of Idris in exchange for payment.357  
 Amendola rejected Pintor’s recommendation to undermine the authority  of Idris al-Sanusi 
as typical of what he called the “indisciplined spirit unfortunately  not infrequent in the colonial 
administration” that prevented the full realization of Italian projects in the Libyan territories.358 
Over the next  few months, Pintor persisted in his condemnation of the accords, and both Idris 
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attentato alla compagine politica senussita, per evitar la quale bisognava non eseguire Regima, non 
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after a short vetting process as Director General for the Colonies of North Africa until his death in 1925.  
See Giovanni Tosatti, “Le carte di un funzionario del Ministero delle Colonie: Luigi Pintor,” in Fonti e 
problemi della politica coloniale italiana, Edited by Carla Ghezzi (Taormina-Messina: Ministero per i 
Beni Culturali e Ambientali, 1989). 
357 ACS Carte Luigi Pintor, b. 5, f. 28, De Angelis to Pintor, 26 April 1922.
358 ACS Carte Luigi Pintor, b. 4, f. 18, Amendola to Pintor, 13 May 1922.
and Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya complained to central authorities of the difficulty  in dealing with 
him.  After months of disagreements between Pintor and the Sanusi intermediaries, Omar 
Mansur al-Kekhiya traveled to Rome and threatened to relinquish his position as an intermediary 
between state officials and Idris al-Sanusi—a position for which he had been paid 600,000 
Lire.359   Pintor asked to be replaced as Governor, and Amendola sent Edoardo Baccari, the 
former director of political affairs in the Ministry of Colonies, in his place.  Known for having 
established a friendly  relationship with Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya, Amendola hoped the 
appointment of Baccari would improve relations with the Sanusi elite.360
The Fascist Administration and the End of Accords
 Edoardo Baccari stayed in Cyrenaica only two months before the government formed 
under Benito Mussolini following the fascist  march on Rome in October 1922 came into power 
and instituted sweeping changes in the personnel of the Italian colonial administration in Libya. 
The new order did not reject the possibility  of establishing agreements with various members of 
the Sanusi family as intermediaries in the Cyrenaican interior, but with a new premium on 
gaining direct territorial control, fascist administrators proved more willing than their liberal 
predecessors to engage military force and less willing to make concessions to Sanusi elites in 
negotiations.   
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 Mussolini appointed Luigi Federzoni as his first  Ministry of Colonies, a position he filled 
first in 1922-24 and again in 1926-28.  After the shift in administration at the end of 1922, 
Federzoni directed investigations into the process of negotiations with Idris al-Sanusi in an 
attempt to assign blame for the failure to fulfill the full terms of the Regima Accords.  Well 
before the march on Rome, Federzoni had voiced opposition to the negotiations with the Sanusi 
elite and what he saw as a linked approach to foreign policy that promoted an alignment in 
Italian interests with pan-Islamic networks when he served on a parliamentary commission on 
foreign and colonial policies in 1920-21.  Federzoni saw the Sanusi Emirate of the Regima 
Accords as a relinquishment of Italian state sovereignty, and he cited a fundamental connection 
between religious and political-military authority in Islam as precluding the possibility of 
establishing a neutral colonial intermediary under Sanusi leadership.  His opposition to the 
negotiations with the Sanusi family  pitted Federzoni against moderate socialists who opposed 
military action in the expansion of the Italian colonies and likened Arab nationalists to heroes of 
Italian unification, and his interest in colonial expansion made him an obvious choice to establish 
a new direction as Minister of Colonies in line with the rising popularity of nationalist politics.361  
 In the course of investigating the process of negotiations with the Sanusiyya, Luigi Pintor 
gained a voice within the fascist administration for having criticized the Regima and Bu Mariam 
accords under the Amendola Ministry.  Despite his direct involvement in the process of 
negotiations, Federzoni appointed Pintor to the position of Vice Director General in the Ministry 
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of Colonies and recognized him as an expert on native affairs in Cyrenaica.362   In the public 
condemnation of the Regima Accords, Pintor placed the blame squarely on Omar Mansur al-
Kekhiya for the failure of the agreements to lead to the disarmament of tribal forces or an 
increase in Italian influence in the region.  Pintor accused Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya of having 
pressured Idris to prevent the dissolution of the armed camps under mixed Italian-Sanusi 
authority and of generating the idea of the Bu Mariam agreement as a ploy to increase his 
personal influence over the territory  of the Abeidat in the region of Derna.363  Based on Pintor’s 
testimony, Italian authorities arrested Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya in January 1923 and condemned 
him to twelve years in prison.  The sentence was overturned on appeal in the Italian courts, but 
state officials forced him to spend the majority  of the remaining years of Italian occupation in 
exile.364    
 The fascist administration condemned the Regima Accords as a symbol of Italian 
weakness and the failed colonial policies of their liberal predecessors.  As the primary proponent 
of the Regima Accords, the fascist press accused the now deceased former Governor of 
Cyrenaica, Giacomo De Martino, of instituting “policies of humiliation and degradation” and for 
valuing Arabic intermediaries above Italian officials by  paying Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya a salary 
well above the stipends of Italian functionaries. 365  Giovanni Amendola also faced incrimination 
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for continuing to focus on negotiations after De Martino’s death and even after the failure of Idris 
al-Sanusi to fulfill the terms of the Regima Agreement.  Amendola defended his approach as the 
Minister of Colonies in the Chamber of Deputies in June 1923, and he argued that though the 
terms of the negotiations with the Sanusiyya had reached only partial fulfillment, they had 
“benefitted Italy much more than the Sanusiyya,  since for the former they assured the secure and 
irresistible peaceful penetration in Cyrenaica, while for the latter they eliminated the most 
effective means of resistance, including the great prestige that came to the Sanusi Confraternity 
due to the lack of all contact with the hated infidel.”366  
   Despite the swift condemnation of the Regima Accords and Omar Mansur al-Kekhiya, 
fascist officials did not reject the possibility of continuing agreements with Idris al-Sanusi for an 
indirect form of rule in the Cyrenaican interior; during his first term as Minister of Colonies, 
Federzoni objected to the provisions allowing for Sanusi military  control, not to the concept of a 
Sanusi intermediary.  In the first year of the fascist  administration, the new military Governor, 
Luigi Bongiovanni, dissolved the mixed Sanusi-Italian armed garrisons by force and occupied 
Ajedabiya, the center of the Sanusi administration to signal the end of Italian support  for Sanusi 
military forces.  But while he initiated the preparations for the military operations, Bongiovanni 
reached out to Idris al-Sanusi and offered to reinstate the Regima Accords if he could gain 
control of the Mogarba tribes near Ajedabiya and the militant shaykhs of the Sanusiyya.  Having 
already left the region for self-imposed exile in Egypt in January 1923, Idris refused to return to 
his position as an Italian intermediary, and Bongiovanni declared an official end to the accords 
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with the Sanusiyya in May 1923.367  Officials in the fascist administration reached out repeatedly 
to Idris and even Ahmad al-Sharif during their military  operations in Cyrenaica.  They even 
called on Enrico Insabato to resume negotiations at one point, but both remained in exile.368 
  The issue of why  Idris al-Sanusi chose to leave Cyrenaica has been a matter of debate 
among historians as a key moment in his political history as a colonial intermediary  and potential 
nationalist symbol.  Official British historians attributed Idris’ decision to leave Cyrenaica at  the 
end of 1922 as recognition that the political transition in Rome spelled an inevitable end to his 
relationship  with the colonial administration.369  Some within the Italian administration suspected 
that Idris al-Sanusi left for Egypt in order to break the accords and allow militant elements within 
the Sanusi family  and their Mogarba allies to take control of the situation without losing the 
possibility of negotiating with European powers again at some future point.  In his own accounts 
after independence, Idris al-Sanusi gave weight to both possibilities.  He cited the replacement of 
Giacomo De Martino with “a much less liberal governor”—meaning Luigi Pintor—and the 
preservation of his reputation as a religious authority that remained extraneous to actual guerilla 
warfare as his motivations for leaving.370  
 The fact that Idris began to request permission to leave for Egypt as early as March 1921 
for medical care suggests the possibility  of a third explanation: that he recognized his limitations 
as a political authority within the Sanusi ṭarīqa and among its regional allies.  Perhaps physically 
215
367 Fabrizio Serra, Italia e Senussia: Vent’anni di azione coloniale in Cirenaica (Milan: Fratelli Treves, 
1933), 131.
368 Del Boca, Italiani in Libia, vol. 2, 73.
369 BNA CAB 44/14, “Relations between Great Britain, Italy and the Senussi 1912-1924,” Prepared by 
the Foreign Office for the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence in 1927; FO 141/585, 
British Secretary of State to British High Commissioner in Egypt, Lord Allenby, 26 January 1923.
370 E.A.V. De Candole, The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya (Published by author: 1988), 42-44. 
weakened by a chronic health condition, Idris al-Sanusi repeatedly signaled a desire to relinquish 
his position within the Italian colonial state and hand over the negotiations to Saf al-Din and 
Muhammad Reda.  Italian officials rejected Idris al-Sanusi’s requests to leave Cyrenaica, 
claiming that he was needed to maintain order among unruly  Sanusi shaykhs and militant 
tribes.371  Idris al-Sanusi seized an opportunity  in the confusion of administrative transition at the 
end of 1922 to leave without going through official channels.  Of course, as Anna Baldinetti has 
pointed out, Idris was just  one of a number of elites who left the Libyan territories in the wake of 
the Libyan Statutes.  Disappointed with the unfulfilled promises of autonomy, Libyan notables 
found greater freedom to organize resources and gain international support for a burgeoning 
nationalist movement.372  
 
Dividing Allies from Enemies: Forced Resettlement of the Coastal Tribes
 Idris al-Sanusi’s departure for Egypt in January 1923 and the Italian occupation of 
Ajedabiya precipitated a change in the power dynamics among the Sanusi elite and their regional 
allies.  Italian military  commanders attributed a unified Sanusi command to armed forces in the 
Cyrenaican interior throughout the 1920s, but the direction of the Sanusiyya, access to Sanusi 
resources in the interior oases, and alliances between Sanusi elite and regional tribal leaders 
shifted at  various points throughout the decade.  With Idris al-Sanusi and Ahmad al-Sharif in 
exile, other Sanusi family members—Saf al-Din, Muhammad al-Reda, and Muhammad Abed in 
Kufra—gained status in the region as power-brokers and potential intermediaries with state 
forces. But two Sanusi shaykhs, Gheggia ben Abdullah and Omar al-Mukhtar, overshadowed 
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them as military leaders who led Sanusi forces against the attempts of Italian state extension into 
the interior.373   The Mogarba and Awaghir tribes near Ajedabiya and in the region of Sirte 
continued their opposition to the expansion of Italian infrastructure and development as proposed 
in the Regima Accords, but not always as a cohesive unit  and not always in collaboration with 
the Sanusi shaykhs.  
 When Italian troops occupied Ajedabiya in April 1923, they displaced the Sanusi forces 
under Gheggia ben Abdullah, a Sanusi shaykh usually described as being of Sudanese origin and 
probably  part of the Sanusi family’s private forces that Idris al-Sanusi used to protect his 
administration during the years of his treaties with the Italian administration.374  At the time of 
their displacement, the Mogarba tribes under the leadership of Saleh al-Ateusc, along with 
Awaghir forces under the command of Abdulsalam al-Khezza, joined Gheggia ben Abdullah to 
repel the Italian advance, but  the continued presence of the Sanusi shaykh in the region unsettled 
Saleh al-Ateusc who objected to his attempts to incorporate Mogarba resources into the Sanusi 
troops under his command.  During the development of the Acroma and Regima Accords, Saleh 
al-Ateusc and other Mogarba notables only communicated with Italian authorities through the 
mediation of the Sanusi family, and as I demonstrated above, they insisted on the continued 
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presence of a Sanusi administration even while they objected to the Regima Accords.  In the 
aftermath of Idris al-Sanusi’s departure, however, Saleh al-Ateusc proved wary of attempts by 
the Sanusi shaykhs to gain further control of Mogarba resources, and his struggles with Gheggia 
ben Abdullah over the command of Mogarba forces led to a crucial split in anti-Italian alliances 
that eventually allowed Italian officials to gain the support of the Mogarba tribes against the 
Sanusi-led forces.375  
 As they looked to expand their military  presence and the potential for infrastructural 
development into the Cyrenaican interior, Italian officials developed a two-step  plan in 1925-26. 
First, they planned to take control of the mountainous region of the Jebel al-Akhdar where Omar 
al-Mukhtar collected the remaining Sanusi forces, and then they would use that position to move 
west to gain control over the Mogarba territory and eventually reach Sirte to join together the 
two Libyan regions. Hoping to weaken the Sanusi forces and the allied Mogarba-Awaghir tribes, 
the Italian command attempted to cut off their access to arms and basic supplies by constructing 
additional garrisons along the border of Egypt and occupying the oasis of Jaghbub, a major 
transit point along the Egyptian border where Italians believed the majority  of arms entered into 
the region.376  
 Italian military command also attempted to isolate the anti-Italian forces of the interior 
from contact with tribes in the territory under Italian control by moving communities in the 
coastal region into settlements where Italian troops could more easily supervise their movements 
and prevent them from trading supplies.  The departure of Idris had called into doubt the 
relationships of the coastal tribes, many of whom had submitted to Italian rule through the 
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mediation of the Sanusi accords, with the Italian colonial states.  Italian authorities felt confident 
that they could depend on some of the coastal tribes to support state expansion.  Tribes like the 
Abeidat had attached themselves to the Italian state early  in the occupation as a way  of limiting 
Sanusi authority, and they  stood to gain from the labor and trade that came with state 
development in the region.377  As they stepped up  military  incursions into the Jebel al-Akhdar, 
establishing a clear division between the tribal communities under Italian control and the anti-
Italian rebellion provided a powerful tool to target the populations of the interior and block their 
access to supplies from the coast.  
    To further try to isolate armed forces in the Cyrenaican interior, the Governor of 
Cyrenaica developed a resettlement program in May 1925 to move populations in the territories 
under direct Italian control into areas north of Italian garrisons where Italian troops could 
supervise their movements and prevent collusion with armed rebels.  Over the following year, 
the Governor of Cyrenaica ordered the resettlement of all sottomessi populations in Italian 
controlled territory.  In the area of Cyrene alone, the Italian commissary reported transferring 
over 15,000 people.378   The forced resettlement and concentration of sottomessi populations 
cleared space for the construction of a truck route to aid military operations against Omar al-
Mukhtar in the mountainous region of Jebel al-akhdar and allowed for a clear spatial separation 
to distinguish between sottomessi and dissident populations.  But in the process, the region 
between the mountains and the settled communities transformed into a dangerous empty space 
where armed bands staged frequent attacks on supply  lines and sottomessi camps.  The forced 
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settlements also earned the Italian administration a reputation for harsh treatment of colonial 
subjects, and international media coverage of the resettlement program condemned the Italian 
surveillance practices while sottomessi populations complained of the imposition of curfews and 
restrictions on grazing territories for their livestock.379
 Some Italian officials recognized the resettlement project as severe and detrimental to 
their capacity to rely  on the goodwill of tribal leaders in the coastal regions, many of whom had 
formerly worked for the Italian state, but the renunciation of the negotiations with the Sanusi 
family had ushered in an era of marked distrust when Italian officials were reluctant to risk a 
reliance on local alliances.  A shortage of Italian troops contributed to the problems of the 
resettlement program as the Italian colonial state lacked the resources to either fully  control or 
protect the tribes in their territories.  Complaining of raids on their herds from the isolated 
communities of the interior, Haasa and Abeidat communities asked the Italian administration to 
provide them with arms to allow them to make up for the deficiencies of the military, but the risk 
of collusion with the anti-Italian rebels was considered too great to consider the proposal.  “Are 
the sottomessi trying to effectively distance themselves from the dissidents or rather attempting 
to reclaim the arms that  we took from them to then use them, in certain circumstances, against us 
as well?”380      
 During the remaining years of the occupation as the fascist administration initiated what 
they  called the “reconquest” of the Libyan interior, the Italian state repeatedly used forced 
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resettlement as a method of securing submission and a clear geographical demarcation between 
rebels and subjects, though as we will see below, the lack of adequate troops prompted a more 
conciliatory approach to gain the submission of Mogarba populations in western Cyrenaica in 
1927.  In the two years before they announced the pacification of Cyrenaica with the capture and 
hanging of Omar al-Mukhtar in 1931, over 100,000 people lived in forced settlements in 
notoriously  harsh conditions.  The Italian state did not record many statistics concerning the 
camps, but some estimate that around 35,000 people died in the camps in the last two years of 
the Italian occupation alone.381  
 The military  Governor General Ernesto Mombelli initiated the resettlement of the 
Cyrenaican tribes in 1925 to aid military operations under his command to destroy the armed 
forces of Omar al-Mukhtar in the Jebel al-Akhdar region.  Mombelli deployed small armed 
groups meant to mimic the mobility and flexibility  of the Sanusi adwar with the support  of 
aviation, and Mombelli’s operations reached the oasis of Jalo where Omar al-Mukhtar and 
Muhammad Reda had established a base camp.  Despite a series of heavy bombardments on the 
forces of Omar al-Mukhtar and Gheggia ben Abdullah, the combined military campaigns and 
isolation tactics failed to win significant gains for Italian territorial control.382   Except for the 
occupation of Jaghbub on the Egyptian coast and the occupation of Ghadames in Tripolitania, the 
map of Italian control in Cyrenaica did not  change much from 1923 until 1926.383  Furthermore, 
evidence of a new influx of arms and supplies through Egypt’s Western Desert pointed to the 
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failure of Italian attempts to cut off supply lines, and rumors of a new Sanusi offensive against 
Italian garrisons fueled calls in Rome for a stronger military push into the interior.384
Luigi Federzoni and the Italian ‘Reconquest’ of Libya
 In 1926, Mussolini looked to the issue of colonial expansion in the Libyan territories as a 
popular distraction from domestic unrest following the murder of socialist  deputy Giacomo 
Matteotti by  fascist agents in 1924.  He paid his first visit to the region to mark his new interest 
in colonial issues, and he returned Federzoni to the position of Minister of Colonies after two 
years as the Minister of the Interior.  During his career as a public figure and politician, 
Federzoni developed a reputation for his support of the Church, the monarchy, and the political 
involvement of traditional elites in Rome.  Considered a moderate influence in the Fascist party, 
Mussolini appointed Federzoni as Minister of the Interior as an attempt to counterbalance more 
radical strains within the Fascist party  calling for increased squad violence.  After failing to stem 
a wave of anti-Church and anti-Freemason violence in 1925, Federzoni returned to the Ministry 
of Colonies with a vigorous program centered on expanding state authority  and promoting his 
particular vision of Italian nationalism in the colonies.385  
 On his return to the Ministry of Colonies, Federzoni established a military  agenda to 
expand the Italian presence into the interior to the 29th parallel, a line that  would bring the oases 
of Jalo, Awjila, and Marada under Italian control.  As a caravan route from Egypt’s western 
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border into eastern Tripolitania and the Fezzan, the plan to occupy these oases aimed at 
debilitating the armed forces of the Sanusiyya and the Mogarba-Awaghir tribes and pushing any 
remaining opposition to Italian state expansion into the Saharan oases of Kufra.  To take charge 
of the operations as the new Governor of Cyrenaica, Federzoni chose Attilio Teruzzi, a fascist 
strongman who had fought in the initial occupation of the Libyan territories.   Both Teruzzi and 
Federzoni identified the hostility of the Mogarba tribes of western Cyrenaica as the primary 
impediment to Italian expansion into the interior, the objective being “total conquest and the 
definitive occupation of the entire Libyan territory up to its most remote Saharan borders.” 386
 Facing a constant shortage of funds and troops, Federzoni called for a possible political 
approach to winning the support  of the Mogarba population of western Cyrenaica, but he 
considered military  operations to be a prerequisite for possible negotiations. 387   Without the 
resources to separate sottomessi populations from dissidents in the Mogarba territory in 
settlement camps like they  did in the Benghazi-Derna region, Federzoni recommended a more 
conciliatory approach, separating them from the Sanusiyya, and opening markets.388  An earlier 
split in the Mogarba tribes, precipitated by  disagreements between Saleh al-Ateusc and the 
Sanusi shaykhs, facilitated the Italian negotiations for the submission of the Cyrenaican Mogarba 
tribes to Italian authority.  By the end of June 1925, the attempt of Gheggia ben Abdullah to take 
command of the Mogarba tribes in the name of the Sanusiyya led to a division in the Mogarba 
forces between those opposed to Gheggia ben Abdullah’s command who followed Saleh al-
Ateusc into Sirte and those who remained in western Cyrenaica and accepted Sanusi 
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leadership.389   By the end of September 1927, Teruzzi and his agents used a combination of 
negotiations and the threat of force, including taking hostages from among family  members of 
Mogarba and Awaghir notables, to induce the submission of the portion of the Mogarba 
populations who remained in western Cyrenaica to Italian authority.390  Their agreement allowed 
Italian troops to occupy  the entire territory  of Sirtica as a base for occupying the southern oases 
along the 29th parallel.391  
 Throughout the process of negotiating the submission of the Mogarba population, 
Federzoni rejected any potential role of Sanusi intermediaries as an absolute detriment to Italian 
national prestige.  Federzoni’s injunction against negotiating with the Sanusi family placed 
Italian agents in Cyrenaica in a delicate position at  times.  The Mogarba in Cyrenaica, unlike 
Saleh al-Ateusc, maintained ties with Muhammad Reda, and they requested that the Italian 
government provide him with an official position in the local political structures.392  In response, 
Federzoni ordered the removal of Reda to the Italian island of Ustica where Italy kept many of 
the political prisoners from the Libyan territories.393  Teruzzi celebrated the refusal to negotiate 
with Sanusi family members as an effort to replace their authority with that of the Italian state, to 
“detach, bit by bit, the populations from their Sanusi patrons.”394 
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 Besides a movement for greater Italian state authority in the colonies, the rejection of 
possible negotiations with Sanusi intermediaries also reflected a debate among colonial experts 
over the capacity  of the Sanusi family to act as state agents that centered on the nature of the 
Sanusi ṭarīqa as a religious or political organization.   Two consecutive issues of the Rassegna 
italiana in 1928 published a debate between Bruno Ducati, a former student of Carlo Alfonso 
Nallino 395  and a prominent  scholar on Islamic law, and Filippo Lo Bello, a frequent author on 
colonial subjects.  Following in the spirit of Nallino, a constant  advocate for indirect  systems of 
rule in the Libyan territories, Ducati defended the negotiations with Idris al-Sanusi as a colonial 
system that took advantage of the competition between Idris and Ahmad al-Sharif to promote a 
friendly Islamic power with state-like authority.  “This brotherhood, in addition to its importance, 
has a special characteristic that differentiates it from all others; i.e., besides its religious program, 
it also has a political program, and it  has entered into politics not as a simple force conforming to 
or subordinate to parties or trends, but acting as an independent unit, such that it  is situated in 
Islam almost as a state within another State.”396  
 The rebuttal by Filippo Lo Bello in the following issue of the Rassegna Italiana, reflected 
the official view of the Federzoni ministry  as a rejection of the Sanusiyya as effective colonial 
intermediaries.  Lo Bello disputed the characterization of the Sanusiyya as an independent 
political authority  and argued that the process of negotiations had essentially created a political 
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authority where one did not exist.  Lo Bello pointed to a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
relationship  between the Ottoman central authorities and Sanusi notables as constituting a “state 
within a state,” and he argued that the Ottoman authorities only  dealt with the Sanusiyya to 
control them and prevent them from becoming overly  powerful in regional politics.  According 
to Lo Bello, the Sanusi family represented a spiritual authority that imperial powers had 
mistakenly  endowed with state functions, and after years of negotiations with centralized 
authorities, Sanusi elite had even lost their legitimacy  as religious leaders, “after many lies and 
due to the ruin and loss of human lives for a cause of which the majority, though ignorant, 
understand its exact scope, the Sanusiyya are blamed and condemned.”397 
 Federzoni signaled his commitment to avoiding further mediation from the Sanusi family 
in discussions in the Italian Chamber of Deputies concerning the development of a new legal 
order to replace the 1919 Libyan Statutes.  After years of propping up Sanusi authority, 
Federzoni argued that they had to refuse the possibility of negotiating power-sharing structures 
with any local notables because of the risk that it would feed expectations among local 
populations that the Italian state would establish another intermediary administration under the 
Sanusi family.  Federzoni advocated an alternative approach to eliminating anti-Italian unrest in 
the Libyan territories by overwhelming local populations with mass colonization from the Italian 
peninsula.  He called for the settlement of at  least 300,000 Italians within a quarter century to 
balance out the demographics.398  Voicing popular conceptions of the Italian colonial project as 
an outlet to benefit Italian agricultural emigrants, Federzoni urged Mussolini to embrace a 
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program of state-directed land concessions to bring massive numbers of Italian settlers into the 
colonies.  Not just a measure for the economic development of the region, Federzoni saw the 
mass colonization as a political necessity  that would bring in Italian nationals, “who would make 
a part of the Mediterranean coast of Africa Italian in fact and not just in law.”399 
 
Fascism and the Catholic Church in the Libyan Territories
 Within the nationalist movement and the PNF, Federzoni promoted a campaign in favor 
of the Catholic Church and against the influence of Freemasons in national politics, and he 
infused those agendas in his colonial administration and his vision for the nationalization of the 
Libyan territories through Italian settlements.400   In Federzoni’s colonial administration, the 
influence of Freemasons came to be equated with an excessive tolerance for Muslim traditions 
and the native population as a limitation of Italian state authority.  In their condemnation of De 
Martino, Amendola, and the Regima Accords, Federzoni and Luigi Pintor declared a political 
battle against what they cast as a Freemason plot to work against the government and support the 
Sanusi elite.401   Condemnations against the influence of Freemasons became widely  diffuse 
during the course of the Italian military  expansion into the interior among military  personnel who 
blamed the influence of Freemasons for the punishing violence against the native population.402  
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 Federzoni aimed his campaign in part against anti-clerical elements among both liberals 
and fascists as part of his promotion for increased Catholic influence in Italian national politics. 
Throughout his political career, Federzoni developed a reputation as a pro-Catholic nationalist, 
and he considered the occupation of the Libyan territories as a key moment in superseding the 
‘Roman Question’ and incorporating the Catholic Church into the Italian nation.403   Federzoni’s 
support of the Catholic Church in national politics translated into increased financial support for 
missionary  work in the Libyan territories during his time as Minister of Colonies as part of a 
wider project to expand italianitá as a precursor for mass Italian immigration into the Libyan 
territories and a further step in his anti-Freemason campaign. 
 When Mussolini named Federzoni as his Minister of Colonies, the relationship between 
the Catholic mission in Libya and the colonial administration was already much improved from 
the bitter disputes between Ameglio and the Franciscan Bishop Antomelli during the early years 
of the Italian occupation.  The Roman Curia replaced Antomelli in 1919 with Giancinto Tonizza, 
a bishop with experience working in Muslim societies who promised to refrain from commenting 
on Italian policies.404  The change in missionary leadership corresponded to a wider shift in the 
Vatican’s approach to missionary work that sought to distance the missions from the political 
issues and financing of colonial administrations, a move that  eliminated much of the fuel for 
disagreements between missions and colonial state officials.405  
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 Federzoni furthered the improved relations by increasing state funding for missionary 
construction projects as part  of his wider development plans to improve colonial infrastructure. 
In 1923, the mission used the state funds to initiate construction of a long-anticipated Cathedral 
in Tripoli.406 In a report to Mussolini explaining an extraordinary budget increase for the 
mission, Federzoni emphasized the necessity of expanding the Catholic Church’s presence in 
Libya in support of Italy’s imperial ambitions and confirmation of Italian racial superiority.  “The 
construction of buildings for the Catholic cult is indispensable to assure the spiritual assistance to 
our colonists and it further constitutes a necessary moral affirmation of the dominant race which, 
in North Africa, resumes the tradition of the church of St. Augustine.”407  Mussolini declared his 
support of the Franciscan missions during his visit to the Libyan colonies in April 1926, and he 
wrote soon after to Emilio De Bono (then Minister of Colonies) to insist on granting increased 
funds to assist the mission in its construction projects.408   In 1928, as part of an extraordinary 
budget of 800 million Lire for public works in the Italian colonies, Federzoni reserved 6.5 
million Lire for the construction of a new cathedral in Benghazi and churches in Merj, Apollonia, 
and Tobruk, a plan that constituted a drastic expansion of the Franciscans’ field of action to 
correspond to the military occupation of the interior.409   
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 Over the course of the 1920s, the relationship  between the Church and the Italian state 
gradually warmed at  home and in the Libyan colonies with the direct influence of Federzoni, 
culminating in the stabilization of relations between the Italian state and the Vatican in the 
Lateran Accords in February 1929.410  Pope Pius XI’s quiet support for nationalist  projects and 
focus on missionary  work after 1925 folded neatly with Rome’s emphasis on colonial expansion 
after the Matteotti crisis.411  The Fascist government’s generosity  towards the Catholic mission 
also fit into a broader strategy  in Mussolini’s foreign policy that sought to augment Italian 
cultural, economic, and political presence in the Mediterranean to counter British and French 
influence.  Mussolini hoped that the improved relationship  with the Holy See in the 1920s would 
work to Italy’s advantage in the Mediterranean by using its missionary  networks to extend Italian 
influence in the Arab world.412  
 Shortly before Mussolini replaced Federzoni as the Minister of Colonies in 1928, the 
Franciscan mission completed construction of the Cathedral in Tripoli.413   At the official 
consecration, Emilio De Bono, newly appointed Governor of the united Libyan territories, gave a 
speech marking the occasion in which he affirmed an abiding connection between Italian 
colonial expansion and the Catholic mission: “Every new attestation of our faith in partibus 
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infidelium is an affirmation of possession, and a pledge of civilization.”414   After years of 
tensions between the Italian colonial state and missionary leaders in the Libyan territories as 
Italian officials tried to negotiate a position as a pro-Islamic colonial power, the consecration of 
the Cathedral served as a symbol of a new commitment to a collaborative approach between the 
Church and state in spreading italianitá across the Mediterranean. 
Conclusion
 Dissatisfied with the slow pace of military operations in the Libyan territories, Mussolini 
took over the position of Minister of Colonies from Federzoni in December 1928.  He named 
Badoglio as the Governor of both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica who, along with General Rodolfo 
Graziani, oversaw the conclusion of Federzoni’s plan for the “reconquest” of the Libyan interior. 
Initially, Badoglio deployed Graziani to Tripolitania to occupy the Fezzan and Sirte regions 
where Saleh al-Ateusc led Mogarba forces in collaboration with powerful members of the Sef 
en-Nasser family and Awlad Suleiman tribes.  Italian troops chased the Mogarba and Awlad 
Suleiman troops into the area around Waw al-Kabir east of Murzuk, and Graziani had families of 
the Mogarba taken hostage and moved northward towards the coast.  His tactics led to the 
submission of over 2,000 Mogarba troops, but Saleh al-Ateusc fled with members of the Sef en-
Nasser family and a core group of armed forces first to Kufra and then into Egypt while Graziani 
and his troops, assisted with heavy aerial bombardments, chased them through the desert.415
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 Graziani declared the threat of the Mogarba neutralized, and he used his position in the 
Waw al-Kabir area to occupy Murzuk, the main center of the Fezzan.  Badoglio sent Graziani to 
Cyrenaica in July  1930 to oversee military operations in the last  territories where anti-Italian 
forces congregated: the oases of Kufra and the Jebel al-Akhdar region.  After bombing Kufra and 
chasing the last remaining anti-Italian forces there into Egypt, Graziani focused his attentions on 
isolating Omar al-Mukhtar and the Sanusi troops in the Jebel al-Akhdar region.  The occupation 
of the Fezzan had already cut off potential supply  lines from the west, so the only potential 
sources of arms and food for the Sanusi forces would come either from the Egyptian border to 
the east or from populations living in Italian-controlled areas who had declared their official 
submission to Italian authority.  Citing evidence that sottomessi populations had provided Omar 
al-Mukhtar with information concerning Italian troop movements and supplies, at times under 
threat, Graziani initiated an aggressive resettlement program that expanded on the forced 
resettlements along the coast that began under Governor Mombelli in 1925-26.  Over the course 
of the following year, the Italian military  forced around 90-100,000 in heavily controlled camps 
in the coastal regions.416  By some accounts, the internments affected around half of the total 
population of Cyrenaica by the end of the military operations, and it left the forces of Omar al-
Mukhtar almost completely isolated.417  
 During the operations to move populations of the interior into internment camps, the 
Minister of Colonies ordered Graziani to apply a further measure targeted directly  at  the 
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Sanusiyya to seize all Sanusi property.  On May 29, 1930, Italian military  police organized a 
simultaneous attack on all Sanusi zawāyā in Cyrenaica except Jaghbub along the Egyptian 
border.  The Italian government then deported all of the religious heads of the zawāyā to the 
Italian island of Ustica which already  held thousands of Libyan political prisoners.418  Graziani 
favored the seizure of the Sanusi zawāyā for eliminating another potential source of supplies and 
money  to the Sanusi forces under Omar al-Mukhtar’s command, but he also claimed that the 
state seizure in effect reclaimed the possessions for members of the Sanusi family like 
Muhammad al-Reda who did not approve of the anti-Italian rebellion and allowed for the local 
populations to free themselves from the demands of the Sanusi zawāyā for religious 
contributions.419
 The Minister of Colonies, however, recognized the new operations as differing from 
previous activities of the colonial administration of Cyrenaica in its “strictly anti-Sanusi 
character, in that the Sanusiyya are recognized as primarily if not uniquely  responsible for the 
rebellion.”420    After the military operations culminated in the occupation of Kufra and the 
hanging and capture of Omar al-Mukhtar, Graziani underscored his conviction, shared by  the 
colonial governor, that the Sanusi elite should never reclaim positions of authority  in what he 
considered finally a fully  Italian territory  on the occasion of his departure from the colonies in 
1934.421   
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Conclusions
 The end of an Italian military offensive in 1931 allowed for a dramatic increase in state-
organized settlement in Cyrenaica.  The prospect of freeing the land for Italian settlement lay  at 
the center of the Italian military  operations.  Starting with Federzoni’s refusal to continue 
negotiations with Sanusi family  members after 1923, voices calling for an end to liberal policies 
of colonial rule through local intermediaries and an increase in Italian presence in the region 
became dominant in the Italian colonial administration, and at the beginning of the “reconquest” 
in 1926, the central government created a permanent Commission for Internal Migration and 
Colonization to organize Italian emigration.  With the economic depression of the 1930s, the 
project of colonizing the Libyan territories with Italian agricultural workers seemed to offer the 
double benefit of consolidating Italian state power over the interior and promoting a program of 
economic autarky by increasing the agricultural capacity  of the land in order to decrease Italian 
reliance on imports from regions under the control of other European powers.  Italian officials 
also hoped that the introduction of European settlements would promote stability and allow for 
an increase in centralized state control without the trouble of dealing with local intermediaries. 
The designation of the Libyan colonies as an official administrative district  in 1939, making up 
Italy’s ‘fourth shore’ across the Mediterranean, signaled Mussolini’s intentions to take advantage 
of increased Italian settlement to integrate the region in the Italian state system in a model 
reminiscent of French rule in Algeria.  While Mussolini continued to extoll the ideas of religious 
tolerance for Muslim citizens, even going as far as to declare himself the ‘protector of Islam’ in a 
carefully  staged ceremony during his visit  to the colonies in 1937, Italian state agencies intended 
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the programs of mass colonization to decrease the relative influence of the Muslim populations 
and Muslim elites in the Libyan territories as they increased the numbers of Italian settlers. 
Immediately  after declaring the region pacified, the Italian military command delayed releasing 
the Cyrenaican Bedouin tribes.  General Graziani justified the continued internment  as a 
humanitarian move to prevent an outbreak of civil war and to preserve the region’s best grazing 
territories for nomadic populations, but the official explanation thinly veiled state interest in 
securing land for Italian settlement in some of the areas Italian agricultural experts considered 
best for cultivation.422 
 Though the state-run settlement programs of the 1930s led to a dramatic increase in the 
Italian population in the region reaching near 110,000 in 1940, the declaration of pacification in 
the Libyan territories did little to stem the flow of Italian emigration to non-Italian lands as many 
Italian advocates of territorial expansion had hoped.  The number of settlers in the Libyan 
territories never exceeded the population of Italians in Tunisia, and the Americas remained a 
more popular destination for Italian emigrants.  The settlement programs also did little to 
advance the fascist program of economic autarky.  The Libyan territories failed to develop as a 
significant source for raw materials for Italian industry, and settler communities continued to 
depend heavily on imports and assistance from Rome until the outbreak of World War II 
destroyed many of the Italian settlements and cut short any future plans for colonization or 
infrastructure development.423
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 In the short term, however, Rome was able to sell the military operations as a resounding 
success and a fulfillment of the promise of territorial expansion that had long been at the center 
of a nationalist movement in favor of the colonial enterprise.  On an international level, 
Graziani’s brutal tactics in the Libyan territories invoked a storm of criticism against the Italian 
government and made Omar al-Mukhtar a hero and a symbol of resistance against imperial 
aggression throughout the Arab world.  In the following years, Mussolini took measures to 
improve Italy’s image by expanding on propaganda that began after the First World War 
depicting Italy as a bridge between the Muslim Mediterranean and Europe.    He achieved some 
success among Arab nationalists who saw the fascist regime as a potential ally  against British 
foreign policies and aggression in Palestine, but for the most part, publicity  on the repressive 
tactics of the Italian occupation of the Libyan interior shaped an overwhelmingly negative public 
image of Italy in the Muslim Mediterranean and helped solidify Omar al-Mukhtar’s credentials 
as a hero of anti-colonial movements.424
 The shifts in Italian domestic politics in the 1920s and the rising influence of nationalist 
politics focused on territorial aggrandizement does not provide an adequate explanation for the 
end of the negotiations between Idris al-Sanusi and the Italian colonial administration in 1923. 
In this dissertation, I have focused on the continuities in Italian approaches to colonial 
administration and the consistent tension between an approach based on local intermediaries and 
an interest  in centralized state control to turn the attention to the inability of Idris al-Sanusi to 
generate consensus for Italian state presence among tribal leaders affiliated with the Sanusi 
ṭarīqa.  I argue that the series of negotiations between Idris al-Sanusi and Italian state officials 
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represented a failed attempt to create a regional hierarchy and a political entity  based on Sanusi 
religious authority  and on a history of similar relationships between Sanusi family  members and 
state authorities in Istanbul.  In their negotiations, Idris al-Sanusi saw himself as a mediating 
element who could use Italian state resources for a modernizing project in regional infrastructure 
development and limit Italian political control in the Cyrenaican interior.  Tribal leaders in the 
region, however, reacted against the rising influence of Idris al-Sanusi and the threat his 
development plans posed to their traditional roles in regional trade routes.  Regional power 
brokers in western Cyrenaica rejected Idris al-Sanusi as a colonial intermediary well before 
Mussolini’s rise to power or the shift  in Italian domestic politics that precipitated the military 
operations of the 1920s.  In the aftermath of Idris al-Sanusi’s self-imposed exile in 1923 and 
Luigi Federzoni’s subsequent declaration of an end to state negotiations with the Sanusi family, 
the Mogarba and Awaghir tribes along with Sanusi military commanders in the region redefined 
the Sufi ṭarīqa as an anti-colonial movement that took on international proportions after the 
hanging of Omar al-Mukhtar in 1931.  The position of the Sanusiyya in broader regional political 
and socio-economic contexts has remained a shifting target in the decades since the Italian 
occupation and independence as a reflection of attempts to define political legitimacy in relation 
to claims of anti-colonial stature linked to a common religious tradition.  
Strategies of the Sanusiyya  
 The Sanusi family did not adopt a monolithic approach in their reactions to the Italian 
invasion and subsequent attempts to impose Italian control over the Libyan interior.  The links 
between the Sanusi elite and tribal factions in the region formed a crucial backdrop  to the various 
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tactics of factions of the Sanusi family  during the colonial period, but little is known about the 
details of the Sufi ṭarīqa’s tribal affiliations.  The future of research into Libya’s modern history, 
assuming the new government provides more open access to historians than Qaddafi did, should 
lie in uncovering possible Ottoman or Sanusi documents from former Sanusi zawāyā throughout 
the Libyan interior that  could provide a clearer idea of how tribal interests influenced the 
strategies of the Sanusi elite during the colonial period.  What little evidence we do have 
indicates that the spread of the Sanusiyya in Cyrenaica and the Northern Sahara was tied to the 
allegiance of tribes in control of trans-Saharan trade routes, especially the tribes of the Zuwaya in 
Kufra and the Majarba in Jalo.  Both of these tribes established their control over discrete areas 
of the Wadai-Benghazi trade route as guides with extensive knowledge of the rough terrain. 
Though we do not have documents that provide a detailed picture of the exact  relationship 
between Sanusi elites and the Zuwaya or Majarba, the pattern of Sufi/tribal relations from other 
ṭuruq in North Africa suggest that the expansion of the Sanusi zawāyā corresponded to the 
economic success of its followers in the Zuwaya and Majarba tribes.     After an initial period of 
ambivalence, some factions of the Sanusi family adopted an unequivocally militant attitude, first 
under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sherif then later under the guidance of Omar al-Mukhtar and 
his warriors from the region of the Jebel al-Akhdar.  The more conciliatory approach of Idris al-
Sanusi represented the interests of the tribes in the southern Libyan oases along nineteenth-
century trade routes that favored a re-opening of trade to the region, especially  after years of 
famine and scarcity of the Fist World War.   
 Interpretations of the Sanusi elite as nationalist leaders during the Italian colonial 
administration formed the basis for the United Nation’s establishment of a monarchy in the 
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newly independent Libya in 1951, and continued reinterpretations of Idris al-Sanusi and his 
position relative to the Italian state   The Italian administration, pushed to the very edges of the 
Libyan littoral by the end of the 1910s, proved eager to comply with the requests of Idris to grant 
his territory some measure of autonomy in exchange for relative stability.  In the politically 
fraught issues of reading collaboration and resistance into the activities of elites in a colonial 
context, it is important to understand the variety of strategies the Sanusiyya used in relation to 
the Italian administration as determined in part by their historical role as mediators among the 
tribes of the Libyan interior.  Like Julia Clancy-Smith did in her seminal work on the political 
strategies of Muslim elites in colonial Tunisia and Algeria, I have tried to avoid nationalist-
driven debates that pit true patriots against those who collaborated with colonial authorities. 
According to Clancy-Smith, social norms based on pre-colonial power structures circumscribed 
the types of political actions available to particular religious leaders like Idris al-Sanusi.425  In the 
context of the pre-colonial power structure, Sanusi elites fulfilled the function of peacekeepers 
and mediators of disputes while maintaining at least the appearance of neutrality.  In the 
disrupted world of colonial hegemony, the proper role of religious authorities was far from clear. 
The division in tactics among members of the Sanusi family  presented one available option; they 
used a variety  of methods to deal with the presence of Italian troops and administrators to 
correspond with the desires of their various supporters.  Idris al-Sanusi seemed to play  a 
balancing act between serving as an Italian agent and as a symbol of Libyan identity.  His status 
as a spiritual guide allowed him to procure valuable resources for the tribes supporting him, 
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including vast numbers of weapons, from the Italians, the British, and the French, as he 
navigated the rocky waters of regional and international competition. 
Italian Territorial Control and Idris al-Sanusi Abroad
 During the period of planned colonization in the 1930s, Idris al-Sanusi and the Sanusiyya 
disappeared from the Italian colonial documents as the officials involved in governing the 
colonies pursued policies of direct  territorial control.  Following the capture and hanging of 
Omar al-Mukhtar, the Italian administration declared the Sanusiyya defeated and irrelevant  to the 
future of their colonies.  Idris al-Sanusi continued to influence Libyan nationalist programs 
among elite Libyans abroad, but he faced continued competition from Libyans from other 
regional and tribal affiliations.  Among notables from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in exile abroad, 
the Second World War created an atmosphere of heightened tension and reinforced regional 
divisions that were to plague the postcolonial state as they vied to gain an edge in the political 
future of Libya.  In 1940, a group of Libyan notables in exile met in Cairo and agreed to provide 
troops to fight on the side of the British in North Africa with the understanding that  the British 
would champion Libyan independence from Italy at the end of the war.  Armed and trained in 
Egypt, the “Libyan Arab Force” fought under British command but flew a Sanusi flag, and 
British officials later credited the extra manpower with providing the necessary  force for Allied 
success in North Africa.  At the same meeting in Cairo, the Libyan exiles also agreed to the 
formation of a provisional government under Sanusi leadership with an advisory council that 
included representatives from both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 
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 In a move that seemed designed to demonstrate his favored status among the British to 
competing Libyan elites abroad, Idris threatened to withdraw his support for the war in 1942.  In 
response, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, won back his support by  specifying that 
British efforts for Libyan independence would promote a Sanusi leadership  in the postcolonial 
state or at the very least that they would secure independence from Italy for the region of 
Cyrenaica even if the remainder of the Libyan territories remained under Italian sovereignty.  To 
that end, Eden declared in the House of Commons: “His Majesty’s government is determined 
that at the end of the war the Sanussi of Cyrenaica will in no circumstances again fall under 
Italian domination,”426 and Idris continued to lean his weight behind the Libyan forces.  Notables 
from the western region criticized Idris for agreeing to comply with the British before gaining 
assurances of the future independence of the entire nation and raised suspicions that the British 
had preemptively  determined that the Sanusiyya would govern the entire region on 
independence.427  His involvement in the World War II secured Idris al-Sanusi the status of a 
regional political intermediary in a British-dominated international order.
The Sanusi Monarchy and the Imperfect Union
 The roots behind Qaddafi’s revolution or even the regional divisions revealed in the 
overthrow of Qaddafi’s regime can be traced back to these moments of Libyan state formation in 
the Second World War and its aftermath when historic animosities among Libyan elites in exile 
and the strategic interests of international powers conspired to create the framework of a new 
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state in a region with a past of predominantly  negative experiences with modern states and little 
shared history that could serve as a foundation for a cohesive national identity.  When the United 
Nations initiated discussions concerning the future of Italy’s Libyan territories after the Second 
World War, the idea of establishing a united kingdom under Sanusi leadership was far from 
evident, but the British interests in fulfilling their wartime promises and gaining a loyal ally in a 
strategic area pushed the international community in that direction.  Though the Ottoman Empire 
had administered Cyrenaica as a subdistrict of Tripolitania for a brief period of time, the two 
regions had little history of working together, and even within those two regions, there was little 
alignment between the interests of the urban centers and populations in the rural interior.  In an 
attempt to establish stability in the region after decades of devastating warfare, the United 
Nations organized a commission under the direction of the former Assistant Secretary-General 
for Conference and General Services at  the UN, Adrian Pelt, to determine the will of the people 
concerning the future state.  The Pelt Commission divided responsibility for surveying the 
Libyan territories among delegates from Egypt, France, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States joined the Pelt Commission to formulate recommendations for the future of the 
region.428  
 The Pelt  Commission spent two years in discussions over the future of the region, but 
they  came to the decision to establish a Sanusi monarchy in a united Libyan kingdom just one 
week before the deadline on 24 December 1951.  The decision pushed aside an alternative plan 
co-authored by the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest  Bevin, and the Italian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Carlo Sforza in May 1949.  The Bevin-Sforza plan called for a gradual process of state 
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formation in which Cyrenaica would remain under British protection, Italy would maintain 
control over Tripolitania, and Fezzan would go to France in continuation with the temporary 
administration established immediately at the war’s end.  Bevin and Sforza planned for the 
regions to unify and gain independence after ten years subject to UN approval.  The Bevin-
Sforza plan gained wide support in the United Nations, but citing disapproval among Arab 
leaders, as established primarily through the reports of the Pelt Commission, the plan quickly fell 
to the side.429  
 The decision to reject  the Bevin-Sforza plan in favor of a Sanusi monarchy clearly  fit into 
British and American interests in acting quickly to establish a friendly independent state in the 
region to create a strategic partnership  in the looming Cold War.  The long history of a beneficial 
relationship  between Idris and British officials in Egypt that had intensified during the Second 
World War seemed to promise the compliance of the Sanusi monarch with the interests of the 
Western allies, but it  exacerbated regional tensions between Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian 
notables as they debated the possible future of a unified Libyan nation. 
 Observers at the time saw the failure of the Pelt Commission to develop a clear plan for 
the Libyan state as a reflection of pervasive regional and tribal divisions throughout the 
territories.  Lisa Anderson has argued that the inconclusive results of the Pelt Commission was 
just as much a result of the international nature of the commission’s delegations, “as each 
delegation pursued lines of inquiry  that coincided with the positions of their governments rather 
than eliciting Libyan views.”430   Ultimately the Pelt  commission supported British (and to a 
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lesser extent) American interests in establishing a unified and independent Libyan state under a 
monarch who could and would enter into military agreements in the ensuing Cold War.  Idris 
confirmed the suspicion that he felt little interest  in the fate of Tripolitania when he admitted to 
the American ambassador that he preferred an emirate over Cyrenaica instead of a monarchy in 
the entire country.431   Early assessments of the postwar situation from the British official 
assigned to Cyrenaica in 1942, Duncan C. Cummings, admitted that the leadership  of Idris al-
Sanusi could prove divisive, but argued that Britain’s reputation in the Muslim world depended 
on their willingness to honor the promise Eden made to Idris for independence.432 
 During the discussions over the future state of Libya, individuals who tended to support 
the idea of a Sanusi leadership in a united kingdom came to prominence in Tripolitania and 
Fezzan.  In Tripolitania, the Pelt Commission identified Bashir Bey Sadawi as the most capable 
and important political leader in the region.  Bashir Bey Sadawi had been involved in forming 
the Tripolitanian Republic after the First World War and later became an active organizer among 
Libyans in exile.  He established the National Council for the Liberation in Cairo with the 
backing of the Arab League with the goal of promoting greater cooperation and unity between 
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.  On the eve of independence, he formed the National Congress Party 
along with his Egyptian advisor (and later historian of the Idris monarchy) Fuad Shukri.  The 
Party called for Libyan unity  under a Sanusi monarchy, though with Tripolitania playing a 
dominant economic role in the state.  Their conversations with Bashir Bey Sadawi and his 
244
431 Dirk Vandewall, “Libya’s Revolution Revisited,”  MERIP Middle East Report 143 (1986): 31.
432 Scott L. Bills, The Libyan Arena: The United States, Britain, and the Council of Foreign Ministers, 
1945-1948 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1995), 20.
supporters convinced British and UN observers of the viability  of the Sanusi monarchy for 
creating a sense of national unity.433  
 The extreme poverty  of the region after the Second World War contributed to the 
difficulties in formulating a plan for the postcolonial state.  On the eve of independence, the 
World Bank ranked Libya as one of the poorest  countries in the world with an income per capita 
at about $30 per year and a population of just one million people after decades of warfare, 
drought, and shortages in trade.  The brutality of the Italian colonial occupation, especially 
during the military campaigns of the 1920s, effectively  destroyed all of the (relatively  few) 
institutional structures from the Ottoman period, and the failure of the Italian administration to 
create an education system, especially in rural areas, left the populations of the Libyan interior 
with weak ties to civic systems and a pervasive distrust in the mechanisms of the modern state. 
Not having a greater civic spirit or institutional histories, traditional client-patron relationships, 
informed by tribal alliances, continued to occupy  a central role in the formation of the 
postcolonial state. 434
 Initially, the British hoped that their relationship  with Idris would prove beneficial to their 
standing throughout the Arab world.  Recognizing the alliance with Idris as a crucial component 
to the ability  of British troops to hold their own in the desert wars of World War II, the British 
chief civil affairs officer in the Middle East R.D.H. Arundell considered maintaining close ties 
with Cyrenaica crucial for British foreign policy.  “The Power which controls this territory sits 
astride the sea lanes of the Eastern Mediterranean, and can threaten the Nile Valley by  land and 
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air.”435   During the 1950s, Libya’s diminished prestige led the British and the Americans to 
consider Libya as little more than a convenient location for an air force base and training 
grounds.
King Idris and the Sanusi ṭarīqa
 Scholars have focused their inquiries on the influence of regional divisions and 
international interests in Libyan state formation during the Sanusi monarchy, but little work has 
been done on the Islamic nature of the Sanusi state.  Did the establishment of the Sanusi 
monarchy represent a final transition of the Sufi ṭarīqa from a religious order to a purely  political 
state structure?  Did claims to legitimacy of the Sanusi monarchy rest on Idris’ capacity to spread 
baraka?  Or did opposition to the Sanusi monarchy center on issues of religious identity? 
 British agents noted his status as a spiritual leader and his symbolic value as a the leader 
of the anti-colonial nationalist Sanusiyya as justification for the essentially British decision to 
establish a unified Libyan nation under the leadership of Idris al-Sanusi.  The British chief civil 
affairs officer for the Middle East, Duncan Cummings, argued that the Sanusi figurehead had lost 
prestige during his period of exile since it separated him from direct contact with the anti-Italian 
rebellion, but Cummings still believed that he continued to have influence over the majority of 
Cyrenaicans if not Tripolitanians.  “To the feckless Arab he bears the essence of sanctity; to the 
politically  minded townsman or exile, he is a convenient peg on which to hang vague ideas of 
Cyrenaican independence.”436 According to foreign observers, if a shared regional identity was to 
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develop, especially among the rural population of Cyrenaica, it  would do so based on a shared 
religion instead of a shared ethnicity.437
 The status of Idris al-Sanusi as a Muslim notable clearly informed and served as 
justification for the United Nations decision to establish a united Kingdom of Libya under Sanusi 
leadership, but when he first became king, Idris al-Sanusi distanced himself from the Sanusi 
zawāyā and his pervious role as head of the Sanusi ṭarīqa.  Despite his traditional foundation for 
authority in his position as a spiritual leader of the Sanusi ṭarīqa, Idris instituted a legal system 
that followed the model of secular western states instead of placing sharia’a in a privileged 
position in a pattern similar to many postcolonial leaders of Arab states in the 1950s and 60s. 
Idris did not  reconstitute the Sanusi zawāyā until 1963.  When he did reopen the zuwaya, he 
restricted their involvement in the development of political parties or the debates over the state 
development.438   Idris’ concern with limiting the involvement of Sanusi shaykhs and zawāyā in 
the Libyan kingdom was part of a larger plan to prevent the development of opposition groups 
that could pose a substantial threat to his hold on power.  
 Idris’ move to separate his position as the Libyan King from his status as spiritual guide 
of the Sanusi ṭarīqa also reflected rivalries within the Sanusi family concerning succession 
within the Libyan Kingdom.  When he was placed on the throne, Idris was married to Fatima, a 
daughter of Ahmed al-Sherif, but the couple was childless thus leaving open the issue of 
247
437 Consider, for example, the note of caution from E.E. Stafford in 1949.  Stafford agreed that Sanusi 
leadership presented the best option for the Cyrenaican region, but he cautioned that regional loyalties 
would not prove strong enough for the postcolonial state to function without significant British assistance. 
“It is not incorrect to regard the word ‘Cyrenaican’ as being synonymous with ‘Senussi,’ but the tie is one 
of faith, not one of blood.”  F.E. Stafford, “The Ex-Italian Colonies,” International Affairs 25, no. 1 
(1949): 54.
438 Baldinetti, The Origins of the Libyan Nation, 130; Dennis Sammut, “Libya and the Islamic 
Challenge,” The World Today 50, no. 10 (1994): 198. 
succession to the throne.  The Libyan constitution set the laws of succession of the King in 
Chapter V, Article 46: “In the event of the King’s death and the Throne remaining vacant owing 
to the lack of a successor to the King or to no successor having been appointed, the Senate and 
the House of Representatives shall at once hold a joint meeting without convocation to appoint a 
successor within ten days.”439   Among members of the committee writing the constitution, 
however, the question arose of whether or not succession to the throne would extend to the entire 
line of descendants from Muhammad bin ‘Ali al-Sanusi, the recognized founder of the Sanusi 
ṭarīqa.  In other words, would political leadership of the Libyan Kingdom become intrinsically 
linked to the spiritual guidance of the Sufi community following the Sanusi path?
 The committee writing the Libyan constitution decided to leave the decision concerning 
royal succession to Idris, and he confirmed a strict division between his role as leader of the 
Sanusiyya and his role as monarch of the Kingdom of Libya by asserting that though any eligible 
male member of the Sanusi family could become head of the ṭarīqa, only descendants in his 
branch of the family could take the throne.  This decision meant that the next in line to the throne 
after himself would by his younger brother and loyal friend, Muhammad al-Rida.440  Angry with 
the decree of succession, the descendants of Ahmed al-Sherif blamed Ibrahim al-Shalhi, a long-
time servant and adviser of Idris, for persuading the king to block their access to political power 
in the Sanusi monarchy.  In 1954, one of Ahmed al-Sherif’s sons killed al-Shalhi in Benghazi, 
and after deciding that a family conspiracy  lay behind the murder, Idris had the entire Sanusi 
family placed under house arrest and later sent  seven of the young men from Ahmed al-Sherif’s 
line into exile. In reaction to the family’s betrayal, Idris took his division between the Sanusi 
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ṭarīqa and the Libyan state a step  further by inserting a clause in the Libyan Constitution 
establishing that except for those individuals in the direct line of descent to the throne (i.e. 
Muhammad al-Rida), no members of the Sanusi family could become Minister.  Adrian Pelt 
applauded Idris’ decision as “one more indication of [King Idris’] policy of not claiming more 
power than a correctly conceived and functioning constitutional monarchy should allow.”441 
 In other ways, a history of adherence to the Sanusi ṭarīqa gave certain groups and 
individuals greater access to channels of power in the Libyan Kingdom.  In particular, the tribes 
with long-standing ties to the trade routes going through Kufra—the Zuwaya and the Tibbu—
maintained a distinct advantage in the Libyan Kingdom.  Idris kept a personal staff and a legion 
of guards made up of his traditional supporters among the Tibbu suggesting that some members 
of this historically servant tribe rose to prominence in the central state structure.442   In the 
southern oases of Cyrenaica, the powerful Zuwaya continued to dominate financial activity and 
local politics and they  perpetuated nineteenth-century perception of the dark-skinned Tibbu as a 
servant class.  Oral accounts from after the war suggest that  the Zuwaya had grown in numbers 
during the Italian occupation.  As the last part of Cyrenaica the Italians occupied, Kufra remained 
a place of refuge from various Cyrenaican tribes driven out  of their homes by the colonial troops, 
and the Zuwaya “proved flexible in matters of genealogy, and acquired large numbers of 
‘members by writing’ (mukatibin as contrasted with members by birth), granting land to them 
and to others who sought freedom from Christian colonial control.”443 
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 During the 1950s and 60s, the Sanusi monarchy came to represent  an ineffectual holdover 
from the colonial past, beholden to British geopolitical interests and lacking in claims to national 
unity.  Even Idris criticized the effort  to establish a unified Libyan nation when he told the 
American ambassador that he would prefer to keep his emirate over the independent and separate 
region of Cyrenaica. Idris banned political parties and tried to prevent “corporate interests,” even 
among his strongest supporters.  “Keenly aware of the resentment his role as head of a secular 
government caused among some of his tribal supporters, Idris reestablished the Sanusi lodges 
that had been closed by  the Italians but did not allow them to reemerge as the autonomous 
institutions they  had once been.  The local shaykhs were now appointed as government 
employees and were supervised by  a general director who reported directly  to the chief of the 
royal diwan.”444   The 1967 Arab-Israeli War exacerbated widespread discontent with the Idris 
monarchy among a generation of Libyans educated with Egyptian teachers and textbooks that 
promoted ideals of Arab nationalism.445  The revolution of 1969 that brought Qaddafi to power 
represented a final rejection of attempts to create a political authority  out of the figure of Idris al-
Sanusi and led to a campaign to discredit the Sanusi family  and the Sanusi ṭarīqa as political 
leaders and heroes of anti-Italian resistance.  We are just beginning to understand the lingering 
influence of the Sanusiyya in the twentieth century at the end of the Qaddafi regime.   
 
250
444 Dirk Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 57; 
this is from a dissertation by Salaheddin Salem Hasan in 1973 “The Genesis of Political Leadership in 
Libya, 1952-1969.” 
445 Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 85. 
Bibliography
Abun-Nasr, Jamil M.  Muslim Communities of Grace: The Sufi Brotherhoods in Islamic 
 Religious Life.  London: Hurst & Company, 1988.
Ahmida, Ali Abdullatif.  The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and 
 Resistance, 1830-1932.  Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
Aksakal, Mustafa.  Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Albergoni, Gianni.  Variations italiennes sur un thème français: La Sanusiya.  Paris: Centre 
 National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984.
Altorki, Soraya and Donald P. Cole.  “Land and Identity among Awlad ‘Ali Beduoin: Egypt’s 
 Northwest Coast.”  In Nomadic Socities in the Middle East and North Africa Entering the 
 21st Century, edited by Dawn Chatty, 634-653.  Leiden: Brill, 2006.
Andall, Jacquiline and Derek Duncan, eds.  Italian Colonialism: Legacy and Memory.  Bern: 
 Peter Lang, 2005.
Anderson, Lisa.   “‘A Last Resort, an Expedient and an Experiment”: Statehood and Soverignty 
 in Libya.”  The Journal of Libyan Studies 2, no. 2 (2001): 14-25.
———.  “Legitimacy, Identity, and the Writing of History in Libya.”  In Statecraft in the Middle 
 East: Oil, Historical Memory, and Popular Culture, edited by Eric Davis and Nicolas 
 Gavrieldes, 71-91.  Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991. 
———.  “Nineteenth-Century Reform in Ottoman Libya.”  International Journal of Middle 
 Eastern Studies 16 (1984): 325-48.
———.  “Obligation and Accountability: Islamic Poltics in North Africa.”  Daedalus 12, 
 no. 3 (1991): 93-112.
———.   “Qadhdhafi and His Opposition.”  Middle East Journal 40, no. 2 (1986): 225-37.
———.  “Ramadan al-Suwayhli: Hero of the Libyan Resistance.”  In Struggle and Survival in 
 the Modern Middle East, edited by Edmund Burk III, 114-128.  Berkeley: University of 
 California Press, 1993).
———.  “Rogue Libya’s Long Road.”  Middle East Report 241 (2006): 42-47.
251
———.  State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980.  Princeton: 
 Princeton University Press, 1986.
Ashhab, Muhammad al-Tayyib al-.  Barqa al-Arabiya ams wa’l-yawm. Cairo, 1947. 
———.  Idris al-Sanusi.  Cairo: al-Tabah, 1957.
———.  ‘Umar al-Mukhtar.  Cairo: Maktabat al-Qahira, 1957.
Askew, William C.  Europe and Italy’s Acquisition of Libya, 1911-1912.  (Durham, NC: Duke 
 University Press, 1942). 
Atkinson, David.  “Nomadic Strategies and Colonial Governance: Domination and Resistance in 
 Cyrenaica,” 1923-1932.”  In Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination/ 
 Resistance, edited by Joanne P. Sharp, Paul Routledge, Chris Philo, and Ronan 
 Paddison, 93-121.  London:Routledge, 2000.
Austen, Ralph A.  Trans-Saharan Africa in World History.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
 2010.
Aydin, Cemil.  The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic 
 and Pan-Asian Thought.  New York: Columbia University, 2007.
Badrawi, Malek.  Political Violence in Egypt, 1910-1924: Secret Socities, Plots and 
 Assassinations.  Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000.
Baldinetti, Anna.  Carte private di Carlo Alfonso e Maria Nallino: inventario.  Rome: Istituto per 
 l’Oriente C.A. Nallino, 1995.
———.  David Santillana: L’Uomo e il giurista 1855-1931.  Rome: Istituto per l’Oriente C.A. 
 Nallino, 1995. 
———.  “Italian Colonial Rule and Muslim Elites in Libya: A Relationship of Antagonism and 
 Collaboration.”  In Hatina, Guardians of Faith, 91-108.
———.  Orientalismo e colonialismo: la ricerca di consenso in Egitto per l’impresa di Libia.  
 Rome: Istituto per l’Oriente, 1997. 
———.  The Origins of the Libyan Nation.  London: Routeledge, 2010.
Bein, Amit.  “‘Ulama’ and Political Activism in the Late Ottoman Empire: The Political Career 
 of Seyhülislâm Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869-1954).  In Hatina, Guardians of Faith, 67-90.
252
Ben-Ghiat, Ruth and Mia Fuller, eds.  Italian Colonialism.  New York: Palgrave, 2005.
Bergna, P. Costanzo.  La missione francescana in Libia.  Tripoli: Nuove arti grafice, 1924.
Bessis, Juliette.  La Méditerranée fasciste: L’Italie mussolinienne et la Tunisie.  Paris: Editions 
 Karthala, 1980.
Betti, Claudio M.  Missioni e colonie in Africa Orientale.  Rome: Edizioni Studium, 1999.
Biasutti, Giambattista.  “La politica indigena italiana in Libia: Dall’occupazione al termine del 
 governatorato di Italo Balbo (1911-1940),”  Dottorato di Ricerca, Università di Pavia 
 2004.
Bills, Scott L.  The Libyan Arena: The United States, Britain, and the Council of Foreign 
 Ministers, 1945-1948.  Kent, OH: Kent University Press, 1995.
Binchy, D.A.  Church and State in Fascist Italy.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941.
Bosworth, Richard J.B.  Italy, Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy before the First 
 World War.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
———.  Mussolini’s Italy. New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
Burgat, François.  “Qaddafi’s Ideological Framework.”  In Qaddafi’s Libya, 1969-1994, edited 
 by Dirk Vandewalle, 47-63.  London: MacMillan, 1995.
Candeloro, Giorgio.  Il movimento cattolico in Italia.  Rome: Riuniti, 1974.
Caroselli, Francesco Saverio.  “Gli Accordi Anglo-Libici,”  Rivista di Studi Politici 
 Internazionali XX, no. 3 (1953).
Casmirri, Silvana.  “Luigi Federzoni.”  In Uomini e volti del fascismo, edited by Ferdinando 
 Cordova, 243-302.  Rome: Bulzoni, 1980.
Ceci, Lucia.  “Missioni e colonialismo italiano in Somalia (1903-1906),” Studi Storici 43, no. 1 
 (2002): 41-105.  
———.   Il vessillo e la croce: colonialismo, missioni cattoliche e islam in Somalia (1903-1924). 
 Rome: Carocci, 2006.
Chadwick, Owen.  A History of the Popes, 1830-1914.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
253
Chilati Dirar, U. “Church-State Relations in Colonial Eritrea: Missionaries and the Development 
 of Colonial Strategies (1869-1911).”  Journal of Modern Italian Studies 8, no. 3 (2001): 
 391-410.
Childs, Timothy W. Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War Over Libya, 1911-1912.  Leiden: Brill, 
 1990.
Choate, Mark I.  Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad.  Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
 University Press, 2008.
Ciammaichella, Glauco.  Libyens et Français au Tchad (1897-1914): La Confrérie senoussie et 
 le commerce transsaharian.  Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche 
 Scientifique, 1987.
Clancy-Smith, Julia.  Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 
 1800-1900.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.
———.  Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters 
 (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904).  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Conrad, Sebastian.  Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2010.
Conti, Fulvio.  Storia della massoneria italiana dal Risorgimento al fascismo.  Bologna, Italy: 
 Mulino, 2003.
Cordell, Dennis D.  “The Awlad Sulayman of Libya and Chad: Power and Adaptation in the 
 Sahara and the Sahel.”  Canadian Journal of African Studies 19, no. 2 (1985): 319-43.
Cordova, Ferdinando.  Agli ordini del serpente verde: La massoneria nella crisi del sistema 
 giolittiano.  Rome: Bulzoni Editore, 1990.
Correale, Francesco.  “Weapons and “smugglers” thoughout Western Sahara: From the 
 Anti-Colonial Resistance to the First World War.”  In Bridges Across the Sahara.  Edited 
 by Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, 129-156.  Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2009.
Cresti, Federico.  Non desiderare la terra d’altri: La colonizzazione italiana in Libia.  Rome: 
 Carocci, 2011.
———.  Oasi di italianitá: La Libia della colonizzazione agraria tra fascismo, guerra e 
 indipendenza (1935-1956).  Turin: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1996.  
254
———.  “Il professore e il generale. La polemica tra Carlo Alfonso Nallino e Rodolfo 
 Graziani sulla Senussia e su altre questioni libiche,” Studi Storici 45, no. 4 (2004): 
 1113-1149.
Davis, John.  Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 
 1987.
De Candole, E.A.V.  The Life and Times of King Idris of Libya.  Published by author: 1988.
De Felice, Renzo.  “Amendola, Ministro delle Colonie.” In Giovanni Amendola nel 
 cinquantenario della morte 1926-1976, edited by Ruggero Moscati.  Rome: Fondazione 
 Luigi Einaudi, 1976. 
———.  Il fascismo e l’Oriente: Arabi, ebrei e indiani nella politica di Mussolini.  Bologna: Il 
 Mulino, 1988.
De Leone, Enrico.  Riformatori musulmani del XIX secolo nell’Africa e nell’Asia mediterranee.  
 Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 1973.
Deakin, Frederick W.  “Il colonialismo fascista nel giudizio degli inglesi.”  In Del Boca, Guerre 
 coloniali, 340-361.
Del Boca, Angelo.  La disfatta di Gasr bu Hàdi. 1915: il colonnello Miani e il più grande 
 disastro dell’Italia coloniale.  Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori, 2004.
———, ed.  Le guerre coloniale del fascismo.  Rome: Laterza, 1991.
———.  Gli Italiani in Africa orientale: Dall’Unità alla marcia su Roma.  Rome: Laterza, 1976.  
———.  Gli Italiani in Libia, 2 vols. Rome: Laterza, 1986.
———.  “The Myths, Suppressions, Denials, and Defaults of Italian Colonialism.” In Palumbo, 
 A Place in the Sun, 17-36.
Del Fra, Lino.  Sciara Sciat: Genocidio nell’oasi: L’Esercito italiano a Tripoli.  Rome: 
 Datanews, 1995.
Deringil, Selim.  “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savegery’: The Late Ottoman Empire 
 and the Post-Colonial Debate,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 45, no. 2 
 (2003): 311-42.
———. The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the 
 Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909.  London: I.B. Tauris, 1998.
255
Dike, K.O.  Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic 
 and Political History of Nigeria.  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.
Ducati, Bruno.  “Lo Stato Senussita.”  Rassegna italiana XXI (1928): 175-182
Duggan, Christopher.  Francesco Crispi, 1818-1901.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Duveyrier, Henri.  Le Confrérie musulmane de Sidi Muhammad Ben ‘Ali Es-Senousi et son 
 domaine géographique, en l’année 1300 de l’hégire (1883 de notre ère).  Société de 
 Géographie: Paris, 1884.
Ebner, Michael R.  Ordinary Violence in Mussolini’s Italy.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 2011.
Evans-Pritchard, E.E.  The Sanusi of Cyrenaica.  Oxford: Clarendon, 1949.
Federzoni, Luigi.  Italia di ieri per la storia di domani. Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 
 1967.
———.  La politica coloniale del fascismo: Discorso pronunciato alla Camera dei 
 Deputati nella tornata del 18 marzo 1927.  Rome: Tipografia della Camera dei Deputati, 
 1927. 
 
———.  Venti mesi di azione coloniale.  Milan: Mondadori, 1926. 
Finaldi, Giuseppe Maria.  Italian National Identity in the Scramble for Africa.  Bern: Peter Lang, 
 2009.
Fizpatrick, Matthew P.  Liberal Imperialism in Germany: Expansionism and Nationalism, 
 1848-1884.  New York: Berghahn, 2008. 
Forbes, Rosita.  The Secret of the Sahara: Kufara.  New York: George H. Doban Company, 
 1921.
Forsyth, Douglas J.  The Crisis of Liberal Italy: Monetary and Financial Policy, 1914-1922. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Fuglestad, Finn.  “Les révoltes des Touareg du Niger (1916-17).”  Cahiers d’Études Africaines 
 13, no. 49 (1973): 82-120.
Galoppini, Enrico.  Il fascismo e l’islam.  Parma: Edizioni all’insegna del Veltro, 2001.
256
Ganapini, Luigi.  Il nazionalismo cattolico: I cattolici e la politica estera in Italia dal 1871 al 
 1914.  Rome: Laterza, 1970. 
Gazzini, Claudia.  “Jihad in Exile: Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi, 1918-1933,” MA Thesis, 
 Princeton University, 2004.
Gentile, Emilio.  The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy.  Keith Botsford, trans.  
 Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996.
———.  The Struggle for Modernity: Nationalism, Futurism, and Fascism.  Westport, CT: 
 Praeger Publishers, 2003.
Ghezzi, Carla.  Colonie, coloniali: Storie di donne, uomini e istituti fra Italia e Africa.  Rome: 
 Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, 2003.
Goglia, Luigi and Fabio Grassi, eds.  Il colonialismo italiano da Adua all’impero.  Rome-Bari: 
 Laterza, 1993.
Gorman, Anthony.  Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth Century Egypt: Contesting the 
 Nation.  New York: Routledge, 2003. 
Gotti Porcinari, Carlo.  Rapporti Italo-Arabi (1902-1930): Dai documenti di Enrico Insabato.  
 Rome: E.S.P., 1965.
Grange, Daniel J.  L’Italie et la Méditerranée (1896-1911).  Rome: École Française de Rome, 
 1994.
Grassi, Fabio.  L’Italia e la questione turca (1917-1923): Opinione pubblica e politica estera.  
 Turin: Silvio Zamorani, 1996.
Gründer, Horst.  “Christian Missionary Activities in Africa in the Age of Imperialism and the 
 Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.”  In Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa 
 Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition.  Edited by Stig Förster, Wolfgang J. 
 Mommsen, and Ronald Robinson.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Gutelius, David P.V.  “The Path is Easy and the Benefits Large: The Nasiriyya, Social Networks, 
 and Economic Change in Morocco, 1640-1830.”  The Journal of African History 43, 1 
 (2002): 27-49.
Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü.  The Young Turks in Opposition.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Hastings, Adrian. The Church in Africa, 1450-1950.  Henry Chadwick and Owen Chadwick, 
 editors.  The Oxford History of the Christian Church.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
257
———.    “The Clash of Nationalism and Universalism within Twentieth-Century Missionary 
 Christianity.” In Missions, Nationalism, and the End of Empire, edited by Brian Stanley, 
 15-33.  Cambridge: Eermands Publishing, 2003.
Hatina, Meir, ed.  Guardians of Faith in Modern Times: ‘Ulama in the Middle East.  Leiden: 
 Brill, 2009.
———.  “Where East Meets West: Sufism, Cutural Rapprochment, and Politics.”  
 International Journal of Middle East Studies 39 (2007): 389-409.
Hazan, N.W.  “The Agricultural Program of Fascist Italy,” Journal of Farm Economics 15, no. 3 
 (1933): 489-502.
Hesnawi, Habib al-.  “Italian Imperial Policy towards Libya, 1870-1911.”  In Modern and 
 Contemporary Libya: Sources and Historiographies.  Edited by Anna Baldinetti.  Rome: 
 Istituto italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, 2003.
———.  “Note sulla politica italiana verso gli arabi libici (1911-1943).” In Del Boca, Guerre 
 coloniale, 31-48.
Hinnebusch, Raymond A.  “Charisma, Revolution, and State Formation: Qaddafi and Libya,” 
 Third World Quarterly 6, no. 1 (1984): 59-73.
Hoffman, Valerie J.  “Annihilation in the Messenger of God: The Development of a Sufi 
 Practice,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 31, no. 3 (1999): 351-369.
Horeir, Abdulmola S. al-, “Social and Economic Transformations in the Libyan Hinterland 
 During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Role of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif 
 al-Sanusi,”  Doctorate of Philosophy, UCLA, 1981.
Hull, Isabel V.  Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial 
 Germany.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Ianari, Vittorio.  Chiesa, Coloni e Islam: Religione e politica nella Libia italiana.  Turin: Società 
 Editrice Internazionale, 1995. 
———.  Lo stivale nel mare.  Italia, Mediterraneo, Islam: alle origini di una politica.  Milan: 
 Edizioni Angelo Guerini, 2006.
Insabato, Enrico.  L’Islam et la politique des alliés.  Nancy-Paris-Strasbourg: Berger-Levrault, 
 1920.
258
James, Marie-France. Esotérisme, occultisme, franc-maçonnerie et christianisme aux XIXe et 
 XXe siècles: explorations bio-bibliographiques.  Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1981.
Karpat, Kemal H.  The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and 
 Community in the Late Ottoman State.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
Kayali, Hasan.  Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman 
 Empire, 1908-1918.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Kedouri, Elie.  England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 
 1914-1921.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.
Kelikian, Alice A.  “The Church and Catholicism.”  In Liberal and Fascist Italy, 1900-1945,  
 edited by Adrian Lyttelton, 44-61.  The Short Oxford History of Italy.  Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2002.
Kent, Peter C.  The Pope and the Duce.  New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981.
Khalidi, Ismail R.  “The Constitution of the United Kingdom of Libya: Background and 
 Summary.”  The Middle East Journal 6, no. 2 (1952): 221-28.
Knysh, Alexander.  “Sufism as Explanatory Paradigm: The Issue of the Motivations of Sufi 
 Resistance Movements in Western and Russian Scholarship,” Die Welt des Islams 42, no. 
 2 (2002): 139-173.
Kramer, Martin S.  Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses.  New York: 
 Columbia University Press, 1986.
Labanca, Nicola.  In marcia verso Adua.  Turin: Giulio Einaudi editore, 1993.
———, ed.  Un nodo: Immagini e documenti sulla repressione coloniale italiana in Libia.  
 Manduria-Bari-Rome: Piero Lacaita, 2002.
———.  Oltremare: Storie dell’espansione coloniale italiana.  Bologna: il Mulino, 2002.
Labanca, Nicola and Pierluigi Venuta.  Bibliografia della Libia coloniale 1911-2000.  Florence: 
 Leo S. Olshki, 2004.
———, eds. Un Colonialismo, due sponde nel Mediterraneo.  Atti  del seminario di studi storici 
 italo-libici (Siena-Pistoia, 13-14 gennaio 2000).  Pistoia, Italy: Editrice C.R.T., 2000.
Landau, Jacob M.  The Politics of Pan-Islam.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
259
Le Gall, Michel.  “Forging the Nation-State: Some Issues in the Historiography of Modern 
 Libya.” In The Maghrib in Question: Essays in History and Historiography, edited by 
 Michel Le Gall and Kenneth Perkins, 95-108.  Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997.
———.    “The Ottoman Government and the Sanusiya: A Reappraisal.”  International 
 Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 21 (1989): 90-106.
Leone, Alba Rosa.  “La politica missionaria del Vaticano tra le due guerre.”  Studi Storici.  21, 
 no. 1 (1980): 123-56.
Lo Bello, Fillippo.  “La confraternita dei Senussi.”  Rassegna italiana XXII (1928): 
 650-656.
Lulat, Y.G-M.  A History of African Higher Education from Antiquity to the Present: A Critical 
 Synthesis.  Westport, Conn.: Prager, 2005.
Lydon, Ghislaine.  On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural 
 Exchanges in Nineteenth-Century West Africa.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
 2009.
Macchi, Adriana, ed.  1927: Diario di un ministro del fascismo.  Florence: Passigli Editori, 
 1993.
Maggi, Stefano.  “The Railways of Italian Africa: Economic, Social and Strategic Features.”  
 Journal of Transport History 3, no. 18 (1997): 54-70.
Malvezzi De Medici, Aldobrandino.  L’Italia e l’Islam i Libia.  Florence: Fratelli Treves, 1913.
Marongiu Buonaiuti, Cesare.  Politica e religioni nel colonialismo italiano (1882-1941).  Varese: 
 Giuffrè Editore, 1982.
Matsumoto-Best, Saho.  “British and Italian Imperial Rivalry in the Mediterranean, 1912-14: The 
 Case of Egypt.”  Diplomacy and Statecraft 18, no. 2 (2007): 297-314.
McKale, Donald M.  War by Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in the 
 Era of World War I.  Kent, OH: Kent State University, 1998.
Medici, Anna Maria.  “Waqfs of Cyrenaica and Italian Colonialism in Libya (1911-1941).”  In 
 Held in Trust: Waqf in the Islamic World, edited by Pascale Ghazaleh, 155-178.  Cairo: 
 American University in Cairo, 2011.
Ministero della Guerra, Stato Maggiore del Regio Esercito, Ufficio Storico.  Campagna di Libia. 
 Rome: Poligrafico per l’Amministrazione della Guerra, 1922. 
260
Moore, Martin.  Fourth Shore: Italy’s Mass Colonization of Libya.  London: Routeledge, 1940.
Moro, Renato.  “Nazionalismo e cattolicesimo.”  Federzoni e la storia della destra italiana nella 
 prima metà del novecento.  Benedetto Coccia and Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, editors.  
 Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001.
Munzi, Massimiliano.  L’epica del ritorno: archeologia e politica nella Tripolitania italiana.  
 Rome: “L’Erma” di Bretschneider, 2001.
Nallino, Carlo Alfonso.  Notes sur la nature du <<Califat>> en général et sur le prétendu 
 <<Califat Ottoman>>.  Rome: Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1919.
———.  Le odierne tendenze dell’islamismo.  Florence: Biblioteca 
 Scentifico-Religiosa, 1902.
O’Fahey, R.S.  Enigmatic Saint: Ahmad Ibn Idris and the Idrisi Tradition.  Evanston: 
 Northwestern University, 1990.
Özcan, Azmi.  Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924).  Leiden: 
 Brill, 1997.
Palumbo, Patrizia, ed.  A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-
 Unification to the Present.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
Pamuk, Şevket.  “Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914.”  In An Economic and Social 
 History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, edited by Halil Inalcik and Donald Quartaert, 
 947-980.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Pedrazzi, Orazio.  “Il Nuovo indirizzo politico.”  In La rinascita della Tripolitania.  Memorie e 
 studi sui quattro anni di governo del Conte Giuseppe Volpi di Misurata, edited by  Angelo 
 Piccioli.  Milan: Casa Editrice A. Mondadori, 1926.
Pellitteri, Antonio.  “Al-dawla al-fatimiyya: Politics, History and the Re-Interpretation of Islam.”  
 The Journal of North African Studies 16, no. 2 (2011): 263-273.
Pelt, Adrian.  Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization.  
 New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.
Peters, Emrys L.  The Bedouin of Cyrenaica.  Jack Goody and Emanuel Marx, eds.  
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
261
Piccioli, Angelo, ed.  La rinascita della Tripolitania.  Memorie e studi sui quattro anni di 
 governo del Conte Giuseppe Volpi di Misurata.  Milan: Mondadori, 1926.
Pollard, John.  Catholicism in Modern Italy: Religion, Society, and Politics since 1861.  London: 
 Routledge, 2008.
———.  Money and the Rise of the Modern Papacy: Financing the Vatican, 1850-1950. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Rathmann, Lothar.  “Archival Material on the Modern History of Libya.” In African Studies - 
 Afrika-Studien: Dedicated to the IIIrd International Congress of Africanists in Addis 
 Abeba, edited by Thea Büthner and Gerhard Brehme, 53-68.  Berlin: Academie-Verlag, 
 1973.
Reynolds, Michael A.  Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian 
 Empires, 1908-1918.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Robinson, David.  Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities 
in  Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920.  Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000.
Rochat, Giorgio.  Il colonialismo italiano.  Turin: Loescher Editore, 1973.  
———.  “Le guerre coloniali dell’Italia fascista.” In Del Boca, Guerre coloniali, 173-196.
Rodogno, Davide.  Il nuovo ordine mediterraneo: Le politiche di occupazione dell’Italia fascista 
 in Europa (1940-1943).  Turin: Bollati Bringhieri, 2003.
Sabbadin, Filberto.  I frati minori lombardi in Libia: la missione di Tripoli (1908-1991).  Milan: 
 Edizioni Biblioteca Francescana, 1991.
Sammut, Dennis.  “Libya and the Islamic Challenge.”  The World Today 50, no. 10 (1994): 
 198-200.
Santarelli, Enzo, Giorgio Rochat, Romain Rainero, and Luigi Goglia.  Omar al-Mukhtar e la 
 riconquista fascista della Libia.  Milan: Marzorati, 1981.
Scarabel, Angelo.  “Una rivista Italo-Araba d’inizio secolo: An-Nadi (Il Convito).”  Oriente 
 Moderno 58, no. 1/3 (1978): 51-67.
Scoppola, Pietro.  La chiesa e il fascismo: documenti e interpretazioni.  Rome-Bari: Laterza, 
 1971.
Sedgwick, Mark.  Against the Modern World.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
262
Segré, Claude G.  The Fourth Shore: The Italian Colonization of Libya.  Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press, 1974.
Serra, Fabrizio.  Italia e Senussia: Vent’anni di azione coloniale in Cirenaica.  Milan: Fratelli 
 Treves, 1933.
Shukri, Muhammad Fu’ad.  Milad dawlat Libya al-Haditha: watha’iq tarikhiya wa-istaqliya.  
 Cairo: Matab’at al-l’timad, 1957.
———.  Al-Sanusiyah, din wa daw-lah. Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1948.
Simon, Rachel.  Libya Between Ottomanism and Nationalism: The Ottoman Involvement in 
 Libya during the War with Italy (1911-1919).  Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987.
Soave, Paolo.  Fezzan: Il deserto contesto (1842-1921).  Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 2001.
Spaulding, Jay and Lidwien Kapteijns.  An Islamic Alliance: ‘Ali Dinar and the Sanusiyya, 
 1906-1916.  Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1994.
St. John, Ronald Bruce.  Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife.  Philadelphia: 
 University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.
Stafford, F.E.  “The Ex-Italian Colonies.”  International Affairs 25, no. 1 (1949): 47-55.
Steinmetz, George.  The Devil’s Handwriting: Precolonialisty and the German Colonial State in 
 Quingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
Teruzzi, Attlio.  Cirenaica Verde.  Rome: Mondadori, 1931.
Tietelbaum, Joshua.  “‘Taking Back” the Caliphate: Sharif Husayn Ibn ‘Ali, Mustafa Kemal and 
 the Ottoman Caliphate.”  Die Welt des Islams 40, no. 3 (2000), 412-24.
Tosatti, Giovanni.  “Le carte di un funzionario del Ministero delle Colonie: Luigi Pintor.”  In 
 Fonti e problemi della politica coloniale italiana, edited by Carta Ghezzi.  Taormina-
 Messina: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, 1989.
Tramontin, Silvio.  Profilo di storia della chiesa italiana dall’unità ad oggi. Turin: Marietti, 
 1980.
Triaud, Jean-Louis.  La légende noire de la Sanûsiyya: Un conférie musulmane saharienne sous 
 le regard français (1840-1930).  Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 
 1995.
263
———. Tchad 1900-1902: Une Guerre Franco-Libyenne oubliée?  Paris:  L’Harmattan, 1987. 
Tùccari, Luigi.  I governi militari della Libia (1911-1919).  Rome: Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, 
 Ufficio Storico, 1994.
Vandewalle, Dirk.  Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building.  London: I.B. Tauris, 
 1998.
Vansina, Jan.  Living with Africa.  Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005.
Veneruso, Danilo.  “Il pontificato di Pio XI.”  In Storia della chiesa, Vol XXXIII: I Catolici nel 
 mondo contemporaneo (1922-1958), edited by Maurillo Guasco, Elio Guerriero, and 
 Francesco Traniello, 29-63.  Milan: Edizioni Paoline, 1991.
Vikør, Knut.  Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge: Muhammad b. Ali al-Sanusi and his 
 Brotherhood.  Evanston: Northwestern, 1995.
Wasti, Syed Tanvir.  “Amir Shakib Arslan and the CUP Triumvirate,” Middle Eastern Studies 
 44, no. 6 (2008), 925-36.
Webster, Richard A.  The Cross and the Fasces: Christian Democracy and Fascism in Italy.  
 Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1960.
———.   Industrial Imperialism in Italy, 1908-1915.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 
 1975. 
Woodward, Peter, ed.  British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the 
 Foreign Office Confidential Print.  Part II, The First to the Second World War. Series G, 
 Africa, 1914-1939, edited by Kenneth Bourne and Cameron D. Watt.  Vol. 6: Egypt and 
 the Sudan, November 1923 - November 1924.  University Publications of America, 1995.
Wright, John.  The Emergence of Libya.  London: The Society for Libyan Studies, 2008.
——— .  Libya: A Modern History.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.
———.  “Mussolini, Libya, and the Sword of Islam.”  In Ben-Ghiat and Fuller, Italian 
 Colonialism, 121-130.
———.   The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade.  New York: Routledge, 2007.
Vandewalle, Dirk.  A History of Modern Libya.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
264
———.  Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building.  London: I.B. Tauris, 1998.
———.  “Libya’s Revolution Revisited.”  MERIP Middle East Report 143 (1986): 30-35.
Vansina, Jan.  Living with Africa.  Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005.
Verdicchio, Pasquale.  “The Preclusion of Postcolonial Discourse in Southern Italy.”  In 
 Revisioning Italy: National Identity and Global Culture, edited by Beverly Allen and 
 Mary Russo, 191-212.  Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1997.
Vikør, Knut.  Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge:  Muhammad b. Ali al-Sanusi and his 
 Brotherhood.  Evanston: Northwestern, 1995.
Visco, Sabato, Ed.  Giovanni Amendola: Discorsi politici (1919-1925).  Rome: Carlo Colombo, 
 1968.
Ziadeh, Nicola A. Sanusiyah: A Study of a Revivalist Movement in Islam.  Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
 1983.
Zürcher, Erik J.  Storia della Turchia.  Rome: Donzelli Editore, 2007.
265
